Small latecomers into the global market: power conflict and institutional change in Chile and Uruguay by Bogliaccini, Juan Ariel
  
SMALL LATECOMERS INTO THE GLOBAL MARKET 
POWER CONFLICT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN CHILE AND URUGUAY 
Juan Ariel Bogliaccini 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of Political Science. 
Chapel Hill 
2012 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
Evelyne Huber 
Jonathan Hartlyn 
Graeme Robertson 
Lars Schoultz 
John D. Stephens 
 
 ii 
ii [Typ
e a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 
Juan Ariel Bogliaccini 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 iii 
iii [Typ
e a 
Abstract 
 
JUAN ARIEL BOGLIACCINI: Small latecomers into the global market: 
Power conflict and institutional change in Chile and Uruguay 
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber) 
 
In analyzing post-liberalization models of capitalism in Chile and Uruguay, this 
dissertation argues that the conflict over power and distribution among the principal 
actors of the productive system define the model followed by the political economy. In 
other words, the conflict between coalitions formed by business, labor and parties is the 
key to understanding why the political economy follows a liberal or coordinated path. 
The dissertation combines a cross-regional analysis of market institutions spheres of 
relations and their complementarities using quantitative data; a historical sociological 
comparison of conflict over power and distribution for Chile and Uruguay; and a process 
tracing analysis of coalitional formation and bargaining over two initiatives that embody 
the conflict over power and distribution for the post-neoliberal period: tax and labor 
reforms. The findings demonstrate that Chile and Uruguay are developing different 
models of capitalism, which challenge the dominant approach to the region which 
postulates the existence of a single and coherent model. These models are the liberal one 
for Chile and the coordinated one for Uruguay, which implies an extraordinary potential 
for future cross-regional comparisons and the importance of abandoning regionally built 
models in order to pursue higher levels of generalization. In this regard, I propose an 
improved typology that integrates developing political economies into the analysis. My 
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findings also demonstrate that the process of creating market institutions is both political 
and historical and, therefore, that ahistorical analyses based on economic equilibrium 
characteristics are insufficient to understand the causes of the differences in terms of 
models of capitalism. The cross-regional quantitative analysis suggests that with the 
exception of Chile, the model of capitalism of the Southern Cone political economies 
shares many characteristics with the Mediterranean ones, allowing merging the two 
groups of countries into a single subtype of coordinated market capitalism: the Statist 
coordinated type. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation is about the development of complementarities among market 
institutions in order to compete in a global market during and after the neoliberal period, 
roughly from 1998 to today
1
. The analysis focuses on Chile and Uruguay, the two small 
political economies in the Southern Cone of Latin America but it also offers a running 
comparison with Argentina, Brazil and a pool of developing and advanced political 
economies. The findings are relevant for understanding models of capitalism in other 
developing countries around the globe.  
The core argument is that Latin American political economies developed different 
models of capitalism during and after the neoliberal period. This contradicts the 
conventional argument that Latin American political economies are converging on a 
single and coherent model, generally labeled “Hierarchical.”. As proposed by Soskice 
and Schneider (2009), this model is different from the liberal (competitive form of 
coordination) and coordinated (strategic form of coordination) ones proposed by Hall and 
Soskice (2001).  
The study of Chile and Uruguay provides extensive evidence about the existence 
of different models of capitalism in Latin America and sheds light on cross-regional 
similarities that have been understudied. It also helps understand why and how market 
                                                             
1
 Refers to the interrelation of reciprocity whereby one institutional sphere of relations supplements or 
depends on the other.  
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institutions differ from one country to another. Chile and Uruguay are two excellent cases 
in Latin America to analyze the process of market institutions formation in developing 
political economies. There are several reason why these are excellent cases for engaging 
in a cross-regional comparative effort.  First, in spite of having political and economic 
institutional instability during the 20
th
 century, Chile and Uruguay are two of the 
strongest democracies in the region. This allows the analysis of power conflict among 
business and labor actors habituated to negotiate in reasonably stable contexts.  
Second, organized business and labor remained independent from the state during 
the 20
th
 century, unlike their counterparts in Argentina and Brazil, where business and 
labor were coopted by populist governments during the 1930s and 1940s. This difference 
is relevant because non-coopted actors develop autonomous strategies in order to fulfill 
autonomous interests. Thus Chile and Uruguay are more suitable for a comparison of the 
process of formation of market institutions with the processes of formation of the models of 
capitalism in the developed world.  
Third, Chile and Uruguay have the most different post-neoliberal market 
institutions arrangements, allowing us to observe different institutional configurations 
and their positive and negative complementarities. Post-neoliberal labor organization is 
different in both countries and when compared to the pre-authoritarian period. In Chile, 
labor is divided, without strong ties to the left-of-center parties except for the Communist 
Party and union density is low, while in Uruguay labor strengthened its centralized 
organization and its coalition with the left of center Frente Amplio Party during the post-
authoritarian period.  
To illustrate the political foundations of post-neoliberal differences in market 
institutions in Chile and Uruguay, take the relationship between left of center parties and 
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organized labor since the return to democracy. Labor Day proclamations are a landmark 
for organized labor’s yearly political activity. Each May 1st (Labor Day in Latin America 
and Europe), central labor organizations issue a demand platform directed at governments 
and the political system. In 2010, Labor Day in Chile and Uruguay were the first ones for 
the newly inaugurated governments. While in Chile the left-of-center Concertación 
coalition had stepped down from office for the first time since 1990, in Uruguay the left-
of-center Frente Amplio Party initiated its second consecutive term in office. In 
Montevideo, a packed “Chicago’s Martyrs” Square (right across from the National 
Parliament building) had President Mujica and his entire cabinet sitting in the first row 
(El País, May 2
nd
 2010, front page), and the May 1
st
 proclamation made its way into the 
front page of most newspapers.  
In contrast, in Santiago, the rally organized by the Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores (CUT, United Labor Federation) in May 1
st
 ended with riots and the police 
dispersing the rioters. From the few members of the Concertación attending the event, the 
President of the Socialist Party and four members of the Partido Por la Democracia (PPD, 
Party for Democracy) were insulted and spit upon. Only  a former Labor Minister, 
Osvaldo Andrade from the Socialist Party, was allowed to march with the CUT because 
“he is among the few that comes every year” (La Tercera, May 2nd 2010, page 6). Chile’s 
conservative politicians have only infrequently attended a Labor Day demonstration since 
the return to democracy in 1990. The 2010 demonstration was barely mentioned and only 
as a story about riots. The relationship between left-of-center parties and organized labor 
in Chile and Uruguay has evolved in opposite directions. I argue that the post-neoliberal 
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integration into the global market of these countries has been done under very different 
models of capitalism.  
 Organized business has also evolved in different ways in Chile and Uruguay. In 
the case of Chile, the Pinochet regime also shifted the pattern of business organization 
inherited from the Import Substitution Industrialization model (ISI). The encompassing 
organization for Chilean business, the Corporación para la Producción y el Comercio 
(CPC), has been the epicenter of business political activity since the early 1980s. In 
Uruguay, on the contrary, the 24 principal business organizations in the country have 
been unable and unwilling to form a united federation. 
This dissertation identifies the effects of institutional discontinuities that alter the 
previous institutional paths; but it also analyzes long term processes that transcend these 
discontinuities. Institutional discontinuity is not the only mechanism by which market 
institutions change. In analyzing the transition from the ISI to the open market model of 
capitalism in Chile and Uruguay, the dissertation finds that the mechanism of institutional 
layering -- that is, the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones -- is 
an important one (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).    
Outline  
Chapter 1 provides the theoretical and methodological approaches. Building on the 
literature on varieties of capitalism, the dissertation amends and enriches Hall and 
Soskice’s classification criteria, improving the linkage between the forms of coordination 
concept and the types and subtypes proposed. The chapter also offers an explanation for 
differences in post-neoliberal national capitalisms as a result of the long term conflict 
over power and distribution between coalitions.  
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Chapter 2 introduces the two pillars on which the analysis is based. First, market 
institutional spheres of relations in Chile and Uruguay come together in qualitatively 
different forms. Second, the Chilean model of capitalism closely resembles the liberal 
model; while the Uruguayan model resembles the Statist subtype of coordinated market 
economies. The chapter has two parts. The first part analyzes the pool of advanced 
political economies in terms of four institutional spheres of relation; classifying them in 
the typology proposed in Chapter 1. In the second part, Chile and Uruguay are analyzed 
and integrated into the typology. The analysis of Chile and Uruguay includes a running 
comparison with Brazil and Argentina.      
The third and fourth Chapters analyze the formation and evolution of distributive 
coalitions in Chile and Uruguay, identifying the mechanisms by which these coalitions 
shape productive systems and market opportunities. Chapter 3 compares the historical 
processes of institutional building. Both countries modernized under a conservative 
pattern that resembles the Continental and Mediterranean European modernization path. 
Neither Chile nor Uruguay had a liberal-laboral type of coalition (Luebbert 1993).  
The argument developed in Chapter 3 is that the historical balance of power 
among labor, business, political parties and even the military are important to understand 
the divergent market institutional paths both countries followed during and after the 
neoliberal period. In addition, the historical evolution of the relationship between labor 
and business is also relevant in order to understand the post-neoliberal one.  
Chapter 4 compares post-neoliberal coalitions by analyzing the bargaining 
process over labor and social policies in Chile and Uruguay. The chapter offers a process 
tracing of bargaining patterns for two relevant policy debates in each country: the labor 
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reform (2001) and the social security reform (2008) in Chile; the wage bargaining 
institutions reform (2005) and the tax reform (2006) in Uruguay.  
The argument developed in this chapter is that the neoliberal period produced a 
complete change of Chilean market institutions, while in Uruguay the re-foundation 
attempt was rejected by center and left coalitions. In Chile’s case, the path toward a 
Liberal Market Economy (LME) type, initiated by the military government, was not 
modified during the post-neoliberal period. In Uruguay, the most important legacy of the 
neoliberal period was to produce a greater emphasis upon markets, but the model of 
capitalism embarked upon during the post-neoliberal period towards the Coordinated 
Market Economy (CME) type. Evidence suggests that the nature of class coalitions in the 
post-authoritarian period is the principal cause of the evolution of the Chilean and 
Uruguayan models of capitalism.  
The conclusion discusses how studying Latin America from a comparative 
perspective provides an opportunity to understand how distributional coalitions form and 
evolve in the new context of open market capitalism. The conclusion also states the 
principal theoretical and methodological contributions of this work as well as the 
implications for the study of varieties of capitalism. 
Methodological contributions 
This dissertation uses quantitative work, comparative historical analysis and process 
tracing analysis. While Chapter 2 uses quantitative data to show the most important 
differences in terms of market institutional characteristics and complementarities in Chile 
and Uruguay, Chapter 3 uses process tracing of tax and labor reforms. This combination 
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of quantitative and qualitative tools has been underutilized by the literature on varieties of 
capitalism, and it is the first methodological contribution of the dissertation.  
The second methodological contribution is to offer a historical analysis of the 
processes of the formation of market institutions and their evolution in Chile and 
Uruguay. As we will see, an historical comparative analysis is necessary to understand 
long-term patterns.  
Theoretical contributions 
The argument and findings advances in this work challenge the argument advanced in the 
varieties of capitalism literature about the convergence of Latin American political 
economies in a single model of capitalism, the “hierarchical” model. The evidence 
produced below demonstrated that there is no convergence.  Building on this principal 
finding, this dissertation offers three theoretical contributions to our knowledge of market 
institutions formation and evolution.  
First is a conceptually solid classification criterion by means of a new typology 
that builds on Hall and Soskice’s (2001) proposed types and conceptualizing subtypes for 
the coordinated market economy. The literature on varieties of capitalism, which was 
based upon advanced political economies, has not been able to help us understand 
developing political economies. While many new models have been suggested in order to 
incorporate developing market economies into the classification, most have failed to 
account for a clear conceptual linkage with the type-concept that originates the 
distinction: “form of coordination”. A type-concept is a concept which is constructed out 
of the combination of the values of several variables (Stinchcombe 1968:43).  
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Second, the dialectic dynamics of coalition formation and conflict dynamics as 
process concepts are integrated into the analysis of varieties of capitalism in developing 
political economies. Underlying this integration is a conviction that our comparative 
understanding of models of capitalism should consider more carefully the processes of 
power conflict in order to understand distributive coalition formation and change, a 
conviction held by other scholars (Howell 2003; Watson 2003; Kinderman 2005; 
Pontusson 2005). In the effort for overcoming the many shortcomings of the corporatist 
literature in the attempt for understanding why there exist different varieties of capitalism 
across the globe, we have thrown away the baby with the bathwater. Market coordination 
forms and institutional complementarities cannot be understood without analyzing the 
conflict among classes and cross-class coalitions. 
The third theoretical contribution comes from a conviction that the understanding 
of models of capitalism should not end at the firm level. Processes at the firm, which are 
the core of the literature on varieties of capitalism, should be combined with those at the 
industry (or sector) and country levels, which are of the most importance to 
understanding coalition formation and power conflicts in coordinated varieties of 
capitalism, given the corporatist nature of the actors. This claim is supported by two ideas 
that stem from the mainstream literature: first, “varieties of capitalism” literature adopts 
the neo-corporatist classification for Scandinavian cases. Second, the firm centered 
approach has not succeeded in explaining Mediterranean Europe or Japanese market 
institutions (Pontusson 2005; Hancke et al. 2007).  
The dominant approach to the Latin American cases has also been firm centered 
(Schneider 2004a, 2004b, 2009; Schneider and Soskice 2009). While I agree with Hall 
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and Soskice (2001) that companies are crucial actors in a capitalist economy, I argue that 
they primarily adapt to the political economies they operate in, while also lobbying for 
changes in the context or exceptions for themselves. Hall and Soskice argue that “in any 
national economy, firms will gravitate towards the mode of coordination for which there 
is institutional support” (2001:9). Thus, it is important to focus on sectoral and national 
level organizations to understand distributive coalitions. 
The literature on varieties of capitalism recognizes this problem, at least tacitly, 
and has produced important knowledge from country-level studies as well as from firm-
level ones (Huber 2002; Pontusson 2005; Hancke et al. 2007; Becker 2011). But I argue 
that it has not taken full advantage of some insights the neo-corporatist approach 
(Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979, Goldthorpe 1984).   
Fourth, it re-conceptualizes Latin American models of capitalism based on the 
new proposed typology. Acknowledging the qualitative differences in terms of market 
institutions’ complementarities in Latin America generates insights that facilitate more 
systematic comparisons with advanced political economies. In addition, this sharpens the 
conceptualization of models of capitalism in other areas of the developing world. 
 
  
Chapter 1. A market coordination framework and methodological approach
 
This chapter begins by presenting the principal features of the analysis of models of 
capitalism in advanced political economies and then reviews several attempts to 
incorporate developing political economies into the theoretical framework.  Following 
that, I construct a typology that classifies models of capitalism in developing political 
economies. Once that classification is complete, I outline a theoretical path for 
understanding the formation and evolution of models of capitalism.  
The principal purpose of this study is to show that the conflict over power and 
distribution among the main actors in the productive system define the model of 
capitalism a political economy follows. The dissertation combines a cross-regional 
analysis of market institutions spheres of relations and their complementarities using 
quantitative data; a historical comparison of conflict over power and distribution for 
Chile and Uruguay; and a process tracing analysis of coalitional formation and bargaining 
over two initiatives that embody the abovementioned conflict for the post-neoliberal 
period: the tax and labor reforms. 
Literature: agreements and disagreements 
Models of capitalism in advanced political economies developed in an environment of 
stable political and economic institutional frameworks since World War II (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). These models have been similarly efficient in terms of economic growth, 
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but with different results in terms of social welfare, as seen, for example, in the divergent 
paths taken by Germany, the United States, or Sweden.      
The study of the varieties of capitalism has been a recurrent topic for more than a 
decade. This is not surprising given the collapse of the socialist bloc twenty years ago and 
the pace at which most countries in the western world have embraced open market 
capitalism. What thirty years ago were socialist political economies, autarchic political 
economies or import substitution industrialization (ISI)-oriented political economies are 
now economies oriented toward market competition around the globe. Since the 1990s, 
the study of models of capitalism in advanced democracies made possible to distinguish 
from the convergence process towards open market capitalism from the route political 
economies were following for integrating into the global market. 
The literature on varieties of capitalism is built on the assumption that 
institutional practices of various types are not distributed randomly across nations. The 
intriguing question of how behavior is affected by the institutions of the political 
economy has encouraged research in the fields of political economy and sociology such 
as the modernization theory (Shonfield 1965) in its heterodox variants including 
comparative and historical sociology (Moore 1966); in neo-corporatism (Schmitter 1974, 
Korpi 1978, Stephens 1979, Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979, Godlthorpe 1984); and in 
social systems of production literature (Streeck and Schmitter 1986). This puzzle has also 
been explored in the welfare state literature (Esping Andersen 1999, Huber and Stephens 
2001, Iversen 2005), in transaction costs economics (Coase 1965, North 1990), and in the 
literature on collective action (Olson 1982), public goods (Samuelson 1958, Buchanan 
1960), and economic sociology (Fligstein 1993 and 2002). 
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Soskice and Hall (2001) found two relevant clusters among advanced industrial 
democracies: liberal market economies (LME) from coordinated market economies 
(CME). According to the authors, nations converge on complementary practices across 
different spheres such as labor market, corporate finance, education and training, inter-
firms relations and labor-business coordination.  
Hall and Soskice define the liberal type as the one in which firms coordinate 
primarily via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements. Soskice (1999) and 
others had previously referred to this type as uncoordinated. Formal contracting is at the 
base of the goods and services exchange system, with market prices the main signal 
followed by firms for adjusting their supply and demand functions.   
The coordinated type is as one in which firms depend more strongly on non-
market arrangements, or “strategic” coordination, to coordinate their production and 
activities with other actors. These arrangements are more relational than formal, contracts 
being more flexible than in a liberal economy. Coordinated systems generate monitoring 
and private information exchange networks among well-defined circles, and collaboration 
dominates competition in inter-firm relations. Equilibriums are the result of strategic 
interaction between firms and other actors as the state, and business and labor 
organizations. 
Hall and Gingerich (2004) refined this  analysis using data from  European market 
economies not included in the liberal/coordinated divide, arguing for the existence of a 
third type: the mixed market economies (MME). This type would be mid-way on the 
continuum between the two purer ends.  It combines characteristics of the LMEs and 
CMEs, but produces less efficient complementarities. MMEs would combine CME-type 
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strategic complementarities, but positive spillovers, and public goods provision are 
inhibited by power asymmetries, organizational fragmentation, and class conflict. Even 
then, however, such economies (e.g. France, Italy or Spain) are nonetheless stable. The 
authors argue that the state provides that element of stability by compensating for 
weakness elsewhere. 
Hall and Soskice’s typology has frequently been criticized, and three criticisms 
are especially relevant for this study, which seeks to integrate peripheral political 
economies into the typology. First, scholars have argued that the typology leads to an 
institutional determinism,  and  neglects underlying power structures, including social 
class (Thelen 2003; Crouch and Farrell 2004; Coates 2005; Pontusson 2005; Jackson and 
Deeg 2006). Second, other authors have stressed that it is “apolitical” and equilibrium-
biased, and therefore downplays social and political conflict (Howell 2003; Watson 2003; 
Kinderman 2005; Pontusson 2005). Third, other studies have argued that it neglects the 
role of the state (Schmidt 2002, 2003; Regini 2003; Watson 2003). As a result of these 
criticisms, we now understand the need to refine our understanding of the conflicts 
generated by political-economic change, as well as the need to analyze economies 
beyond the basic liberal/coordinated archetypes.    
A further critique of Hall and Soskice’s typology has stressed its rigidity, creating 
an artificial division of the world into reified notions of LME-CME archetypes, and does 
not provide researchers with the tools to move beyond this bifurcation (Schmidt 2002, 
2003; Watson 2003; Hay 2005; Pontusson 2005; Boyer 2005b).  This critique has been 
central to several studies attempting to incorporate new cases into the analysis. Hall and 
Soskice argued in their 2001 volume that the principal Mediterranean countries (France, 
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Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey) did not fit either the liberal or coordinated 
model, suggesting that they may constitute a separate “Mediterranean” type of capitalism. 
This third type was said to be characterized as marked by a large agrarian sector and a 
recent history of extensive state intervention that had led to specific kinds of capacities 
for non-market coordination in the sphere of corporate finance but more liberal 
arrangements in the sphere of labor relations (Rhodes 1997).  In general, however, this 
set of countries was not fully explored, and the Mediterranean model remained simply an 
untested hypothesis.  
Nonetheless, other scholars soon began to think of models of capitalism in terms 
of a larger group of political economies. Table 1 summarizes the principal attempts to 
build typologies for different regions. Pontusson (2005) moves the analysis from the firm 
(or micro) to national (or macro) level.  He also identifies two spheres of coordination: 
business, and labor markets/welfare states. Analyzing only the pool of advanced 
industrial democracies and building on Katzenstein (1985), Esping-Andersen (1990) and 
Soskice (1999), Pontusson identifies two types of capitalism: first, social market 
economies and liberal market economies. Social market economies are characterized by 
non-market strategic coordination, and within this category are two subtypes: Nordic and 
Continental. In contrast, liberal market economies are characterized by market 
coordination. Pontusson’s work takes into account the institutional legacies of conflicts 
between labor and business and the enduring importance of the existing structure of 
political power. Working at the macro-level allows Pontusson to incorporate two 
important variables into the analysis: the existence of economy-wide collective 
bargaining institutions and levels of social protection provided by the government.  
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Pontusson’s work helps us better understand important cases such as Japan, 
France or Italy. In particular, he argues that the literature has largely under-theorized 
production regimes while focusing upon considerations about efficiency and coordination 
over conflicts of interests and the exercise of power. Similar critiques have come from 
individual country studies, especially Italy (Molina and Rhodes 2007) and Spain (Royo 
2008). In addition, by identifying the Nordic and Continental models as subtypes of the 
coordinated type, Pontusson underscores how strategic coordination allows for different 
patterns. 
Table 1. Selected typologies for market economies in the literature  
Hall & 
Soskice 
(2001) 
Hall and 
Gingerich 
(2004) 
Pontuson 
(2005) 
Amable 
(2007) 
Hancke et 
al. (2007) 
Schneider 
& Soskice 
(2009) 
Becker 
(2011)** 
Liberal  Liberal Liberal Market 
Based  
Liberal Liberal Liberal 
Coordinated  Coordinated Nordic 
Social  
Social-
democratic  
Coordinated Coordinated Corporatist  
Mediterra-
nean* 
Mixed  Continental 
Social  
Continental 
European  
Etatisme Hierarchical  Statist  
   Southern 
European  
Compensa-
ting State 
 Meso-
Communita-
rian  
   Asian    Patrimonia-
list  
*Hall and Soskice suggest this model exists but do not analyze it in depth.  
**Two more relevant studies have analyzed production regimes from the welfare state literature. Huber 
(2002) argues that there are two post-neoliberal emergent models: neoliberal model and social-democratic 
model. Sheahan argues that there are two models with three subtypes each (market-oriented and state-led 
models). The literature on varieties of capitalism, in particular Schneider and Soskice, has failed to discuss 
the problem considering these two approaches.  
 
Studying advanced industrial democracies, South East Asian and Mediterranean 
countries, Amable (2007) also identifies five spheres of relations, although some are 
different from the ones Hall and Soskice identify. These are: product-market competition, 
wage-labor nexus and labor market institutions, financial intermediation sector and 
corporate governance, social protection and the welfare state, and the education sector. 
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Instead of two models of capitalism, Amable argues that there are five. Amable’s 
typology includes a liberal type as well as other four types: a social-democratic model 
(with high collective bargaining coverage and high union density, a social state, but 
liberal features with respect to corporate financing and labor market regulation), a 
continental model (similar to Hall and Soskice’s coordinated model), a Mediterranean 
model (low union density but with high impact on wages determination, high labor 
market rigidity but high informality, and a labor force with general skills and low 
innovation capability) and an Asian model (where the bureaucracy and familiar based 
forms of coordination are important; unions only operate at the firm level). 
Hancke et al. (2007) analyze patterns of variation in market institutions from a 
national level and consider the role of the state in institutional developing and evolution, 
proposing four types of market institutions (Table 1). The analysis is limited to the pool 
of advanced industrial democracies.  
Becker (2011) proposes a typology that includes the analysis of peripheral 
political economies, focusing on the relationship between capital and labor and between 
politics and the economy. He identifies five ideal types: Liberal, Statist, Corporatist, 
Meso-communitarian and Patrimonial. Becker’s work is important because it adds a 
consideration of patrimonialism, which previous conceptualizations have not done. 
 Schneider and Soskice argue that Latin America has its own stable and coherent 
model of capitalism (Schneider and Soskice 2009), which they call “hierarchical.” It is 
different from both the “liberal” and “coordinated” types in that the hierarchical model 
has very limited redistributive capability. Their work is based on a firm-level analysis of 
how firm behavior is affected by the broader societal institutions of the political 
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economy.  This analysis is based on Schneider’s research on business in Latin America 
(Schneider 2004a, 2004b and 2009). Schneider and Karcher (2010) have reinforced this 
idea by analyzing labor markets in the region.  
This idea of a hierarchical Latin American model is opposed to Huber’s (1996 
and 2002) and Sheahan’s (2002) analyses. Huber’s institutionalist approach understands a 
model of capitalism as a set of core economic and social policies in the context of market 
economies (Huber 2002:2). Her analysis is centered on policymaking, under the premise 
that a distributive outcome of a model of capitalism is a function of policy models and 
political and institutional conditions under which policymakers operate. Huber also 
emphasizes how space and time constrain policymaking. Contrary to Schneider and 
Soskice (2009), Huber suggests that Latin American countries followed different paths of 
adjustment to debt crisis and the ISI model crisis by developing different export 
strategies. While some countries opted for higher levels of protection and competed in the 
international market on the basis of more sophisticated manufactured products, others 
competed in the international market on the basis of raw materials and cheap labor. These 
different responses to adjustment also affected the degree of state retrenchment, 
particularly in labor and social policy areas.  
Sheahan’s analysis of Latin American models of capitalism (2002) is based on the 
modernization approach, particularly following Shonfield’s (1965) insight about the 
interventionist role of the state in order to modernize industries and stimulate production, 
with a focus on social inclusion. Sheahan focus on patterns of institutions and policies in 
labor market and social policy, and his classification of models of capitalism is state-
centered and based on two premises: the instability of economic strategies in Latin 
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America, and the structural characteristics of the region, both economic and political. 
Sheahan’s two-type classification –“liberal” and “state-led”- with three subtypes each, 
takes into account both cross-national differences and  changes over time within 
countries. 
To sum up, the literature on varieties of capitalism has greatly expanded since 
Hall and Soskice’s initial work. However, in its attempt to incorporate other regions into 
the analysis, the conceptual core of their distinction among capitalist systems of 
institutions and the complementarities they produce (or do not produce) has been lost in 
the process. The problem can be identified as a classic case of conceptual stretching 
(Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993). In the next section I seek to address this problem 
by proposing a typology for classifying models of capitalism that is grounded on the main 
theoretical type-concept: the form of market coordination.   
The proposed Hierarchical model for Latin America 
Soskice and Schneider propose that Latin American political economies fit a single and 
coherent model of capitalism: the Hierarchical model. The authors argue that “despite the 
shifts away from import-substituting industrialization (ISI) and authoritarian rule, neither 
of the two advanced country models (liberal or coordinated) fits Latin American political 
economies” (2009:32). They argue that the region fits a single and coherent model of 
capitalism: the hierarchical model. The conceptualization of the hierarchical model of 
capitalism is based on a series of structural characteristics Latin American political 
economies share. As Soskice and Schneider (2009) argue, Latin American political 
economies are characterized by low labor unionization rates, high levels of labor market 
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regulation, unstable employment records with high unemployment and high long-term 
unemployment, high informality and low levels of formal education.  
However, while some of these characteristics, such as the high levels of labor 
market regulation and low levels of formal education are the legacy of the previous ISI 
model and either unstable or authoritarian political institutions; other characteristics are 
the consequence of the transition towards the global market economy. In this second 
group are the low labor unionization rates, unstable employment records with high 
unemployment and high long-term unemployment, and high informality. Soskice and 
Schneider’s analysis of market institutions in the region is a static one, a picture of the 
1990s. The evidence presented in their work does not capture the long term trend (Table 
2) in terms of the evolution of market institutions in a context of stabilizing political 
democratic institutions and open market economy institutions.  
During the neoliberal period Latin American political economies began their 
process of integration into the global economy under a context of strong policy constraint 
because of their situation with respect to international creditors and the IMF; but they did 
not produce a single model of participation in the global economy. The process just 
described is comparable to the situation of the western European political economies in 
the post-World War II period. As Keohane’s (1984) assessment holds, although this was 
a period of strong US hegemony producing a period of "embedded liberalism" in which 
Western European nations settled within a liberal international economy, they did not 
necessarily adopt a liberal model of capitalism. In fact, these political economies 
consolidated different systems of production and welfare in the following decades. The 
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main critique of the Hierarchical model presented here is that it fails to acknowledge 
these diverse long-term trends among Latin American political economies.   
 
Table 2. Varieties of labor markets in liberal, coordinated and hierarchical models. 
Median trends. 
  LMEs HMEs CMEs 
Labor representation Union density (percentage) 28 15 45 
Labor market regulation Botero et al. Index 0.33 0.53 0.51 
Job Tenure Median years 5 3 7.4 
Informal economy Percentage GDP 13 40 17 
Skills Median years of schooling 11 5.7 9.9 
Source: Soskice and Schneider 2009. LME = Liberal model, HME = Hierarchical model, CME = 
Coordinated model 
 
As Schneider and Karcher (2008) recognizes, it is hard to obtain a longitudinal 
perspective on the evolution of some of these figures for the region. This poses the 
problem of basing the analysis in data belonging to a period of instability in which long 
term processes are disturbed. In Chapter 2 I discuss the Southern Cone political 
economies models of capitalism at length, analyzing secondary data for the period 1990-
2010, in which I discuss, closely following a set of market institutional spheres of 
relations, the evolution of these political economies and compare them with the set of 
developed political economies. In particular, I show that the conceptualization of the 
hierarchical model fails to consider the short term duration of some of the effects that the 
neoliberal period had on Latin American market institutions and are at the core of the 
model; portraying an inexact and misleading picture of the region’s long term trends. In 
this section I briefly discuss how Chile and Uruguay trends diverged in many of the 
institutional shperes of relations analyzed by Soskice and Schneider. In the following 
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chapters I build the case for considering that the concept of a Heirarchical model may not 
fit the Latin American political economies varieties of capitalism. 
In terms of the labor market, Soskice and Schneider are correct in describing a 
labor force segmented between the public and private sectors; the former one enjoying 
high levels of labor protection, high access to welfare benefits relative to the private 
sector workers, medium-high unionization rates and long job tenure. The private sector 
workers, on the contrary, and mostly after the process of deindustrialization that 
accompanied the transition from the ISI model to the open economy model, have 
experimented a lowering in unionization rates, shortening of employment duration 
periods, longer unemployment duration periods and a growth of the informal economy 
(Morley 2001; Lora 2001; Bogliaccini 2012).  
In the post-neoliberal period, however, unionization rates, unemployment rates, 
employment rates, and the size of the informal economy have had diverging trends across 
the region. Just taking the two cases analyzed in depth in this work, while in Chile 
unionization rates have remained at around 11% of the labor force during the period, in 
Uruguay it increased in the post-neoliberal period since 2004 from 14% in 2002 to 37% 
of the labor force in 2011, similarly to what the rate was in 1985. The policy 
transformations in the labor relations institutions in Uruguay during the 2000s, analyzed 
in Chapter 4, suggest this divergence with respect to the Chilean path is meaningful and 
useful for understanding the hypothesized difference in their models of capitalism.  
Although Soskice and Schneider are right in considering that the labor force in the 
region relies mostly on general skills and that overall formal education level is lower than 
in the coordinated and liberal models, there has been also divergence in terms of average 
 22 
2
2
 [Typ
e a 
and median years of schooling in the region between the mid-1990s, when most of the 
regional educational reforms were launched, and the early 2010s. While in Chile both the 
median and average years of schooling have improved as the country has reached 
secondary education completion rates close to 90%; Uruguay has universalized pre-
primary education but failed to augment secondary education completion levels. Labor 
market regulations have changed extensively in the region, adapting to the requirements 
of an open economy subject to compete in the global market, but this change has not been 
uniform across the region. In Chapter 4, these important differences in terms of models of 
capitalism evolution are analyzed for the cases of Chile and Uruguay.  
Chapter 2 also analyzes other meaningful differences in terms of market 
institutions not considered by Soskice and Schneider, as for example in terms of 
corporate governance. Although Soskice and Schneider describe the regional firms 
organization patterns as one of horizontal diversification as a strategy for coping with 
regional market instability, they fail to analyze corporate finance patterns, which have 
developed in different directions in Latin America as while firms in some countries 
increased their reliance in stock markets to finance their endeavors, firms others have 
deepened their reliance in the banking system. I analyze such differences in Chapter 2.    
Innovation levels are extremely low, as Soskice and Schneider points out, but this 
is similar to innovation levels in Mediterranean Europe, as I show in Chapter 2 and 
Amable (2007) and Royo (2008) have argued too. This has to do with the productive 
profile in these two regions and, for the case of Latin America, the increasing amount of 
foreign investment the region is receiving, the stabilization of political systems and also 
of economic markets will change at a great extent the productive profile in the next two 
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decades or so. Therefore, this characteristic of Latin American political economies is also 
probably subject to differentiation.  
To sum up, Soskice and Schneider build their case for the hierarchical model 
relying on a snapshot of the region taken at a time of high instability due to the transition 
from the ISI model to the open economy model, which portrayed profound changes in the 
productive matrix of the region in terms of deindustrialization and the growth of the 
service economy. Their analysis lack an assessment of the long term evolution of market 
institutions, which this work provides in the historical comparison done in Chapter 3, and 
the analysis of post-neoliberal institutional change, which this work provides in the 
process tracing of the labor and tax reforms in Chapter 4. 
A Market Coordination Framework  
As we have seen, the initial literature on varieties of capitalism divided advanced market 
economies into liberal and coordinated types, but gradually expanded in an attempt to 
incorporate new cases.  The chapters that follow build on this literature.  It seeks to make 
three contributions. The first one is a reconceptualization of the classification criteria 
developed by Hall and Soskice which allows for classifying new cases without stretching 
the concept of a model of capitalism. The second contribution is to incorporate the 
dialectic dynamics of coalition formation and conflict dynamics into the analysis of 
varieties of capitalism. The third theoretical contribution is a re-conceptualization of 
Latin American models of capitalism based on a new typology.  
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Step One: Classifying forms of market coordination 
Hall and Soskice’s (2001) distinction between liberal and coordinated models is based on 
how different political economies coordinate their productive systems.  The core concept 
that defines ideal types for Hall and Soskice is the form of coordination– that is, the 
mechanisms that coordinate production. There is no uncoordinated political economy in 
the sense of random institutional behavior. Hall and Soskice argue that complementarities 
are not random, but that patterns can be found and those patterns are important. 
Since all political economies are coordinated in some form, the distinction is 
about the form of coordination. Hall and Soskice identify two main forms of 
coordination: competitive and strategic. Competitive coordination is described as in the 
classic economic literature (Williamson 1985); where “in response to price signals 
generated by markets, actors adjust their willingness to supply and demand good and 
services, often on the basis of the marginal calculations stressed by neoclassical 
economics” (Hall and Soskice 2001:8). This form of coordination corresponds to the 
liberal type. Strategic coordination is “heavily dependent on non-market relationships to 
coordinate endeavors and construct core competencies.” As Hall and Soskice state 
(2001:8), “coordination equilibrium results from the strategic interaction between firms 
and other actors”.        
Hall and Soskice’s two types are ideal -- no political economy completely fulfills 
the characteristics of either ideal type; rather, a model of capitalism is a type-concept, 
constructed out of a combination of the values of several variables that are operational 
indicators of the spheres of relations considered important for coordination (Stinchcombe 
1968:43). The purpose of such conceptualization is to be able to define a typology (a set 
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of type-concepts) that highlights meaningful differences among constellations of 
attributes. 
A typology therefore is not right or wrong, but is more or less adequate for 
identifying useful and relevant types. Types themselves become useful if they allow the 
observer to better understand political and institutional processes. There is no good 
explanation without a convincing classification of the phenomena at hand. But 
classifications are rarely rigid in social science, and we should expect cases to move from 
box to box, as we shall see in the case of Chile during the neoliberal period. Nevertheless, 
to classify is to highlight which characteristics of a case identify it with respect to other 
cases, without which it is hardly possible to explain why a certain case has evolved in 
certain direction or why it has moved from one box to another box at a given time. 
 Hall and Soskice state that “liberal market economies and coordinated market 
economies constitute ideal types at the pole of a spectrum along which many nations can 
be arrayed” (2001:8). This implies that differences between CMEs and LMEs are of 
degree, where a political economy is more or less coordinated, more or less liberal. 
Perhaps a more suitable approach is to focus on differences between strategic and 
competitive coordination as differences of kind, not of degree (Sartori 1970). Hall and 
Soskice’s typology is based on the identification of the liberal type, which is consistent 
with a liberal economy in sense of classical economic theory. Once this first type is 
identified, the coordinated type is defined by contrast – that is, the coordinated model is a 
residual category for cases that do not belong to the liberal type. The logical status of 
these two types is, as the typology is built, of a contradictory sort: the two types are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustively exclusive. Therefore, no third possibility exists.  
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This logical treatment is different from the one Hall and Soskice give to the 
typology. At this point it should be taken into account that the proposed difference is of 
treatment, not ontological. Why is it more suitable? As I shall discuss, it is better 
equipped to incorporate a broader array of cases. Before going further with the analysis, 
however, it is important to acknowledge that most of the work scholars have done on the 
topic since Hall and Soskice has been tacitly linked with a per genus et differentiam 
treatment. Hall and Soskice themselves state that there may exist “another type of 
capitalism, sometimes described as Mediterranean” (2001:21). This is inconsistent with 
their logical treatment of the CME-LME continuum. Albeit proposing a slightly different 
conceptualization, Pontusson (2005) discusses the existence of liberal market economies 
and social (instead of coordinated) market economies. In their analysis of Latin American 
political economies, Schneider and Soskice (2009) define a Hierarchical type that is 
different from both CMEs and LMEs, and even the Mediterranean type. Overall, the 
literature has tacitly built on the idea of types of capitalism form a per genus et 
differentiam logical treatment.                     
A second conceptual step is to allow for the existence of subtypes among LMEs 
and CMEs, as Pontusson suggests for the pool of advanced industrial democracies. This 
would be particularly important in the case of CMEs, given that it is reasonable to assume 
that strategic coordination should be done by different sets of complementarities among 
spheres of relations. In other words, there are different logically consistent alternative 
strategies to competitive market arrangements (i.e., Nordic and Continental in 
Pontusson’s work). In what follows I propose that these subtypes should relate to the 
upper level type by family resemblance criteria (Sartori 1970, Goertz 2006). Family 
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resemblance structures have sufficiency conditions without necessity requirements. This 
approach is suitable because it assumes that categories generated by concepts may not 
have clear boundaries.  The family resemblance approach to the classification of models 
of capitalism implies that different combinations of complementarities among 
institutional spheres create different subtypes of the coordinated type of capitalism.  
Why is it important to conceptualize subtypes of CMEs? As the pool of analyzed 
political economies has grown, scholars began proposing other models that not require 
competitive coordination but should not be clustered with the original set of CMEs, 
either. Therefore, in order to differentiate within the CME type, I propose to take one step 
down in the ladder of abstraction. Subtypes of CMEs are qualified by a larger set of 
attributes, thereby making them more discriminating.  
As noted above, the literature has identified types of capitalism everywhere, 
mostly regionally clustered (Rhodes 1997; Amable 2007; Hancke et al. 2007; Schneider 
and Soskice 2009; Becker 2011). However, as new models arrived, the conceptual 
linkage between the type and its conceptual foundation has become more and more 
unspecified. These Mediterranean, Hierarchical, Asian, Patrimonial, Meso-
Communitarian, and other types are similar in that they lack a clear conceptual linkage to 
the core concept: form of coordination. If we agree with Hall and Soskice’s proposed 
conceptualization and types, then no third logical possibility exists. In other words, a 
political economy either coordinates strategically or competitively. A closer analysis to 
types of capitalism, in Chapter 2, suggests that these different “types” are really better 
classified as CMEs subtypes with different strategic arrangements.     
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The pages that follow seek to demonstrate that there are four subtypes of CMEs: 
Corporatist-centralized, Corporatist-sectorial, Statist and Group-Coordinated. Table 3 
presents the types and subtypes and briefly describes the principal attributes of each 
model with respect to four spheres of relations: labor relations and labor market, 
corporate governance and finance, skills formation, and redistributive effort by the state.  
The labor relations and labor markets sphere coordinate bargaining over wages 
and working conditions. It includes the analysis of inter-firm relations at the national 
level throughout encompassing organizations. The corporate governance and finance 
sphere is primarily related to the ability to access to finance and investors. The skills 
formation sphere relates to the issue of labor force skills formation. The redistributive 
effort dimension encompasses the extractive policies from the state and the level of 
redistribution via social expenditure. This dimension is relevant because once tax 
structures, tax levels and social expenditure levels are established; they impose certain 
conditions for the development of the productive system. 
Scholars have insisted on naming the types or subtypes geographically -- Nordic, 
Continental, Mediterranean (or Southern European), Asian. Regional clustering clearly 
occurs because of multiple mechanisms that facilitate diffusion (Weyland 2002, 2007), 
but regionally-based distinctions for types of capitalism have become more confusing as 
more cases are analyzed. Chile and Uruguay are excellent cases for illustrating this 
problem. This is because the data presented in the following chapters show that the first 
one should be classified as a LME and the second one as a Statist-CME. It is for this 
reason that Table 3 (and from here on) proposes alternative naming for CMEs subtypes, 
based on their institutional characteristics rather than their geographical location. 
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Table 3. Ideal types and subtypes of market economies 
 
Liberal 
 (& Chile) 
Coordinated 
Corporatist 
(Nordic) 
Sectorial-
Corporatist 
(Continental) 
Statist 
(Mediterranean & 
Uruguay) 
Group-
Coordinated 
(Asian) 
Labor 
relations 
and labor 
market 
Decentralized 
wage 
bargaining, 
price 
competition, 
low 
employment 
protection. 
Weak unions. 
Hostile 
environment 
for unions. 
Highly 
centralized 
wage 
bargaining, high 
quality 
competition, 
low labor 
mobility. High 
employment 
protection. 
Strong and 
centralized 
unions, high 
union density. 
Centralized 
wage 
bargaining, 
quality 
competition in 
some sectors, 
moderate price 
competition in 
other sectors. 
Strong unions, 
moderately 
centralized, 
low union 
density.  
Centralized wage 
bargaining, price 
competition, few 
sectors 
competing on 
quality.  
Strong unions, 
moderately 
centralized, low 
union density. 
Conflictive 
coordination with 
strong state 
intermediation. 
Decentralized 
wage bargaining, 
weak unions at 
national level. 
High 
coordination at 
firm level. High 
quality 
competition, low 
labor mobility. 
High 
employment 
protection. 
Corporate 
governance 
and finance 
High 
sophistication 
of financial 
markets, high 
reliance on 
stock market 
for corporate 
finance. Low 
barriers for 
business entry. 
High ownership 
concentration, 
medium 
reliance on 
stock market for 
corporate 
finance. Low 
barriers for 
business entry. 
High 
ownership 
concentration, 
bank based 
finance. Low 
barriers for 
business entry. 
High ownership 
concentration, 
low reliance on 
stock market for 
corporate 
finance; bank 
based finance. 
High barriers for 
business entry. 
High ownership 
concentration, 
low reliance on 
stock market for 
corporate 
finance; bank 
based finance. 
High barriers for 
business entry. 
Skills 
formation 
Emphasis on 
general skills, 
medium public 
expenditure, 
weak 
vocational 
training. High 
tertiary 
education 
enrollment 
rates. 
Emphasis on 
specific skills, 
high public 
expenditure, 
strong 
vocational 
training. High 
enrollment rates 
in tertiary 
education. 
Emphasis on 
specific skills, 
medium public 
expenditure, 
vocational 
training. 
Medium 
enrollment 
rates in tertiary 
education. 
Emphasis on 
general skills, 
medium public 
expenditure, 
weak vocational 
training. Low 
enrollment rates 
in tertiary 
education. 
Emphasis on 
specific skills, 
company based 
training.  Low 
public 
expenditure. 
Medium 
enrollment rates 
in tertiary 
education. 
Redistribu-
tive effort 
by the state 
Weak, low 
involvement of 
the state. 
Mean-tested 
benefits, 
poverty 
alleviation. 
High level of 
taxation, high 
state 
involvement. 
High generosity 
of universally 
oriented welfare 
state. 
High level of 
taxation, high 
involvement of 
the state. 
Employment 
based welfare 
state 
(contributory), 
segmented.  
Medium levels of 
taxation, high 
involvement of 
the state. 
Employment 
based welfare 
state, segmented, 
with market 
mechanisms at 
the top. 
Low levels of 
taxation, high 
levels of tariffs 
on imports. Low 
state 
participation in 
social protection. 
Low public 
expenditure in 
welfare, firm 
based protection 
Sources: Based on Katzenstein 1985; Esping Andersen 1990 and 1999; Rhodes 1997; Soskice 1999; Huber 
and Stephens 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Huber 2002; Pontusson 2005; Hancke et al. 2007; Amable 
2007; Schneider and Soskice 2009; Becker 2011. 
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The names of the four CME subtypes are related to the framework in which the conflict 
for power and distribution takes place. Therefore, Nordic political economies constitute 
the Corporatist subtype, following the neo-corporatist tradition, while the Segmented-
Corporatist subtype is named by adapting the concept of Sectorial-Corporatism proposed 
by Lehmbruch (1984) to distinguish between corporatist arrangements that operate within 
a particular industry or sector and such arrangements as they may operate trans-sectorally 
in the Nordic type of corporatism, so as to concert the policies and strategies of major 
economic interests and of government.   
In Statist coordinated market economies, the state is the main coordinator, and the 
relationship between labor and business is usually conflictive and without a history of 
successful long-term coordination. In most such situations either labor, or business or 
both have been historically weak. Hancke et al. (2007) propose using this term, although 
unlike them I argue that France should be also included in it instead of constituting a 
group by itself (etatism). 
Finally, I classify Japan and Korea as Group-Coordinated market economies. This 
group is distinctive, as Becker states, by the organization of firms as communities in which 
managers and employees are expected to act cooperatively on behalf of the group’s common 
interest. In these political economies, domestic intra-sector competition in high technology 
sectors is common, which is a clear difference with respect to Corporatist and Segmented-
Corporatist market economies, in which this kind of competition is rare. Finally, state-organized 
welfare is only supplementary and that the role of politics is restricted to enhance the companies’ 
international competitiveness.          
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Table 4. Comparative chart on spheres of relations analysis  
Spheres of relation 
Hall & 
Soskice 
(2001) 
Huber 
(2002) 
Pontuson 
(2005) 
Amable 
(2007) 
Hancke 
et al. 
(2007) 
Schneide
r & 
Soskice  
(2009) 
Becker 
(2011) 
Industrial relations X X X X X X X 
Vocational training 
and education 
X X X X X X X 
Corporate 
governance 
X 
 
X X X X 
 
Inter-firm relations X 
  
X 
 
X 
 
Coordination with 
employees 
X 
   
X X 
 
Welfare system 
 
X X X 
  
X 
 
As Table 4 suggests, the literature on varieties of capitalism has combined studies at the 
firm level and at the national level. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that a firm-centered 
analysis allows for understanding how different actors seek to advance their interests in 
strategic interaction with others. Given that capitalist model building involves 
mechanisms that are observed in the power struggle among business, labor and parties at 
the national level (via institutional shaping and coalitional bargaining), a country level 
analysis is better suited to the analysis of these mechanisms and their outcomes. 
Step Two: Understanding conflict dynamics  
This study’s second contribution is to incorporate the dialectic dynamics of coalition 
formation and conflict dynamics into the analysis of varieties of capitalism. Once the 
classificatory map has been satisfactorily built and the level of analysis has been 
determined, we can turn to the question of how political parties, business and labor are 
shaping a certain model of capitalism in post-neoliberal Chile and Uruguay. Different 
institutional complementarities, not being randomly clustered, are better explained by 
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analyzing the political economy’s underlying power structure. The different kinds of 
market coordination emerge from different institutional configurations that respond to 
long-standing class and cross-class coalitional bargaining. In other words, there is a 
political foundation of market coordination mechanisms which is to be understood only 
by analyzing these coalitions.  
To understand why different political economies diverged in their capitalist paths 
required the analysis of process concepts (Sartori 1970). These process concepts are the 
dialectic processes of class and cross-class coalitional bargain over institutional shaping; 
while reshaped institutions also provide new incentives for these actors and their 
coalitions. Figure 1 illustrates the political foundations for the formation of market 
institutions and market coordination mechanisms. 
Business, labor, parties and other organized groups form coalitions in order to 
advance their interests. Governments react to the interests and power of domestic groups, 
and to constraints and incentives provided by the international context (Rogowsky 1989). 
This dialectic process is continuous, and under stable political and economic conditions it 
strengthens the existing equilibrium (Olson 1962). However, political or economic 
turmoil may trigger qualitative changes in market institutions because of an alteration of 
coalitions and their relative power. The 1929 crisis and the 1982 debt crisis triggered the 
most important processes of institutional discontinuation in market institutions in the 
Southern Cone of Latin America. While the first directed the region towards the ISI 
model, the second triggered the process of reintegration into the global market. 
As we have learned from the institutionalism literature, the organization of actors 
is a function of environmental hostility. Katzenstein (1985), Crouch (1991) and others 
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have suggested that the exposure to the global market encouraged articulation among 
business sectors. In Western Europe (Crouch 1991, Luebbert 1993) and the Southern 
Cone, political economies followed a similar path until the 1929 crisis provoked a 
transition towards the ISI model. The institutions of European and Latin American 
production systems then diverged. While Western European countries began a process of 
integration into the global market fueled first by the Marshall Plan then by the European 
Economic Community, Latin America followed a heavily protected model with minimum 
integration to the global market or even regional coordination. 
 
Figure 1. Political foundations of market coordination mechanisms  
 
In heavily protected economies, the state becomes a powerful bargainer with the ability to 
protect domestic sectors from global market perils. Moreover, the state can choose and 
pick which sectors to protect and for how long to do so. Therefore, in a context of finite 
resources, sectors prefer to pursue individualistic strategies in order to obtain special 
benefits. In other words, the importance of remaining at the margin of the global market 
economy depends upon whether the state has the economic resources or administrative 
Market coordination 
mechanisms 
Change in 
institutions 
Institutional spheres 
of relations 
complementarities 
Policy 
reform 
Business 
political 
strategy 
capability 
Labor 
political 
strategy 
capability 
and 
Conflict over power and 
distribution  
Competitive 
(Liberal) 
Strategic 
(Coordinated) 
or 
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capability to offset the effect that adverse market changes would have on certain sectors 
of the economy.  
High levels of protection from external perils, as well as subsidies from 
government, pose no incentives for business and labor to cooperate. The rationale for this 
is that the protected environment provides an opportunity to dilute distributive conflicts 
via subsidies and additional protections. Only when the protective structure begins to 
collapse and the state becomes weaker does cooperating become relevant. However, in 
contexts with unstable institutional frameworks, the history of previous conflicts in which 
one actor successfully outflanked the other would favor new attempts to either alter or 
repress the institutional framework, or both. 
The lack of cooperation between business and labor reflects the preference for 
corporatist arrangements based upon the actors’ success during the conflictive process in 
which unions and employers try to outflank each other by gaining political leverage and 
legislative influence. In other words, long-term cooperation strategies are inversely 
related to the ability of the groups to achieve privileged access to government or to 
extract special benefits from it. Unstable institutional settings and a heavily protected 
economy are two factors that make it easier for those groups to achieve such privileged 
access.  
The importance of the stability of democratic institutional rules for coalition 
formation relies on the stability of the constraints that serve as incentives for coalitions to 
bargain. As Olson argues (1962), stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend over 
time to accumulate more cooperation and organizations focused on collective action. 
North (1990) stated the other side of this coin in game theoretical terms: cooperation is 
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difficult to sustain when the game is not repeated. In unstable institutional frameworks, 
institutions are usually less likely to be rule-enforcing mechanisms governing the 
behavior of groups or persons by means of external, formal sanctions (Elster 1989). In 
such a context, institutions are also more likely to be part of the set of bargaining 
resources at the disposal of ruling coalitions, and thus are likely to be modified in order to 
adjust the bargaining scenario among coalitions. As the likelihood for institutional 
manipulation increases, the likelihood for sustaining cooperation decreases.  
This long term process of coalitional bargaining under the ISI model is only the 
first part of the explanation of how post-neoliberal models of capitalism are being shaped 
in today’s Chile and Uruguay. The second part, analyzed in Chapter 4, examines how 
institutions were changed during the transition from the ISI model to the open market 
model and their evolution during and after the neoliberal period.      
Step Three: Explaining Chilean and Uruguayan routes to the global market  
Since the study of models of capitalism in developing political economies is still 
embryonic, analyzing these two cases allows us to learn how political and economic 
institutions change during realignments away from ISI coalitions.  
ISI produced fragmentation in institutions and obstructed the appearance of 
encompassing organizations. As Swank suggests (2001), this fragmentation had the 
double effect of restricting policy change by increasing the number of veto points 
available to the defenders of the status quo, on the one hand, reinforcing heterogeneity 
that inhibited the growth of encompassing interest groups, on the other. It weakened any 
commitment to universalism. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, Chile disrupted this legacy by 
means of an abrupt institutional discontinuity during the bureaucratic authoritarian 
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period; Uruguay still faces this challenge in building its post-neoliberal model of 
capitalism. 
Chile and Uruguay are the smallest economies of the Southern Cone. As such, an 
analysis of these two cases portrays a quite different picture than the one offered by the 
cases of Argentina and Brazil, which received the most scholarly attention in terms of the 
relationship between organized groups and the state during both the ISI and the neoliberal 
period.  The influence of populist tendencies in organizing interests was milder in Chile 
and Uruguay, allowing business and labor organizations to remain rather independent 
from the government. The importance of this difference from Brazil and Argentina’s 
paths is the absence of business or labor organizational cooptation by the state, which 
interrupted the autonomous processes of organization (Collier and Collier 1991). Thus the 
process of formation of institutions in Chile and Uruguay is more similar to the processes of 
formation of the models of capitalism in the developed world than the one in Argentina and 
Brazil. 
Patterns of organization for labor and business followed a path-dependent process 
that was only weakened and in the case of Chile, interrupted, as the transition from ISI to 
integration into the global market advanced. In both cases one key aspect of this path-
dependent weakening is the state’s progressive inability to provide special benefits as ISI 
stagnation deepened.  
In Uruguay, this state transformation operated as a slow-moving cumulative 
process with a slow moving outcome in the form of an economic opening (Pierson 2003). 
The process of institutional change was one of layering, where strong veto players 
opposed liberalization in the 1990s in both business and labor (Mahoney and Thelen 
2010). ISI market institutions survived the bureaucratic authoritarian regime, and markets 
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were opened gradually by different waves of reforms. Since the liberal approach to open 
market capitalism failed to build strong institutional grounds, the process of market 
opening and global integration was done in a context of strong political confrontation 
among parties, business and labor, in which old institutions remained protected and new 
elements where added gradually. Defense of special benefits gained during the ISI period 
characterized the transition, as the process of negotiation over labor and tax reforms 
between 2006 and 2009 illustrates.     
In Chile, on the contrary, there was a discontinuous institutional change during 
both the Allende and Pinochet periods. This discontinuity produced structural effects in 
the form of an accelerated transition toward a liberal form of capitalism (Pierson 2003). 
The process of institutional change was one of displacement of ISI institutions during the 
bureaucratic authoritarian period. In the absence of veto players, the military regime 
substituted ISI market institutions by new ones modeled after liberal institutions. After 
almost a decade of reforms under an authoritarian rule and another decade in which, 
although under democratic rule, the military acted as a strong veto actor during attempts 
to roll back reforms, Chile entered the path of LMEs. The fact that the worst economic 
crisis after the model was imposed took place under the military regime, which was able 
to sustain themselves by their monopoly on coercion, and the strong growth and poverty 
reduction records in the 1990s, dissuaded a left of center coalition without strong ties 
with labor from opposing liberal market institutions.     
The transition from a protected economic environment to the integration into the 
global market economy, as well as the re-democratization process, provoked coalitional 
reorganization among business, labor and parties. Such coalitional rearrangements 
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produced a change from a labor-mobilizing party system to an elite-based one in Chile, 
and a change in the opposite direction in Uruguay.
2
 In Chile, exclusionary strategies 
toward labor persisted after the Pinochet regime in the form of legal constraints on 
organizing and political strategy capability, as well as straight conflict between the left of 
center government coalition and organized labor. Overall, the post-liberalization type of 
party system in both Chile and Uruguay reinforced the winning coalitions that came out 
of the opening process, and therefore the model of capitalism that these political 
economies have been  building ever since. 
To participate in a coalition, an actor must demonstrate ability to use politics to 
obtain some objective in the political arena (Lehmbruch 1984). Corporatist institutions 
are understood in this work as institutionalized consultation and bargaining between the 
state and centralized representative organizations of labor and capital (Huber and 
Stephens 2001) are created by the struggle for privileged access to government and by the 
strengthening of institutionalized linkages between the bureaucracy and interest 
organizations (Marks 1989, Pontusson 2005). Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1984) show 
that even in the seemingly peaceful societies of Scandinavia, post-war West Germany 
and Austria, the making of social policy has continuously involved intense conflicts 
among different groups and classes. 
 
                                                             
-2 These categories refer to Roberts (2002) typology of party systems in Latin America for the ISI period.  
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Figure 2 illustrates the four core dimensions I have defined in order to assess labor and 
business in post-neoliberal Chile and Uruguay. The four dimensions are sufficient but not 
necessary for this capability. This means that there are different routes to build such a 
capability. The first dimension is the level of organizational centralization. This 
dimension refers to how the actor is organized, for example, in terms of union 
membership. Higher levels of organizational centralization are expected to improve an 
actor’s political strategy capability because it internalizes intra-group conflicts, eliminates 
competition at the bargaining table and therefore strengthens the actor’s position during 
bargaining processes. The second dimension is the regulatory environment; which is 
particularly relevant for labor because in certain settings, mostly liberal, labor’s political 
activity is constrained by law. Such is the case of UK, many US states, New Zealand and, 
as we shall see in Chapter 4, Chile (Crouch 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001). The third 
dimension, the level of representation in business or labor organizations, refers to the 
extent of the organization of the labor force or the business sector. The level of 
representation should affect the actor’s political strategy capability independently from 
the organizational centralization level. The reason for this is that a highly representative 
or 
or 
Political strategy 
capability 
Organizational centralization level 
Regulatory environment  
Linkages with political actors 
Representation level 
or 
Figure 2. Political strategy capability dimensions 
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organization increases the political cost the other bargainers incur when confronting this 
actor. The fourth dimension, the (informal) linkages among labor, business leaders and 
political leaders improve these actors’s political strategy capability. These linkages do not 
constitute coalitions per se, but facilitate informal bargaining and improve 
communicational channels. In Chapters 3 and 4 there are a set of examples of this kind of 
linkages both for labor and business leaders.  
To sum up, actors with higher political strategy capabilities have the most 
opportunities to build coalitions with other actors in order to impact policy reforms. 
Chapter 4 shows how business and labor manage to build their PSC and how much they 
are able to influence a certain policy direction depending on their PSC.   
Methodological approach  
This dissertation employs a combination of cross-national quantitative analysis, historical 
comparative analysis and process tracing analysis. When compared to any single 
approach, the combination of these methods permits greater generalizability and in 
particular it helps to establish causality through tracing links between events and actor’s 
behavior in the historical narrative. This, in turn, improves the conceptualization and 
measurements of the models of capitalism, as well as the analysis of competing 
explanations about types of models, and therefore the overall confidence in the central 
findings. 
Chile and Uruguay have been selected for the historical comparison, and a pool of 
22 cases that are included in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2. These cases are the 
advanced industrial democracies typically analyzed in the literature on varieties of 
capitalism –Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
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Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  Added to this list are the other three Mediterranean countries (Greece, 
Portugal and Spain) plus Korea and the other two Southern Cones countries, Argentina 
and Brazil. 
Chile and Uruguay were chosen because of their differences in market 
institutions. If there are qualitatively different market institutions within Latin America, 
the study of Chile and Uruguay in Chapter 4 should unveil these differences. Chile has 
one of the most successful models of capitalism in the region in terms of growth. 
Uruguay has done much better in terms of promoting equality but has had a more modest 
record of growth. The organization and relative strength of labor and business, crucial 
components of the models of capitalism, vary significantly between the two cases. 
Government policy toward labor and labor markets has been very different as well. 
Neither has a strong innovation record.  
Using quantitative data (Chapter 2) allows learning about relevant differences and 
similarities these countries have in terms of their market institutions and the kind of 
complementarities they generate. This first step is necessary because of the lack of 
consensus in the literature about the extent to which post-neoliberal growth and 
distributive strategies differ across the region. Overall, this first part of the analysis is 
variable-oriented (Ragin 1987) and seeks to assess the existence of different 
combinations of attributes and thus of models of capitalism. 
The country is the unit of analysis is an empirical matter involving the relation 
between the boundaries of the unit and the boundary conditions of the mechanisms at 
work. These units are the places where mechanisms connect causes to effects 
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(Stinchcombe 2005). Selecting the country level instead of the firm level simply reflects 
our interests in the conflict over power and distribution. The firm level of analysis lacks 
the ability to capture complex and meaningful processes at more aggregated levels, where 
most coordination occurs. 
The overarching interest is in long-term change -- that is, in the causes of the 
differences in institutions in post-neoliberal market economies (Chapter 3). Of particular 
interest is how abrupt changes in production systems and political institutions in Latin 
America during the 1930s and 1970s affected the form and complementarities of market 
institutions as well as the coalitional dynamics of labor and business. The literature on 
varieties of capitalism has understudied these dynamics, focusing instead on the most 
stable political and market institutions. 
The historical comparative analysis includes a running comparison with advanced 
political economies to understand characteristics of cases that are proper of their relative 
level of development and those that are comparable amid their differences in terms of 
relative development. This comparison is also central to the argument about the lack of a 
coherent Latin American model of capitalism and the importance of cross-regional 
analysis to understand the macro-dynamics of formation of market institutions.  
  The analysis of the bargaining process over labor and tax policies in Chile and 
Uruguay (Chapter 4) is done by process tracing of two relevant policy debates in each 
country: labor reform (2001) and tax reform (2008) in Chile; and wage bargaining law 
(2008) and tax reform (2006) in Uruguay. I use two specific research instruments: first, 
for each country I analyze the reform debates and their outcomes based on archival 
research on parliamentary documents and press releases. Second, I complement the 
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analysis by conducting 60 interviews with the principal political and social actors that 
participated in the debates. The case studies differ in terms of their growth and 
distributive strategies for regional parameters.  
 The analysis of Chile and Uruguay is case-oriented (Ragin 1987). It serves the 
purpose of tracing the process of the hypothesized causal mechanisms between the 
components of the models of capitalism and outcomes of growth, income distribution and 
innovation (Mahoney 2003). Using process tracing, I will scrutinize how particular 
features of these models influence these outcomes. Specifically, I will be able to assess 
the coordination and efficiency-oriented argument with the conflict of interests and 
exercise of power argument. 
Let me end by summarizing the implications of this dissertation for the study of 
models of capitalism in Latin America and other developing political economies. In terms 
of the historical comparative analysis of the two selected cases, it provides a long-term 
explanation for coalitional formation and evolution, and institutional evolution, to be 
combined with the widely analyzed short-term effects the neoliberal period had on 
market capitalism. In terms of the quantitative analysis, it provides empirical grounds to 
support the proposed typology and, more importantly, the proposed extensions and 
amendments in conceptual terms to previous works in the field. 
 
  
Chapter 2. Into the global market: models of capitalism in Chile and Uruguay
 
This chapter describes and classifies the emerging models of capitalism in Chile and 
Uruguay for the post-neoliberal period. Using quantitative data, these two models are 
compared and integrated into the varieties of capitalism literature. In order to conduct this 
comparison, the chapter is divided in two parts. The first part is a comparison of the 
models defined in Chapter 1 (Table 3), which focus on liberal market economies (LMEs) 
and four subtypes of coordinated market economies (CMEs): Corporatist, Segmented-
Corporatist, Statist, and Group-Coordinated. The second part inserts Chile and Uruguay 
into the analysis of these models. 
Chile and Uruguay followed different paths of adjustment to the debt crisis and 
ISI model crisis, therefore shaping two different types of market regulatory institutions. 
The argument supports Huber’s challenge to the widely accepted classification of Latin 
America as one coherent type of capitalism different from any other: the hierarchical 
model (Huber 1996 and 2002; Schneider and Soskice 2009). Specifically, I argue that 
Chile resembles a Liberal market economy while Uruguay resembles a Statist-
Coordinated market economy. 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the comparison between the Southern 
Cone emerging models of capitalism and the ones in the developed world for the post-
liberalization period. The historical comparison of production systems under the ISI 
model is done in the next chapter, while the focus in this chapter is to analyze 
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complementarities of market institutions in the context of these political economies’ 
integration into the global market. The Southern Cone models of capitalism since the 
liberalization period are considered embryonic or emerging models, given that they are 
still stabilizing after a period of major economic and institutional transformations from 
the ISI model to the participation in the global market.  
Institutional complementarities in LMEs and CMEs 
Divergent models of capitalism in advanced political economies have developed since the 
post-war period in an environment of stable political and economic institutions. These 
models proved to be similarly efficient in terms of economic growth and innovation, but 
with different results in terms of income distribution. There is little dissent in the 
literature about the divergent paths Germany, the United States, or Sweden followed 
since the post-WWII period. 
Institutional spheres of relations  
 Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the main differences between the liberal market economy and 
the four subtypes of coordinated market economies for the four institutional spheres of 
relations. Scores are the relative distance between model average value and total average 
value for all five models.  
In terms of the industrial relations sphere, Figure 3 shows there are not significant 
differences between the Segmented-Corporatist, Corporatist and Statist subtypes with 
respect to the proportion of labor force whose salaries and working conditions are 
bargained collectively. However, the Corporatist subtype does it in a context of 
significantly higher union density than the other two subtypes. The Group-Coordinated 
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subtype has a strong coordination mechanism for salaries and work conditions, but this is 
not reflected in Figure 3 because it is at a firm level. Rigidity of employment is higher for 
the four subtypes of coordinated market economies than for the liberal type as expected, 
although the Statist subtype has the highest by far. Unemployment and long term 
unemployment are also particularly high in this subtype. Overall, the Segmented-
Corporatist and in particular the Statist subtypes are characterized by the most rigid labor 
markets. 
 
Figure 3. Industrial relations sphere 
 
Source: Union density and Collective bargaining coverage (OECD 2009). Rigidity of employment (WB - 
Doing Business Project 2008). Unemployment and Long term unemployment (WDI 2011). The rigidity of 
employment index measures the regulation of employment, specifically the hiring and firing of workers and 
the rigidity of working hours. This index is the average of three subindexes: a difficulty of hiring index, a 
rigidity of hour’s index, and a difficulty of firing index. The index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values 
indicating more rigid regulations. 
 
 
Figure 4 refers to the spheres of corporate finance and human capital formation. It shows 
how the Statist subtype imposes the most bureaucratic barriers for new domestic business 
entering the market. The Corporatist and Liberal models are on the opposite end of the 
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continuum from the Statist subtype. Liberal and Group-Coordinated models rely heavily 
on stock market capitalization, although the Corporatist subtype has progressively relied 
on this form of corporate finance since the 1990s. 
In terms of human capital formation, the Group-Coordinated subtype, in which 
firms rather than governments spend heavily in skills formation, shows the lower public 
expenditure in education. The Corporatist subtype is on the other end of the continuum, 
with the highest public expenditure in education. The Statist subtype shows the lowest 
proportion of labor force with secondary education, suggesting a problem in terms of 
formal education coverage, as discussed below. This is important because Southern Cone 
political economies, with the partial exception of Chile, share this problem. 
 
Figure 4. Corporate governance & skill formation spheres (1990-2010) 
 
Source: Stock market capitalization, Business start-up procedures, Labor force with secondary education 
and Public education expenditure as percentage of GDP (WBI 2011).  
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Figure 5 shows how the Corporatist subtype collects the most taxes with respect to GDP, 
while the Group-Coordinated subtype stands at the opposite extreme. This feature of the 
Group-Coordinated model is consistent with its unique tax structure heavily oriented 
toward import taxes, while the other models depend more on domestic taxes. The 
Corporatist subtype has the highest income tax and value added tax (VAT); however, it 
follows the coordinated pattern of low corporate taxation. The Statist and Liberal models 
have high inequality while the Corporatist model is the most egalitarian. 
 
Figure 5. Redistributive effort by the State sphere (1990-2010) 
 
Source: Marginal Income Tax, Marginal Corporate Tax, VAT, Tax revenue as % of GDP and Tariffs on all 
imports (WDI 2011). Social Security and welfare expenditure (OCDE 2009) 
 
 
Abundant evidence supports the claim that tax and transfer levels (welfare state 
generosity) are the most important determinant for redistribution and poverty alleviation 
(Huber and Stephens 2001). Iversen (2005) finds that in the absence of redistributive 
welfare states, the labor force has no incentive to invest in specific skills, since general 
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skills are the most important source of protection against adverse changes in the labor 
market. In light of the evidence provided in the next part of this chapter, this mechanism 
is at play in Southern Cone political economies. 
Outcomes: growth, innovation and income distribution  
This section compares outcomes of the various models of capitalism in terms of growth, 
income distribution and innovation. Tables 5 to 9 show how the liberal and the four 
coordinated subtypes fared in terms of the three above-mentioned outcomes during the 
last fifty years. The five models have been successful in sustaining economic growth over 
the last forty years and –except for the Statist subtype– in innovation.3 Growth rates in 
the five models tend to converge, in a declining trend, during the last two decades. The 
higher rate of growth in the Group-Coordinated model is owed to Korea’s 5.2 percent 
growth. Italy and Japan present the lowest growth rate on the group during 1990-2010. 
Innovation evidence is consistent with previous findings. While innovation was 
similar for the Liberal, Corporatist and Segmented-Corporatist models during the last 
four decades; Hall and Soskice (2001) suggest that LMEs and CMEs engage in different 
innovative patterns. LMEs are better suited for radical innovation given the combination 
of flexible labor regulations and corporate finance via equity markets. The argument is 
that these kinds of labor markets allow for hiring personnel with the appropriate expertise 
and for releasing them if their work proves to be unprofitable. Equity market-based 
finance allows for merger and acquisition processes among firms that facilitate rapidly 
gathering the resources necessary for innovative projects (Hall and Soskice 2001:40). 
                                                             
3 Innovation is measured as the ratio between patents registered by residents over population (WDI 2011). 
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Corporatist and Segmented-Corporatist CMEs, on the contrary, are better suited for 
incremental innovation given that their dense inter-corporate networks and rigid labor 
markets make it difficult to rapidly merge with or acquire other firms. Strong worker 
representation makes it difficult to radically reorganize firms (Hall and Soskice 2001:41).  
 
Table 5: Liberal Economies 
 
GDP Growth GDP pc 
Unemploy-
ment 
Long term 
Unemploy-
ment 
Patents 
p/person 
Gini 
 
1960
-73 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974-
89 
1990-
10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1990
-10 
Austra-
lia 
4.8 3.1 3.2 21418 29164 7.6 7.2 25.3 24.9 0.4 0.1 35.2 
Canada 5.2 3.3 2.4 24737 31482 9.4 8.3 9.3 11.7 0.1 0.1 32.6 
N. 
Zealand 
4.0 1.3 2.8 18706 22715 5.2 6.4 12.4 17.2 0.3 0.4 36.2 
U.K. 3.2 2.1 2.0 20437 29098 10.2 6.7 45.8 30.1 0.4 0.3 36.0 
U.States 5.0 3.0 2.6 28083 38394 7.3 5.7 8.4 9.9 0.3 0.6 40.8 
Average 4.4 2.6 2.6 22676 30171 7.9 6.8 20.2 18.8 0.3 0.3 36.1 
Source: Data from WDI 2011, The World Bank. 
 
 
Table 6: Segmented-Corporatist-Coordinated Economies 
 
GDP Growth GDP pc 
Unemploy-
ment 
Long term 
Unemploy-
ment 
Patents 
p/person 
Gini 
 
1960
-73 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974-
89 
1990-
10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974-
89 
1990
-10 
1990
-10 
Austria 5.0 2.4 2.0 22653 31055 3.6 4.1 . 25.2 0.3 0.3 29.1 
Belgium 4.9 2.2 1.8 21936 29680 10.8 8.1 70.9 54.5 0.1 0.1 33.0 
Germany 4.1 2.2 1.5 22170 30099 . 8.5 46.5 48.2 0.4 0.5 28.3 
Nether-
lands 
5.1 2.3 2.3 23041 32559 9.7 4.6 50.4 41.2 0.1 0.1 30.9 
Average 4.8 2.3 1.9 22450 30848 8.0 6.3 55.9 42.3 0.2 0.2 30.3 
Source: Data from WDI 2011, The World Bank. 
 
 
The Group-Coordinated model, which outperformed the other models for the entire 
period, combined incremental long-tenured and high skill labor based innovative 
procedures with radical innovative procedures based on sharing information and 
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technology  among firms inside a given conglomerate (chaebol, using the Korean term) 
(Amable 2007, Becker 2011). Japan and, later, Korea have dominated the hi-tech market 
since the 1970s.   
On the other end of the continuum, low levels of innovation in Statist CMEs are 
due, at least in part, to the combination of very rigid labor regulations and the lack of 
development of inter-corporate networks. France is the exception, performing close to the 
Segmented-Corporatist subtype in this respect. Greece, Portugal and Spain have had a 
recent history of strong authoritarian state intervention in the economy which left a series 
of non-market strategic coordination capabilities in the industrial relations sphere, but 
liberal arrangements in the sphere of corporate finance (Rhodes 1997, Hall and Soskice 
2001). This lack of complementarities between spheres provoked a diminished capability 
to reduce inequality and to generate innovation (Table 8). It is particularly noted for 
backwardness in terms of formal education. 
 
Table 7: Corporatist-Coordinated Economies 
 
GDP Growth GDP pc 
Unemploy-
ment 
Long term 
Unemploy-
ment 
Patents 
p/person 
Gini 
 
1960-
73 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974-
89 
1990-
10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1990
-10 
Denmark 4.3 1.9 1.7 23147 30619 7.6 5.9 30.2 22.7 0.2 0.3 24.7 
Finland 4.9 3.2 2.0 19917 26886 4.9 10.4 18.6 25.5 0.3 0.4 26.9 
Norway 4.4 3.4 2.6 29050 42549 2.7 4.1 9.3 12.9 0.2 0.3 25.8 
Sweden 4.1 2.1 2.1 22058 28869 2.8 7.1 10.9 21.5 0.5 0.4 25.0 
Average 4.4 2.7 2.1 23543 32231 4.5 6.9 17.2 20.7 0.3 0.3 25.6 
Source: Data from WDI 2011, The World Bank. 
 
The literature has identified two patterns among the working-age households in order to 
explain change in income distribution: changes in the distribution of wages among 
employed workers and changes in the distribution of employment across households 
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(Iversen 2005, Pontuson 2005). The literature also recognizes that taxation and social 
expenditure are able to offset these income distribution changes to some extent (Huber 
and Stephens 2001, Iversen 2005, Pontuson 2005, Segura-Ubiergo 2007, Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008). Income inequality, measured by the Gini Index (WDI 2011), is highest 
in Liberal and Statist models, which is consistent with the literature. 
 
Table 8: Statist-Coordinated Economies 
 
GDP Growth GDP pc 
Unemploy-
ment 
Long term 
Unemploy-
ment 
Patents 
p/person 
Gini 
 
1960
-73 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974-
89 
1990-
10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1990
-10 
France 5.7 2.6 1.6 21526 27610 9.0 10.1 40.7 39.3 0.2 0.2 32.7 
Greece 7.9 1.8 2.4 16784 21497 7.0 9.5 42.6 51.9 0.1 0.0 34.3 
Italy 5.4 3.0 0.9 20495 26709 9.6 9.6 65.7 57.4 0.1 0.1 36.0 
Portugal 7.1 3.2 1.8 12922 19902 7.1 6.2 50.4 43.9 0.0 0.0 38.5 
Spain 7.3 2.6 2.5 16445 24475 17.4 15.4 52.4 43.8 0.0 0.1 34.7 
Average 6.7 2.6 1.8 17634 24038 10.0 10.1 50.3 47.3 0.1 0.1 35.2 
Source: Data from WDI 2011, The World Bank. 
 
Table 9: Group-Coordinated Economies 
 
GDP Growth GDP pc 
Unemploy-
ment 
Long term 
Unemploy-
ment 
Pattents 
p/person 
Gini 
 
1960
-73 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974-
89 
1990-
10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990-
10 
1974-
89 
1990-
10 
1990
-10 
Japan 9.2 4.0 1.0 20635 28876 2.5 3.9 16.0 25.2 1.8 2.7 24.9 
Korea 8.3 7.9 5.2 7673 19410 3.8 3.5 . 2.5 0.1 1.6 31.6 
Average 8.7 6.0 3.1 14154 24143 3.1 3.7 16.0 13.8 0.9 2.2 28.2 
Source: Data from WDI 2011, The World Bank. 
 
The persistent high levels of income inequality in the Statist model can be explained first 
and foremost by politics: extended authoritarian periods in Spain, Portugal and Greece 
prevented coalitional bargaining over distribution for decades. Consistent with this 
argument, France has the lowest inequality in the group; while Italy’s high levels of 
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inequality are explained, at least in part, by the north-south divide and institutional 
differences (Putnam 1993).  
In terms of outcomes, Statist political economies combine high unemployment 
rates with high long-term unemployment rates. They also combine high employment 
rigidity with high levels of collective bargaining coverage but the lowest share of the 
population with secondary education. This combination of a rigid and dual labor market, 
in which wages are bargained for high proportions of the labor force by small unions, 
produces incentives for governments to adjust via unemployment during crises (Iversen 
2005; Mares 2006). A full analysis of the different models is done in the following 
section. The overall low-skilled labor force and the lack of firm- based vocational 
training do not encourage the high-tech investment that incentivizes labor protection, 
which characterizes the Segmented-Corporatist and Corporatist models.  
Iversen (2005:19) shows that a higher incidence of vocational training is 
associated with lower wage differentials and therefore a more egalitarian income 
distribution. The structure of the wage bargaining system has also been shown to have 
important consequences for the wage structure (Rowthorn 1992; Iversen 1999 and 2005; 
Wallerstein 1999; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Mares 2006). Centralization of wage 
bargaining at the industry or the national level favors intraoccupational compression of 
wages; which in turn works as a complement to employment and unemployment 
protection (Iversen 2005).  
Unemployment records for the period 1990-2010 are similarly low for the Liberal, 
Corporatist and Segmented-Corporatist models. Unemployment and long-term 
unemployment in the Group-Coordinated model are the lowest among all models. Firms 
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and their networks constitute the core of the welfare system in this model (Anchordoguy 
2005; Aoki et al. 2007). State-organized welfare is only supplementary, and in addition to 
this and to legal and infrastructural responsibilities, politics are restricted to enhancing 
the international competitiveness of the companies. The Group-Coordinated political 
economies rank at the bottom in terms of the share of GDP dedicated to public social 
spending. Finally, national level wage bargaining mechanisms are also very limited, and 
this model is distinguished by the absence of an institutionalized system of economy-
wide bargaining among unions, employers and government.   
 
Table 10: Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies 
 
GDP Growth GDP pc 
Unemploy-
ment 
Long term 
Unemploy-
ment 
Pattents 
p/person 
Gini 
 
1960
-73 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974-
89 
1990-
10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1990
-10 
Liberal 4.4 2.6 2.6 22676 30171 7.9 6.8 20.2 18.8 0.3 0.3 36.1 
Segment-
ed Corp. 
4.8 2.3 1.9 22450 30848 8.0 6.3 55.9 42.3 0.2 0.2 30.3 
Statist 6.7 2.6 1.8 17634 24038 10.0 10.1 50.3 47.3 0.1 0.1 35.2 
Corpora-
tist 
4.4 2.7 2.1 23543 32231 4.5 6.9 17.2 20.7 0.3 0.3 25.6 
Group-
Coord. 
8.7 6.0 3.1 14154 24143 3.1 3.7 16.0 13.8 0.9 2.2 28.2 
Source: Data from WDI 2011, The World Bank. 
 
 
In terms of long-term unemployment, the Liberal and Corporatist models join the Group-
Coordinated with low rates of long-term unemployment during the most recent period. 
The Segmented-Corporatist and Statist models, on the contrary, exhibit high levels of 
long-term unemployment. The literature suggests that the reason for such high long-term 
unemployment rates is the higher rigidity and dual characteristic of the labor market in 
both cases. Table 10 compares the five models. 
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Chile and Uruguay in the global market economy  
Chile tends to cluster with the Liberal model while Uruguay (as well as Argentina and 
Brazil) stands in between the Statist and Segmented-Corporatist models, somewhat closer 
to the former. This clustering allows us to rethink the approach of the literature to the 
region and to the rest of Latin America.  
The Southern Cone of Latin America, the Asian Tigers and most of 
Mediterranean political economies do not share two characteristics of the utmost 
importance for developmental sustainability with the advanced industrial political 
economies.  First, democratic institutions in the former group stabilized much later. 
Second, their productive systems had to transit, in a short and usually shocking period, 
into the global market from previously heavily protected economies. Between the 1960s 
and 1980s these political economies advanced toward the reconstruction of stable 
democratic institutions and began a steady process of integration into the global market. 
Or, stated differently, there is an institutional maturation gap between advanced industrial 
political economies and peripheral political economies.  
Latin America began the opening process at different paces by the mid-1970s, and 
since the 1990s it has decidedly been integrating itself into the global market. The 
liberalization period constituted a structural adjustment process at the time that Latin 
American countries were also entering the third wave of democratization. Although the 
region embraced the goals of macroeconomic stabilization and efficiency in government 
expenditure at the cost of abandoning the full employment goal and retrenching welfare 
programs, the post-neoliberal period that began around 1998 showed how political 
economies in the region followed qualitatively different strategies in the relationship 
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among industrial relations, macroeconomic stability, and expenditure level and quality of 
welfare provisions. 
The instability of democratic institutions and the change in productive model 
structure are important to take into account because changes in them modify incentives 
and therefore strategies for business and labor organizations.  These changes make 
cooperation more instable. This is important for two reasons: first, capitalist models in 
Latin America are still in a process of consolidation, even in the more advanced Southern 
Cone political economies. Second, it is only possible to consolidate a model under 
conditions of institutional stability, since actors’ learning about bargaining is retarded if 
rules change constantly.   
The Southern Cone of Latin America, as well as Mediterranean Europe and South 
East Asia, followed a path of modernization that fits Moore’s (1966) proposed 
“conservative” modernization scheme, with strong states alternating between 
authoritarianism and democracy. This conservative scheme of modernization also 
determined their welfare architectures (Dion 2005; Filgueira and Filgueira 2002; Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008; Huber, Mustillo and Stephens 2008; Pribble 2008; Segura-Ubiergo 
2007).  
In the cases of Chile and Uruguay, democratic institutions consolidated steadily 
and uninterruptedly between the 1930s and the 1960s. Labor movements in both 
countries had no active role in the modernization process for different reasons in each 
case, which will be analyzed in the next chapter. Business remained divided between 
industrial sectors supporting the ISI modernization and rural sectors opposing it. 
Productive systems were heavily protected for a longer time than in other regions.  
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Distributive systems during the ISI period tended to be contribution-based and 
segmented, given that rural and informal workers, and later on service sector workers, 
were excluded. On the one hand, these systems fostered growth of urban labor and 
unionization and enabled employers to pass on high social security taxes to consumers 
behind high tariff walls, but on the other hand developed only a limited capacity to 
absorb the swelling ranks of the urban labor force and thus left a rapidly growing urban 
informal sector and the still large rural sector without coverage (Huber and Stephens 
2005; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Pribble 2008; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Martínez-
Franzoni 2008). 
Although these two countries’ political and economic development until the 
1970s follow a rather similar path, with the caveats explained in the next chapter, their 
opening process followed diametrically different routes, even under the same 
international context and pressures. Liberal programs were launched in both countries, as 
examined in Chapter 4, but with opposite outcomes. In line with Huber’s (2002) 
argument, these two cases should be considered most-different cases in the region, and 
during the neoliberal period they followed different routes toward the global market 
(Huber 2005; Teichman 2001; Castiglioni 2005; Hernández 2000, 2003; Huber and 
Stephens 2005).  
Chilean integration into the global market was a well-designed and implemented 
effort backed by Pinochet’s authoritarian regime. The model the ruling coalition emulated 
was the liberal one. The fact that the reform was carried out under a repressive 
authoritarian regime allowed reformers to ignore political opponents outside the ruling 
coalition. Uruguayan integration into the global market was not coherently implemented 
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until the second democratic government after the BA regime took office in 1990. 
Although the model this government followed was the post-Washington Consensus 
neoliberal one, the effort was resisted by diverse sectors that successfully blocked 
significant portions of the proposed reforms.   
Chapter 4 explains how the principal difference between the Chilean and the 
Uruguayan opening process is due to the different success reformers had in each case in 
shaping political economy institutions. While in Chile the reform was deep and 
uncontested, in Uruguay the pro-reform coalitions were weak and the anti-reform 
coalitions were successful in blocking them. The Chilean reform privileged market 
efficiency over income distribution, establishing strong limitations to labor at the national 
level. In addition, reformers decentralized wage bargaining at the firm level and created 
strong disincentives for workers to unionize. In Uruguay, on the contrary, the neoliberal 
reform attempted in the early 1990s lacked the political will to ensure extensive 
institutional transformation, and the embryonic liberal experiment failed over the long-
term. 
Spheres of relations complementarities in Chile and Uruguay 
a. Labor relations and corporate finance  
A first important difference between models of capitalism is how wage setting 
mechanisms, employment levels and macroeconomic policy interact (Iversen 1999, 
Mares 2003, Iversen 2005, Soskice and Iversen 2006).  Among the advanced political 
economies, LMEs tend to maintain the macroeconomic equilibrium adjusting via 
employment, but as shown in Table 5, in normal conditions long term unemployment is 
low. This means that the labor market is more dynamic, based on general skills, and 
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therefore the norm is employment rotation, including short unemployment periods. 
Corporatist market economies adjust via wages and short periods of fiscal deficit. This 
strategy, which rests on the combination of disciplined unions with high density and 
centralized collective bargaining institutions (Figure 6) and non-contributive social 
protection systems, has been analyzed extensively (Iversen 1999, Mares 2003, Soskice 
and Iversen 2006). An alternative strategy, successfully implemented in Corporatist-
Coordinated political economies during the 1980s and 1990s crises, relies on unions’ 
ability to discipline their members in terms of wage cuts in order to prevent employment 
cuts. This strategy, however, is not available for Segmented-Corporatist or Statist 
political economies, primarily because unions are not able to discipline a sufficiently 
large proportion of the labor force in not to demand wage increases during recessions.   
In other words, high levels of collective bargaining coordination indicate high 
levels of strategic coordination in the industrial relations sphere. However, high levels of 
collective bargaining coordination are not always the product of high union density 
among labor. This suggests that while LMEs are a cohesive group in this respect, CMEs 
show greater variation among subtypes. Figure 4 shows how the interaction between 
union density and collective bargaining coverage produces three combinations. These 
combinations distinguish LMEs (low union density and low coverage) from CMEs; but 
they also distinguish Corporatist CMEs (high union density and high coverage) from the 
Segmented-Corporatist and Statist ones (low union density but high coverage). The 
Group-Coordinated subtype clusters with the Liberal one, but the figure does not capture 
the important differences in coordination at the micro-level (Amable 2007, Becker 2011), 
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where while the former has a dense network of intra-firm coordination and the later does 
not. 
 
Figure 6. Union Density and Collective Bargaining Coverage (1990-2010) 
 
Note: Each of the four models positioning in Figures 6 and 9 to 14 is an average for the political economies 
included in tables 5 to 10. Difference in size in marker points is done to differentiate models from single 
countries.  
Source: OCDE (2008); Mazzuchi (2009); Cardoso y Guindin (2009). 
 
In terms of the Southern Cone political economies, Chile has a configuration similar to 
the Liberal model (not to the Group-Coordinated one), while Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay cluster with the Segmented-Corporatist and Statist subtypes, with high 
collective bargaining coverage but low union density. Furthermore, Figure 6 suggests that 
the conflict over distribution should be part of the story of varieties of capitalism and that 
it is not sufficient to distinguish LMEs from CMEs, but also to distinguish among CMEs 
subtypes.  
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Taking this important complementarity arena into account, two aspects are of 
particular interest. First, all Southern Cone political economies have rather weak labor 
movements, which is consistent with their path of conservative modernization. Even 
Chile never had a strong labor movement in terms of its density (see Chapter 3). Second, 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay share the adaptive rigidity of labor markets in the Statist 
and Segmented-Corporatist models. The reason for this rigidity is the mismatch between 
union density and the proportion of the labor force whose salaries are bargained 
collectively. On the one hand, the high levels of employment rigidity and the high 
bargaining strength of small labor movements –particularly in Mediterranean Europe, 
Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay- does not permit adjustment  via wages, as explained 
above. The dual structure of the labor market makes it impossible for labor unions to 
control salary demands by disciplining the informal and usually the public sectors of the 
labor force. Therefore, neither the levels of cooperation of the Corporatist model nor the 
flexibility of the liberal types is available as a strategy. Since the 1990s, even Corporatist 
political economies have had difficulty in adjusting via wage restraint given the 
increasing labor flexibility they are confronting (Mares 2003, Iversen 2005). 
Chile and Uruguay (until 2002) followed a liberal path in their process of 
integration into the global market, privileging fiscal restraint and maintaining the lowest 
possible levels of unemployment by limiting wage increases. Chilean governments were 
the most successful in maintaining low levels of unemployment during the 1990s 
compared to the rest of the Southern Cone, but unemployment rose to around 10 percent 
after 2001. Uruguay was less successful in maintaining low unemployment during the 
1990s. However, while Chile maintained the same macroeconomic policy and industrial 
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relations structure during the 2000s, Uruguay shifted away from the liberal path, 
embarking in a corporatist path in the aftermath of the 2002 crisis, when the newly 
elected left-of center coalition relaxed fiscal restraint in order to boost both employment 
and wages. The structure of industrial relations was also reformed; reinstating centralized 
collective wage bargaining institutions after 2006. 
 
Figure 7. Employment Rigidity and Stock Market Capitalization 
 
Source: Rigidity of Employment Index (WB – Doing Business Report 2008); Market capitalization of listed 
domestic companies as % of GDP (WDI 2011) 
 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between employment rigidity and corporate finance via 
stock markets. As suggested by the literature (Hall and Soskice 2001, Mares 2003, 
Iversen and Soskice 2006), LMEs rely heavily on the stock market for corporate finance. 
This, in turn, requires a flexible employment structure in order to quickly respond to the 
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market demands. In other words, layoffs and other reductions in employment should be 
easy in order to compete in the market. It is interesting to note that among CMEs, the 
Corporatist model has increased its reliance in the stock market for corporate finance 
although at a higher (but still moderate) level of employment rigidity during the last two 
decades. 
In advanced political economies the Segmented-Corporatist and Statist models 
rely less on stock market mechanisms for corporate finance, as expected and predicted by 
the literature. For our two cases, Chile stands close to the liberal type while Uruguay 
maintains moderate levels of employment rigidity with a dual structure in which public 
employment is very rigid but private employment is not. It has no corporate financing via 
the stock market. Should an increase in market capitalization in Uruguay occur, the 
country will probably behave as predicted by the Segmented-Corporatist and Corporatist 
subtypes.  
In terms of unemployment, Chile departs from the Liberal model in terms of its 
elevated long term unemployment rates and its inability to reduce the post-1998 
unemployment increase (Figure 8). Uruguay maintained high unemployment rates until 
the post-2001 crisis (Figure 9). The economic bonanza triggered by BRIC growth since 
then, in particular China and Brazil, is lowering unemployment rates.  
The reinstallation of a centralized wage bargaining system at the sectoral level 
since 2005 in combination with the labor immobility of public workers may produce 
undesirable Statist-like complementarities in the industrial relations sphere instead of the 
desirable Segmented-Corporatist or Corporatist ones. On the other hand, the rapid and 
unfinished growth of union density from around 14% in 2004 to 37% in 2010 suggests 
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that unions are internalizing this private-public conflict into their encompassing 
organization, which moderates demand. If it continues, this trend will lead to a virtuous 
complementarity in this area. These trends in both countries are analyzed in Chapter 4. 
 
Figure 8: Productivity, Unemployment & Annual average real wages  
Chile. (1996=100) 
 
Source: Chilean Central Bank, WDI and ECLAC. Productivity is calculated as the ratio GDP/Labor force, 
as FIEL (2007) 
 
Finally, Figure 10 plots the relationship between a corrected measure of unemployment 
and stock market capitalization.
4
 These results are consistent with the literature and the 
                                                             
4
 The corrected unemployment measure is constructed by subtracting the current account balance from the 
unemployment. Soskice (1999) takes this measure from OCDE (1997) and uses this heuristic measure of 
unemployment to better understand the employment capability of a certain political economy. The rationale 
for this is that while in the long term unemployment is constrained by the equilibrium in the current 
account (Layard, Nickell y Jackman 1991, Carlin y Soskice 1990), in the short and medium terms an 
economy is able to expand demand, the excess of which is absorbed via deficit in the current account. 
Germany and other Segmented-Corporatist political economies, which restrict demand, have a level of 
unemployment that is higher than the equilibrium level while maintaining current account surplus. In other 
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data presented earlier. Although the corrected unemployment measure constitutes a crude 
approximation to the natural employment capability of an economy, it serves the purpose 
of showing how Chile behaves similarly to Liberal market economies, as the varieties of 
capitalism literature, and Soskice (1999) himself, proposed. The other interesting piece of 
information, not previously recognized, is how the other Southern Cone political 
economies cluster with the Statist ones in a pervasive lower-right quadrant in which 
already high unemployment rates are combined with government budget deficits and 
moderate to low stock market capitalization. 
Figure 9: Productivity, Unemployment & Annual average real wages  
Uruguay (1996=100) 
 
Source: National Statistical Institute, Uruguay and WDI. Productivity is calculated as the ratio GDP/Labor 
force, as FIEL (2007) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
words, as Soskice (1999) explains, at the point in which productivity and labor force are both equal to cero, 
a unity increase in the unemployment rate equals to an approximately 1% increase in GDP. This 1% of 
GDP reduces the current account in the ratio between exports over GDP (assuming that exports are 
exogenous and imports proportional to GDP). Under these assumptions, the proposed unemployment 
correction is a conservative measure.   
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Figure 10. Unemployment and Stock Market Capitalization (average 1990-2010) 
 
Source: Unemployment minus current account and Stock market capitalization of listed domestic 
companies (WBI 2011) 
 
To sum up, Chile and Uruguay stand at different and quite opposite ends in terms of the 
relationship among employment, wages, corporate finance and macroeconomic policy. 
While the industrial relations and corporate finance spheres of relation produce liberal 
complementarities in the Chile, they clearly generate coordinated complementarities in 
Uruguay, somewhere in between the Statist and Segmented-Corporatist models. This 
suggests these two cases do not belong to the same model of capitalism. 
b. Labor market and skills formation 
Although there are no available quantitative data for assessing in-firm skills formation 
strategies for the Southern Cone political economies, interviews with key senior 
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informants at the top of business organizations in Chile and Uruguay agree that this kind 
of training occurs only a in few relatively large firms, most owned by foreign capital.
5
 
This is consistent with the primary and extractive sectors based economies in the region. 
However, there are differentials between (low) Uruguayan (and Argentina and Brazil) 
secondary education completion rates and (high) Chilean ones. Although the four 
countries undertook important educational reforms during the 1990s, the results were 
different for each case. In the cases of Chile and Uruguay, the Chilean reform 
emphasized universalizing secondary education, which succeeded although at a cost of 
increasing educational segmentation. The Uruguayan reform emphasized the 
improvement of coverage in primary education but failed to improve coverage in 
secondary education (Filgueira and Bogliaccini 2004).  
Figure 11 compares education levels in the labor force of selected models of 
capitalism and Southern Cone political economies. While Chile shows the best coverage 
in the Southern Cone region for secondary education among the labor force, Argentina 
and Uruguay remain at medium levels of labor force with tertiary education. However, 
the seemingly low levels of secondary education among the labor force suggest that these 
two political economies still benefit from their formerly successful education systems but 
                                                             
5
 The key informants interviewed on this issue were: CPC President, Sofofa President, AG Mining 
President, Mining Union President, CUT Board member in Chile; and CCU, CNCS, CMPP, CIU Presidents 
and PIT-CNT board member in Uruguay. The Construction Chamber in Uruguay was beginning a co-
sponsored ambitious and interesting program of skills formation in association with the sector’s union 
(SUNCA) and government, but it still was at a very early stage in 2010. I will come back to briefly analyze 
this initiative in chapter 4 given that the construction sector was one of the few that continued bargaining 
wages collectively during the neoliberal period (1990-2004), which I suggest allowed them to lead 
coordination strategies after centralized collective bargaining was reinstated in 2006 because of their 
history of stable coordination and relationship building during the previous 15 years.  
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will have serious skills availability problems in the near future. Actual figures suggest a 
future shrinking in the proportion of the labor force with tertiary education.  
A side note about Brazil must be added, given that its low levels of skilled labor 
force as measured here hides an important effort made since the mid-1990s to 
universalize primary education coverage, which at the outset did not educate almost a 
third of primary education aged children. It is reasonable to expect an overall steady 
increase in secondary and tertiary education levels in the following decades. Also, in 
comparative terms, the labor force in in the formal sector of advanced political economies 
is more educated than the labor force in the Southern Cone. However, the proportion of 
labor force with tertiary education is higher in the liberal type than in all four coordinated 
subtypes. 
Figure 11. Labor force w/secondary and w/tertiary education (1990-2010) 
 
Source: WDI 2011 
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In comparing the labor market’s overall skill level and its level of protection (Figure 12), 
Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil and the Statist subtype do not have a  well-endowed labor 
force but have a rigid environment that difficult either a specialization in high skill based 
production or a liberal type of general skills market competitive based production. 
Although levels of labor rigidity in Uruguay are similar to those in the Corporatist and 
Segmented-Corporatist models, the much lower skill level in its labor force precludes it 
from following their path. This is particularly important because strategies for adding 
skills to the labor force tend to be structurally and politically difficult to implement, and 
they pay off only in the medium to long term.   
 
Figure 12. Labor force w/secondary education & Employment Rigidity (1990-2010) 
 
Source: WDI 2011 
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In spite of having a more flexible labor market and a relatively well educated labor force, 
Chile has not been able to reduce long term unemployment, which suggests it also has a 
rigid employment structure. Its higher proportion of labor force with secondary education 
puts Chile in a better position than its neighbors to attract investment based on a high 
skilled labor force, although the region has so far been unable to attract such kind of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Although a labor force with a high secondary education level is not a sufficient 
condition for developing high-skilled production, as the Liberal type and arguably Chile 
demonstrates, secondary education is a necessary condition for it. There is an argument in 
the literature about the importance of considering the high levels of informality that 
Southern Cone political economies have in order to classify them as a unique type of 
capitalism (Schneider and Soskice 2009). However, this argument should be revised in 
the light of two considerations. First, although informality is evenly high in the Southern 
Cone region, these political economies still show different routes of specialization in the 
service economy and different overall skills of their labor forces. Second, the increasing 
participation in the global market, as well as the regional effort in reducing poverty and 
inequality, at least in these highly  urbanized countries, points in the direction of 
considering informality levels as a characteristic of their relative development level to be 
overcome in the medium run.  In fact, Chile and Uruguay are already making efforts to 
reduce informality.   
To sum up, Chile seems to be better positioned than Uruguay in terms of the 
complementarity between labor markets and labor force skill formation. This advantage 
is based on Chile being on the track of a Liberal type of complementarities, which is 
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based on price competition. Uruguay remains in a “blocked” position, where neither the 
liberal track nor the virtuous tracks among the CMEs appear to be available in the 
foreseeable future. However, both countries confront a serious problem in terms of the 
level of skill formation investment by firms. Mixed strategies (public-private) for 
investment in skills formation are still embryonic.  
The difference in terms of formal education coverage in the labor force between 
the Southern Cone and the rest of the analyzed countries should be regarded as due to 
their differences in the level of development. However, the differences between Chile and 
Uruguay in terms of coverage and equality of opportunities are due to historical and 
structural developments of their education systems. While Chile has a deeply segmented 
system in which coverage is high but opportunities to advance into tertiary education is 
low, Uruguay has a less segmented system with serious problems of coverage at the 
secondary level but greater equality of opportunities (Filgueira y Bogliaccini 2004; 
Katzman y Rodriguez 2006; Katzman y Retamoso 2007; Bogliaccini y Rodriguez 2012).   
c. The state, market regulations and the redistributive effort  
A country’s redistributive effort and its market regulations are two spheres that impose 
costs on production, and so their complementarities should be analyzed carefully. High-
technology competitive sectors heavily invest in skill formation, establish barriers for 
employment rotation and protect jobs with generous welfare benefits. Political economies 
with production systems oriented to this kind of competition tend to have a higher 
redistributive effort than those competing on either commodity markets or non-skilled 
manufacturing export sectors. The industrial relations system and the power equilibrium 
between business and labor are also important in order to explain how the redistribution 
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is done (Esping Andersen 1990 and 1999, Huber and Stephens 2001, Iversen 2005, 
Alegre and Filgueira 2009).    
Figure 13 shows the relationship between total revenue (as percent of GDP) and 
welfare state generosity. The Corporatist model imposes the highest tax burden on its 
productive system. Overall, all coordinated sub-types except the Group-Coordinated have 
the highest social expenditure as a share of GDP (Welfare protection in the Group-
Coordinated subtype is not done at the national level but at the firm level, as explained 
above). The Liberal subtype has remained at a lower level of both fiscal pressure and 
social expenditure with respect to the coordinated subtypes (except the Group-
Coordinated). All this is consistent with the literature. 
 
Figure 13. Revenue (% of GDP) & Welfare State Generosity (1990-2010) 
 
Source: OCDE 2011 & ECLAC 2011 
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As for the Southern Cone, the situation is comparable to that of the developed political 
economies, except for the Group-Coordinated subtype. Uruguay and Chile are the 
countries in the region that tax the most, but while Uruguay also has the most generous 
welfare state, Chile has the least generous one. Argentina and Brazil have similar levels 
of social expenditure to Uruguay, but with lower tax levels as a share of GDP. Therefore, 
given that these two sets of countries are at different levels of development, two 
conclusions emerge: first, at a lower level of taxation and expenditure, Uruguay fits the 
coordinated political economies pattern while Chile fits the Liberal one. Second, 
Southern Cone political economies should increase their social expenditure levels given 
their high income inequality, and since 2005 Uruguay has been doing so, although the 
relatively brief time span does not yet allow those changes to affect the period average. 
Uruguayan tax reform in 2006 as well as the labor reform in 2008, which will be 
analyzed in Chapter 4, increased the level of revenue from income as well as corporate 
taxes. The labor reform also contributed to a higher level of revenue from taxes in 
formalizing rural and domestic service employment. By 2011 a boost in the marginal 
income tax rate rose from 25% to 30% has been proposed in Congress. In Chile, as 
Chapter 4 analyzes, business organizations have successfully blocked direct tax increases 
during the last two decades.      
Political economies with low income inequality tend to have generous welfare 
systems. The Corporatist model, which has a universal non-contributory scheme for 
redistributing benefits, is the most egalitarian among the analyzed models.  Figure 14 
shows how the level of welfare state generosity is related with the level of inequality. The 
figure suggests that when the level of development is controlled, complementarities in 
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these aspects are consistent between Uruguay and the coordinated subtype, and between 
Chile and the Liberal type. The Southern Cone also faces a challenge in terms of the 
balance between revenue, level of public expenditure and quality of that expenditure, 
which is not shown in the figure. This handicap is related to the relative lack of 
institutional stability in terms of democracy and economic model in order to provide 
political coalitions the opportunity to bargain for redistribution with a long term 
perspective.  
 
Figure 14. Welfare State Generosity & Inequality (1990-2010) 
 
Source: OCDE 2011, ECLAC 2011 & WDI 2011 
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are also consistent with the persistent higher levels of income inequality. However, the 
experience in the Statist subtype suggests that increasing social expenditure alone is not 
enough to reduce inequality, since the quality of the expenditure and its egalitarian 
leverage depend greatly on the institutional channels that are used for redistribution. The 
literature on welfare states discusses this matter thoroughly (Esping Andersen 1990 and 
1999; Huber and Stephens 2001; Mares 2003 and 2006; Iversen 2005, among others).  
Southern Cone political economies performance 
Table 11 compares the four Southern Cone political economies in terms of growth, 
innovation and inequality. With the exception of Brazil, the region has underperformed 
the four models of capitalism in terms of growth during the first two periods. However, 
during the last two decades it has joined Korea in a path of higher growth rates than the 
most advanced economies. Chile has maintained high growth rates since the early 1990s, 
but Uruguay has improved it only since 2004. Unemployment records show opposite 
trends in these two cases: while Chile maintained rather low unemployment rates during 
the 1990s but have been steadily growing since Lagos administration (2000-2006), 
Uruguay began reducing unemployment since the post 2001 crisis period. Nevertheless, 
overall unemployment in the region is higher than in the other four analyzed models. 
Innovation records in the region are miserable. Inequality levels in the region remain the 
highest in comparison with the five analyzed models. However, Chile and Brazil 
maintain significantly higher levels than Argentina and Uruguay. As suggested by the 
data, this is consistent with the literature. 
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Table 11: Southern Cone Economies 
 
GDP Growth GDP pc 
Unemploy-
ment 
Long term 
Unemploy-
ment 
Patents 
p/person 
Gini 
 1960
-73 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990-
10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1974
-89 
1990
-10 
1990
-10 
Argentina 3.9 0.6 4.6 8846 10621 4.8 12.5 . . 0.05 0.02 49.0 
Brazil 7.6 4.3 3.1 7239 8173 3.7 8.1 . . 0.02 0.02 57.7 
Chile 3.4 4.0 5.1 5393 10659 11.0 7.3 25.5 50.3 0.01 0.02 54.3 
Uruguay 1.0 2.1 3.4 7012 9583 10.4 11.2 . . 0.02 0.01 44.6 
Average 4.0 2.7 4.0 7122 9759 7.5 9.8 25.5 50.3 0.03 0.02 51.4 
Source: Data from WDI 2011, The World Bank. 
 
 
Overall, after two decades of democracy and participation in the global market, growth 
records have improved following the path most middle income emerging economies have 
followed, inequality remains excessively high and production remains heavily based on 
primary product exports. However, this apparent convergence in terms of growth and 
innovation between Chile and Uruguay hides divergent strategies.  
Conclusions  
This chapter served two purposes. First, it mapped the embryonic models of capitalism in 
Chile and Uruguay in the constellation of capitalist types and subtypes for the post-
neoliberal period. Second, it contradicted the hypothesis of Schneider and Soskice (2009) 
that there exists a unique and coherent model of capitalism in Latin America. At least in 
the Southern Cone, post-neoliberal embryonic models are very different in Chile and 
Uruguay. Moreover, Brazil and Argentina tend to cluster with Uruguay.  
The four spheres of relations analyzed in this chapter revealed a different attribute 
configuration in Chile and Uruguay, which is in turn more similar to those of political 
economies outside the region. Moreover, these spheres of relations produce 
complementarities that resemble the ones in different models of capitalism already 
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identified in the literature. These two political economies have entered into the global 
market with different productive and redistributive structures, which has imposed on 
them different challenges and allowed for the pursuit of different policies.  
In terms of the predicted outcomes, Chile shows higher growth rates than 
Uruguay during the three periods showed in Table 11, suggesting a Statist weakness in 
terms of growth records. Although Uruguayan growth rates have increased dramatically 
after 2004, it is still uncertain if the productive structure will sustain high rates once the 
commodity boom ends. It is still early to draw a conclusion because the boom is ongoing 
and Uruguayan market institutions are still at flux. Innovation is still marginal in both 
cases, which poses serious constraints to Uruguay’s ambition to evolve into a CME 
different than the Statist subtype. In terms of income distribution, the outcomes for Chile 
and Uruguay are consistent with the differences between LMEs and CMEs among 
advanced political economies. In this respect Uruguay seems better suited to enter the 
Segmented-Corporatist or even Corporatist tracks. The tax and labor reforms since 2005, 
to be analyzed in Chapter 4, are consistent with this trend. In Chile, on the contrary, 
business ability to block most of the attempts to increase governmental expenditure since 
1990 and the role the market has in many public services, such as education, limit the 
ability to significantly reduce an already high inequality level. 
Therefore, the analysis strongly suggests Chile is a Liberal market economy, 
while Uruguay is a coordinated market economy that tends to cluster between the 
Segmented-Corporatist and Statist subtypes. Although the embryonic stage of these two 
countries’ integration into the global market in comparison with all other regions 
analyzed so far in the literature suggests that institutional dynamism should not be 
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discarded, since the historical evidence for advanced political economies shows that once 
in a certain path, important institutional discontinuity is needed in order to move to 
another path.    
The next two chapters, comparing Chile and Uruguay as the most different cases, 
will explain why and how they ended up building such different capitalist configurations. 
Carmines and Stimson (1989) began their seminal work by questioning the natural 
tendency we scholars have for focusing on the most proximate and visible causes to 
explain our phenomenon of interest. They argue that long-term processes are not so easily 
captured but, most of the time, are the most important ones. Pierson (2003) completes 
this idea, postulating that many important social processes take a long time to mature, and 
many effects are not observable until much later.  
The next chapter therefore analyzes class and cross-class coalition formation in 
Chile and Uruguay --  their evolution, the evolution of the institutional frameworks in 
which they bargained over redistribution, and the effect of the instability of these 
frameworks on the formulation of long term developmental strategies.   
 
  
Chapter 3. Business and labor organizational and coalitional patterns during the 
20th century in Chile and Uruguay
 
 
“The history of a revolution, like every other history, 
ought first of all to tell what happened and how. That, 
however, is little enough. From the very telling it ought to 
become clear why it happened thus and not otherwise. 
Events can neither be regarded as a series of adventures, 
nor strung on the thread of a preconceived moral. They 
must obey their own laws. The discovery of these laws is 
the author’s task.” L. Trotsky, Prologue to the History of 
the Russian Revolution, p. 13.  
 
This chapter describes and analyzes the political and economic context in which business 
and labor organized and cooperated during the 20
th
 century in Chile and Uruguay. The 
organizational form of business and labor, and their cooperation patterns during the post-
neoliberal period were affected by the historical contexts in which they evolved.   
Before the 1929 crisis, the patterns of labor and business organization in the 
Southern Cone of Latin America were comparable to the ones in the advanced industrial 
democracies. Business organization patterns were consistent with the neo-corporatist 
theory of a centralization pattern in small economies subject to the perils of the market 
(Goldthorpe 1984, Katzenstein 1985, Crouch 1991). Labor organization responded to 
governmental strategy. In terms of labor organization, the Chilean government relied 
upon exclusionary and repressive action toward labor until the late 1930s, which 
encouraged early labor centralized organization, only interrupted by legal changes in 
labor rights introduced during Pinochet’s regime. In Uruguay, on the contrary, the 
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government’s willingness to deliver benefits to labor meant that it did not feel the need to 
organize and pursue political power until the 1960s.  
The ISI model aborted the centralization trend in business organization as a strong 
state encouraged rent-seeking strategies. From this period on, the evolution of labor and 
business organization differs from that of the advanced industrial democracies. The 
absence (in Uruguay) or the lack of relevance (in Chile) of business encompassing 
organizations during the ISI period is a consequence of the early success of business in 
gaining and sustaining benefits from the state. During the ISI period, business reverted 
back an earlier trend toward centralized organization in both countries. Labor in Chile 
continued to confront exclusionary strategies, although the expansion of the franchise 
during the period and a close relationship with left-of-center parties prompted the 
formation of a powerful political coalition by the end of the period. In Uruguay, the 
exhaustion of the pro-labor coalition in the Colorado Party (Batllista coalition) during the 
1950s prompted labor to form an encompassing organization. 
These patterns of organization in Chile and Uruguay followed a path-dependent 
process that was only weakened, and in the case of Chile interrupted, when these 
countries began the transition from the ISI to global market integration. One key aspect 
of this path-dependent weakening was the state’s inability to provide special benefits to 
powerful sectors of both business and labor as ISI stagnation deepened. In the case of 
Uruguay, this State transformation operated in a slow-moving cumulative process 
(Pierson 2003). In the case of Chile, there was a discontinuous institutional change 
between the Allende and Pinochet periods. This discontinuity accelerated the transition 
toward a liberal form of capitalism (Pierson 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). The 
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abrupt changes in the political context during the 1970s and subsequent changes during 
the 1980s provoked organizational and coalitional reorganization among Chile’s 
business, labor and political parties. At the same time, exclusionary strategies toward 
labor were strengthened during the Pinochet regime be legal constraints on organization 
and capacity for political strategy. Business was forced by the military to revitalize the 
Production and Commerce Confederation (CPC - Confederación de la Producción y del 
Comercio) in order to coordinate political strategies. These two aspects outlived the 
military regime to shape these sectors’ organizational forms and coalitional strategies 
during the post-neoliberal period. In Uruguay, on the contrary, the abrupt changes in 
political and economic contexts were not accompanied by a strong reformist military 
government. Business organizations remained sectorial and labor’s centralization 
continued on the same pre-dictatorship paths once the transition to democracy initiated.  
Overall, the level of cooperation between business and labor is inversely related 
to their ability to achieve privileged access to government. Understanding the lack of 
cooperation between business and labor requires an analysis of the incentives for 
corporatist arrangements as unions and employers try to outflank each other in the labor 
market by gaining political leverage and legislative influence.  
Unstable institutional settings and a heavily protected economy are two factors 
that facilitate those groups’ abilities. First, as the likelihood for institutional manipulation 
increases, the likelihood for sustained cooperation decreases. In other words, the 
importance of the stability of democratic institutional rules for coalition formation 
determines the incentives for coalitions to bargain. Second, in heavily protected 
economies the levels of protection and subsidies from the government gives no incentives 
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for business and labor to cooperate. The rationale for this is that the protected 
environment dilutes distributive conflicts via subsidies and other protections. Then as the 
protective structure begins to collapse and the state becomes weaker, cooperation 
becomes more important. However, in contexts with unstable institutional frameworks, 
the history of previous conflicts in which one actor successfully outflanked the other 
would favor new attempts to either alter the institutional framework once again, or 
repress it, or both.        
Contestation in industrial relations (1900-1929) 
This is a period of institutional strengthening and growing interest representation for 
business and labor. Industrial relations in the Southern Cone were dominated by 
contestation in export-oriented and mostly agrarian political economies. Chile was also 
an enclave economy dependent on nitrates and copper. Light industrialization was 
encouraged, but industry was weak. Bargaining and coalitional activity in the political 
arena focused on the issues of labor rights.  
The two world wars did not affect industrial relations and coalitional formation in 
the Southern Cone with the same intensity as they affected European political economies. 
While in the latter these two wars triggered the formation of cross-class coalitions and in 
many cases explicit labor-business coalitions for warfare production or even clandestine 
resistance during occupation periods (Crouch 1993), Southern Cone politics were not 
subject to those incentives and thus contestation strategies remained largely unchanged. 
On the other hand, the 1929 economic crisis had a profound political effect by triggering 
the breakdown of democratic institutions and an intensification of conflicts in industrial 
relations. Furthermore, the crisis triggered a profound change in terms of economic 
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organization that would lead to the ISI process during the next five decades, with a 
subsequent change in the pattern and evolution of industrial relations.   
Organization and power of labor movements  
Chile and Uruguay began the 20th century after a series of civil wars. However, the 
political outcome of those conflicts was different. The 1891 Civil War in Chile ended 
with a conservative victory over liberal reformism and until 1920 conservative 
governments opposed and repressed labor organization (Haindl 2007). In Uruguay, the 
1904 Civil War ended with the complete victory of the liberal Colorado Party (PC – 
Partido Colorado) over the conservative Nacional Party (PN – Partido Nacional). This 
triggered a period of intense social reforms until 1916. 
Chile had one of the most important labor movements in Latin America during 
the period.
6
 From the 1900s to the 1930s, the Chilean working class created unions with 
important participation in political life. The activity was particularly intense in some 
years (especially 1907, 1913, and 1918-1919) that ended in government repression of 
labor. Created in 1911, the Chilean Worker Federation (FOCh - Federación Obrera 
Chilena) focused on mutualism and had no political relevance until 1916. However, after 
1916 it strengthened its relationship with the newly founded Communist Party (1912, as 
the Partido Obrero de Chile). From 1916 to 1920, there was a period of strong social 
unrest and strong state repression and the beginning of direct involvement in politics 
                                                             
6
 Statistics provided by the Confederación Sindical Latinoamericana (CSLA) in 1928 show the importance 
of labor organizations in Chile in comparison with Argentina and Uruguay (Rama, Carlos 1976) in terms of 
worker participation in labor organizations.  
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(Haindl 2007:21).
7
 Anarchist workers also organized themselves in 1917 under the 
Chilean section of the International Workers of the World, but remained a minor actor 
without political relevance (Muñoz Gomá and Arriagada 1977; Roddick, in Carriére et al. 
1989). 
The labor movement supported different political parties: the Democratic Party 
(broken away from the Radical Party in 1887) between 1900 and 1906, the Communist 
Party after 1912, and President Alessandri Palma in the 1920 election. Alessandri 
Palma’s presidency, and with it the end of the “Parliamentary Republic” (1891-1925), 
initiated a period of predominance of liberal coalitions in politics that advanced labor 
legislation and worker protection, including the legal recognition of labor unions.
8
 New 
legislation included the 8 hour-day, the right to organize unions in any firm with more 
than 25 workers, 15 days of paid leave per year, the right to worker compensation on 
termination of employment and provision of advance notice when firing, and pensions for 
people 65 years old and over.
9
 The liberal coalition was supported by the middle class 
and, in passing the 1925 Constitution that ended the “Parliamentary Republic”, also by 
the military. Repression softened, but organized labor was not part of the ruling coalition 
(Muñoz Gomá and Arriagada 1977; DeShazo 1983; Haindl 2007). There was no liberal-
labor (lib-lab) alliance.  
                                                             
7
 The FOCh’s 1919 convention received 91 delegates in representation of 20,000 workers and voted a 
program that explicitly stated as an objective to abolish the capitalist regime. 
8
 The “Parliamentary Republic” was still a presidential system, but with a debilitated president given a 
series of constitutional reforms after the 1891 Civil War. The president wasn’t able to dissolve the 
Congress and the Ministry of the Interior played the role of the head of government (Castedo 1999). 
9
 Laws No. 4053 (Working contracts), No. 4054 (Labor pensions), No. 4055 (Work insurance), No. 4056 
(Conciliation courts for labor issues); No. 4057 (Labor organization rights), No. 4058 (Cooperatives), and 
No.4059 (Labor contracts). 
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In spite of the strong state repression during the “Parliamentary Republic” period, 
or probably because of it, the Chilean labor movement remained united. The FOCh was 
dissolved in 1927 when Colonel Ibañez del Campo decreed the end of the independent 
urban labor movement after leading the coup overthrowing Alessandri’s government. 
Some years later, the organization was replaced by the Chilean Labor Confederation 
(CTCh - Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile) in 1936 (Muñoz Gomá and Arriagada 
1977). This organizational centralization was characteristic of the Chilean labor 
movement for most of the 20th century and until the post-Pinochet period. It is during the 
1930s that the Chilean labor movement strengthened its relationship with class-oriented 
parties, mainly with the Communist Party but also with the Socialist Party. As a 
consequence of these two factors, the Chilean labor movement became an important 
political actor.  
In Uruguay, on the contrary, the Colorado Party’s political domination 
strengthened labor rights until 1916. During the two terms of President Batlle y Ordoñez 
(1903-1907 and 1911-1915) Uruguay enacted significant pro-labor legislation, such as 
the right to strike and the 8 hour day (Caetano 1984). Repression was mild and occurred 
mostly during President Williman’s term, also from the Colorado Party (1907-1911). 
Both the anarchist-oriented Uruguayan Regional Workers Federation (FORU – 
Federación Obrera Regional Uruguaya) and the socialist oriented General Workers 
Union (UGT – Unión General de Trabajadores) were founded in 1905.10 During Battle y 
Ordoñez’ presidencies, FORU members were co-opted by the government, but the 
                                                             
10
 This second one did not last long, but was important in the foundation of the social-democratic oriented 
Socialist Party in 1910. 
 86 
8
6
 [Typ
e a 
organization did not develop formal linkages to the Party. In 1923, the anarchic-
syndicalist Uruguayan Syndicalist Union (USU – Unión Sindicalista Uruguaya) was 
created, and in 1929 a communist bloc left FORU to create the Uruguayan General Labor 
Confederation (CGTU – Confederación General del Trabajo del Uruguay),11 led by the 
Communists. The unionization rate was less than 9 percent of the labor force throughout 
the period. In spite of this positive environment, or probably because of it, and contrary to 
the experience of Chilean labor, organized labor in Uruguay was weakly organized, 
fragmented along ideological lines, and without strong organizational ties to the main 
parties (Alexander 2005).  
These organization processes in the Southern Cone labor movements were similar 
to developmental patterns with their European counterparts in the sense that labor 
movements acquired either fragmented or centralized structures from early on and then 
reinforced these early trends (Crouch 1993). The organization and power of Argentinean 
and Uruguayan labor movements around 1914 is comparable to the development of the 
French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish movements at that time. They grew fragmented. 
Organized movements as such had no connections with political parties; instead, they 
embraced anarcho-syndicalist strategies that encouraged neither organizational nor 
political growth. The Chilean movement developed a centralized structure from early on. 
Because the movement was heavily repressed during the period, it may have had high 
levels of centralization but it had no political power. There is reasonable consensus in the 
                                                             
11
 The Communist Party was founded in 1921, splitting from the social-democratic Socialist Party led by 
Emilio Frugoni. Although both parties were electorally weak, Frugoni’s parliamentarian activity would be 
unsuccessfully but determinedly oriented toward the defense of a social-democratic and economic 
organization, instead of the continental European fascist rooted one that the Colorado Party and the 
Nacional Party followed until the 1950s.  
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literature about the fact that by the late 1920s, only the Danish labor movement had a 
significant shop-floor presence at a national level (Luebbert 1991, Crouch 1993). 
Southern Cone labor movements continued being politically weak and confronted 
intransigent employers as did many movements in Europe at that time. However, the 
autonomy of Argentinean and Brazilian movements was lost during the populist 
governments of Vargas and Perón, respectively, in the following two decades; as was true 
of Portugal and Italy during this period (Collier and Collier 1991, Crouch 1993).   
To sum up, the most important lesson from Chile and Uruguay during this period 
is the divergent paths in terms of organization. Centralized labor movements were better 
suited for participating in political coalitions during the next decades, as the evidence 
suggests for continental and northern European political economies and the case of Chile. 
As Luebbert (1991:197) suggests, the key for centralization is also in state policy. Since 
both labor movements faced an intransigent business class, centralization would not 
occur unless it was encouraged by an antagonistic or indifferent state. The German case, 
in which both employers and the state were intransigent, illustrates the expected outcome 
of a highly centralized and coordinated movement, as was seen in Chile. There was no 
alternative to powerful organization as a survival strategy. In the case of Uruguay, a 
reasonably accommodating state controlling an intransigent business class substituted for 
labor’s lack of shop-floor organization. As in France at the time, therefore, labor had no 
incentive to overcome its ideological divide (Luebbert 1991, Crouch 1993).      
Business organization 
Business organization during this period occurred along sectoral lines in Chile and 
Uruguay, dominated by the agrarian sector and, in the case of Chile, the nitrate and 
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copper mining sectors. However, ad hoc inter-sectoral political action, as well as 
negotiations for the creation of encompassing umbrella organizations would intensify 
toward the end of the period as a consequence of liberal pro-labor legislation. These 
processes were intensified with the 1929 crisis, before the ISI model posed a different set 
of incentives.  
Chilean business sectoral organizations are among the oldest in the region 
(Schneider 2004). As in every other Latin American country, the National Agriculture 
Association (SNA – Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura) was the first business 
organization to be created, as early as 1838. Beginning in 1870, the SNA was 
progressively dominated by large landowners (Arriagada 2004). The National Chamber 
of Commerce (CNC – Cámara Nacional de Comercio) was created in 1858, and early 
industrialists organized into the Manufacturing Promotion Society (Sofofa - Sociedad de 
Fomento Fabril) in 1883, which also came to be an important political actor by the 
1930s. The Mining National Society (Sonami – Sociedad Nacional de Minería) was 
founded that same year.
12
    
Business in Chile intensified its creation of an encompassing organization after 
1925 because of the liberal-military alliance that passed pro-labor legislation. The 
turbulent political years between 1927 and 1932, the effects of the 1929 crisis, and 
Allesandri Palma’s second term accelerated the process. The SNA led the process of 
creating the United Committee of Commerce and Business Development Organizations 
                                                             
12
 By the beginning of the 20th century, mining emerges as an important activity and it is the place where 
the most important conflicts among capital and labor occur. Nitrate mining, the most important subsector, 
suffered a crisis during the Great War, as Germany was the main nitrate buyer. By the 1920s, the United 
States became the main buyer (mining growing 52% with the revitalization of nitrate and the growth of 
copper) and the government allowed business to form the Nitrate Producers Association (Asociación de 
Productores de Salitre de Chile) in order to manage the price of nitrate (Haindl 2007). 
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(Comité Unido de las Sociedades de Fomento y Comercio) in 1931, and the Production 
and Commerce Corporation (CPC – Corporación de la Producción y el Comercio) in 
1934, with Sofofa, Sonami and the CNC (Arriagada 2004).     
Business in Uruguay was also organized by sectors during the second part of the 
19
th
 century. There were two agrarian organizations: the Rural Association (ARU - 
Asociación Rural del Uruguay), created in 1871, and the Rural Federation (FR - 
Federación Rural), created in 1915. This is important given the agrarian focus structure 
of the economy and the leading role these associations played in terms of interest 
representation.  
In Uruguay the National Chamber of Commerce was founded in 1867, the 
Chamber of Merchants (CMPP – Cámara Mercantil de Productos del País) in 1891, the 
Chamber of Industry (CIU – Cámara de Industria del Uruguay; initially Uruguayan 
Industrial Union – UIU – Unión Industrial del Uruguay) in 1898, the Rural Federation in 
1915, and the Chamber of Construction (CCU – Cámara de Construcción del Uruguay) 
in 1919. As in Chile, the lead in political activity was taken by agricultural associations. 
The FR took the lead as early as the 1911 and 1913 economic crises, and in the midst of 
Colorado Party pro-labor reformism. The FR’s leading role continued until the 1930s, 
and in the early 1920s a process of slow but sustained coordination of strategies among 
sectors began.  
In 1925, the National Chamber of Commerce proposed the creation of a 
Commerce Commission (Alta Comisión de Comercio), grouping rural and urban 
organizations (Caetano 1984). The initiative did not prosper, but it constituted the only 
attempt to create an inter-sectoral business umbrella organization until the 1990s. In 
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1929, the FR successfully proposed the creation of the Economic Surveillance Committee 
(CVE – Comité de Vigilancia Económica), which included all business groups except the 
Uruguayan Rural Association (ARU) and whose purpose was to act as a conservative 
watch-dog for government economic policy. However, the CVE cannot be considered an 
umbrella organization, as it was organized under FR tutelage, inside its organizational 
structure, and its statutes specify that any policy position had to be approved by the FR 
and that any organization willing to participate was required to accept any action 
proposed by the FR. Moreover, the FR had a privileged participation in the CVE’s board 
of directors.
13
   
To sum up, Chilean and Uruguayan business organization processes had 
important similarities. If the economy had remained open to the global market, the 
business organizational path in Chile and Uruguay probably would have been of 
increasing inter-sectoral coordination and strengthening of umbrella associations. But this 
was not the case, and the political events and economic decisions following the 1929 
crisis radically changed the situation. Both the CPC in Chile and the CVE in Uruguay 
languished, the former becoming a marginal political actor during the next decades, and 
the latter eventually disappearing during the 1930s (Caetano 1984, Arriagada 2004, 
Zurbirggen 2005). 
Both countries’ organizations had important similarities to their European 
counterparts as well, although Latin American and European experiences departed with 
the end of World War II, when the former deepened the ISI model while the latter 
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 This set of characteristics and participation conditions explains why the other rural business organization, 
ARU, declined participation. 
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deepened its integration into the global market. As in Mediterranean and most of 
Continental Europe, the attitude of business toward labor was intransigence. Toward the 
end of the period, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese businesses were forced into associative 
strategies by the fascist regimes. A similar path was followed by Argentinean and 
Brazilian business with Perón and Vargas, respectively, but was avoided in Chile and 
Uruguay (Crouch 1993, Schneider 2004).  
Coalitional formation and political activity 
The state had a different attitude toward labor and business in the two countries because 
of the different types of coalitions in government. The main focus of bargaining among 
the state, business and labor was labor rights legislation. This was related to the 
introduction of universal suffrage. In Chile, labor was continuously repressed, with 
literacy requirements to be able to vote (until 1970) constituting the main strategy of 
conservative coalitions that the liberal reformist coalition during this period did not 
challenge. In Uruguay, on the contrary, the Colorado Party reformist coalition favored 
labor rights and organization, although there was some repression during the period, but 
universal male suffrage began as early as 1918. Table 12 shows the different ruling 
coalitions and the strength of their political domination.
14
  
The attitude of the elite toward labor rights legislation differed in Chile and Uruguay. 
While in the latter the business elites maintained strong ties with the Colorado and 
                                                             
14 In tables 12 to 14, periods of coalitional dominance are divided in ones in which the coalition strongly 
dominates politics and ones in which weakly dominates politics. The consideration behind this division is 
that a certain coalition strongly dominates politics when in a democratic context it has total control over the 
executive and majority in Congress; or when the coalition rules undemocratically. A coalition weakly 
prevails when there is cohabitation in the executive (only possible during the two periods of collegiate 
executive) or when the party or party fraction in office does not have parliamentary majority. 
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National Parties, channeling their demands through them, Chilean business elites 
attempted to channel their demands through other actors than the traditional Liberal and 
Conservative Parties. The Radical Party electoral vote increased systematically during the 
1930s with the support of the middle class and part of industrial business; while the class-
oriented Socialist and Communist Parties were supported by organized labor. 
 
Table 12. Distributive coalitions during the democratic breakthrough  
 Coalition Political Actors Business Actors Labor 
Actors 
Strongly 
dominant 
Weakly 
dominant 
Uruguay 
Reformist  PC – Batllista - - 1903-1916 1916-1925 
Conserva-
tive  
PN – Herreristas 
PC – Riveristas 
Rural Federation;  
Rural Association;  
Industrial Chamber; 
Chamber of 
Commerce  
-  1925-1933 
 
Chile 
Reformist  Liberal Alliance 
until 1925 & 
Liberal Party since 
1932 
Sofofa - - 1920-1925   
Conserva-
tive 
Conservative Party 
Coalition 
Sonami (Salt & 
Copper) 
SNA 
CNC 
- 1891-1901 
&  
1910-1920 
1901-1910 
Populist Military (divided) SNA - 1927-1931 1925-1927 
 
This was a period of political party fragmentation and coalitional instability in both 
countries. The Liberal and Conservative parties were dominated by the elites, mostly 
Catholics. The programs of these parties began to converge during the 1940s and 
business elites remained at distance from them (Moulián 1989; Haindl 2007). The 
Radical Party became the middle class party and dominated the center of the electorate 
during the 1930s and 1940s. Its laicism and pro-labor policies facilitated its alliance with 
Socialists and Communists during the 1940s. 
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There were three important coalitions in Chile during this period (Table 12): a 
conservative coalition, a reformist coalition and a populist one. The conservative 
coalition that ruled during the “Parliamentary Republic” nurtured the export-oriented 
growth model, and successfully impeded the expansion of the franchise and labor rights 
(Castedo 1999).  
The reformist coalition was led by Arturo Alessandri Palma and briefly 
dominated politics in 1925, and then again between 1932 and 1938. This coalition is a 
liberal one in the sense of European politics at the time, given its lack of a relationship 
with organized labor (Luebbert 1993). It was weak at the time of the most important 
reforms (1925), and only succeeded in passing them because of a short-lived alliance 
with the populist Ibáñez del Campo. The 1925 Constitution that reinstituted a Presidential 
system also expanded the franchise to literate males over 21 years. Several laws 
expanding labor rights were approved in Congress that same year. Between 1932 and 
1938, a minimum wage law was passed for private workers, as well as a social security 
pension program for private workers’ families, and unemployment insurance (Haindl 
2007).
15
    
Unlike their counterparts in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, Chilean reformists 
had the United States and not Europe as their main reference for economic and political 
matters. In 1925, Alessandri’s government asked the US economist William Kemmerer 
                                                             
15
 A copay of 24.33% of salaries was established, 16.33% to be paid by the employer and 8% by the 
employees, without state participation. 
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to serve as an economic adviser.
16
 The importance of the Kemmerer Commission does 
not lie in its immediate results, but in illustrating the geopolitical center of reference for 
Chilean elites during the 20th century. Later on, Alessandri Rodriguez’ government 
(1958-1964) created the Klein-Saks Mission with similar purposes, and Pinochet’s 
regime followed the advice of the so-called "Chicago Boys". 
A populist coalition dominated the political arena between 1925 and 1932 with 
populist General Carlos Ibáñez as the main political figure. During this period, political 
parties were secondary actors and the military had a preponderant role in government. 
Business began a process of distancing itself from parties during this period. In particular, 
the SNA would progressively side with General Ibáñez. This organization strongly 
supported the creation of the Agrarian Party (Partido Agrario) in 1931, which  would 
remain insignificant  until 1945, when it joined other parties to form the Agrarian Labor 
Party (PAL – Partido Agrario Laborista), endorsing Ibáñez’s candidacy (Arriagada 
2004). The importance of this political strategy lies in the attempt by business to enter 
politics as an outsider, not channeling its demands and lobby through the Liberal or 
Conservative Parties.  
Ibáñez had significant opposition from inside the military and weak support from 
Conservative and Liberal elites. It strengthened during the 1930s and 1940s and led to an 
alliance between SNA and Ibáñez for the 1952 election. However, populist influence in 
political and economic processes remained minor in Chile. The importance of this 
coalition in this period is largely an expression of party fragmentation.   
                                                             
16
 The so-called Kemmerer Commission’s advice included the creation of the Central Bank (1926) and the 
re-instauration of the Gold Standard (1925). Gold Pattern was short lived, since President Montero 
eliminated it in 1932 as a measure to address the effects of the 1929 crisis. 
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There were two principal distributive coalitions in Uruguay during the period. The 
two largest political parties – the PC and PN– were elite-based but fragmented and “catch 
all” instead of organized along ideological lines. Business organization remained 
fragmented along sectoral lines, and cross-sectoral coordination was ad hoc and short-
lived. Labor was weakly organized, fragmented along ideological lines –mostly 
dominated by conflicts between Communists and Anarchists– and without strong 
organizational ties to the PC or the PN, and not part of any of the governing coalitions 
during the period. The unionization rate was less than nine percent of the labor force 
throughout the period and tended to decrease toward the end of it, although labor gained 
in rights and bargaining capability during Batlle y Ordoñez’s second term (Barran and 
Nahum 1983; Rodriguez 1965; Caetano 1984; Filgueira C. 1989; Collier and Collier 
1991, Gonzalez 1991, Roberts 2002; Barran 2004; Alexander 2005; Zurbriggen 2006). 
The Batllista reformist coalition was formed almost exclusively by the 
predominant sector of the PC -Batllismo- and had strong ties with domestic industry and 
labor. However, these two actors did not have political strategic capability yet as they 
were just organizing themselves. Batllismo co-opted UIU leaders into important 
bureaucratic positions in the State (Barran and Nahum 1983:52). These businessmen and 
the UIU itself were favorable to the Batllista protectionist policies, but they did not 
participate in the political arena as organized rural business would participate inside the 
conservative coalition. Labor was also favorable to the Batllista progressive social 
reforms (Barran and Nahum 1983:71), but FORU did not participate in any political 
coalition either. Similarly to what happened to leaders of industry, labor leaders were co-
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opted by Batllismo individually into bureaucratic or party positions.
17
 The relationship 
between Batllismo and labor was fluid, but Batllismo opposed Communism and 
Anarchism, the two competing ideologies among organized labor at the time. During this 
period, social reformism and political incorporation were engineered by elites, promoted 
from above (Collier and Collier 1991). Social reformism was one of the tools the 
Colorado government relied on in order to demobilize the armies after the 1904 civil war. 
It was also a tool for modernizing the country mirroring the Swiss and German models, 
which were influential in Colorado political elite thinking at the time. Finally, Batllismo 
promoted social reformism as a tool for discouraging class coalitions around Socialist or 
Communist ideologies. The conservative coalition was formed by the majority sector in 
the Nacional Party -Herrerista- and the minority sector in the Colorado Party -Riverista- 
18
-
19
. This coalition opposed social reformism. 
The capacity of organized business for political strategy was weak after the civil 
war until the FR led business to oppose reforms in alliance with the conservative Herrero-
                                                             
17
 During the period between 1911 and 1916, labor won totally or partially 49 of 103 strikes (48%), while 
they had only won 28% during Williman’s presidency (1907-1911) (Barran and Nahum 1983:72). 
18
 Although PC's Conservative and Reformist fractions remained together for electoral purposes during the 
whole period, tensions between the two were important. Caetano (1984) extracts an extremely interesting 
discussion in the House between Rep. Legnani (Batllista) and Rep. Manini Ríos (Riverista) on the 
possibility that these two sectors of the PC would split electorally. Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de 
Representantes. Tomo 350, p.593 (April 2
nd
 1929 Session).  
19 In the PN, a minority sector ideologically to the left of Herrera created the Radical Blanco Party (PBR – 
Partido Blanco Radical) before the 1925 election, although obtaining only 1.22% of the votes. The Party 
lasted until 1933. Another minority sector ideologically to the left of the majority conservative sector 
Herrerismo created in 1931 the Independent National Party (PNI – Partido Nacional Independiente), 
formally splitting from the PN until the 1958 election. These two secessions reinforced Herrera’s leadership 
in the party, as well as the PN’s conservative identity. 
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Riverista sector.
20
 In 1925, the FR, led a process of inter-sectoral ad hoc coordination, 
and cross-sectoral dialogue among business groups intensified in order to oppose a set of 
proposed laws, the most important of which was the creation of the National meat 
processing plant; the creation of public pension fund; and the creation of a uniform 
minimum wage (Caetano 1984). 
Conservative sectors in the PC and the PN, as well as organized business, mostly 
the agrarian sector, began in the 1920s to favor fascist-like regimes. In particular, 
Mussolini’s regime in Italy was viewed as a desirable path of development for national 
political institutions, and conservative sectors supported Franco’s uprising and regime in 
Spain (Caetano 1984, Barran 2004).  
Although the CVE successfully lobbied to block most of the social and labor 
reforms proposed by Batllismo, organized business did not create a durable umbrella 
organization as was the case in Chile during the same period.
21
 The main reason is that 
FR’s leaders were also political figures in both the PN and the PC, particularly from the 
Herrerismo and Riverismo sectors, respectively.
22
 
Unlike Chile, Uruguay was oriented toward Europe, not toward the United States 
as Chile. The agrarian business sector (mostly made up by cattle growers) had a close 
                                                             
20 FR’s successful pressure over Viera’s government to provoke the 1916 social reforms halt constituted a 
landmark in terms of organized business capacity for political strategy. 
21
 In particular, CVE opposed the creation of Wage Councils in industry, as well as the creation of 
unemployment benefits in 1932 (Caetano and Jacob 1989:147). 
22
 Caetano (1984) shows that among the 30 members of the FR's Board of Directors in 1929, 7 were 
members of the House at the same time (4 Herreristas, 2 Riveristas, and even 1 Ballista). This includes Mr. 
Pedro Maninni Ríos, President of the FR and at the same time leader of the Riverista sector. Considering 
also past political action (in Congress or in the Executive Power), 16 out of 30 of them were in this 
category (8 Herreristas and 4 Riveristas among them). 
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economic relationship with Britain, but stood against US meat processing plants’ trusts 
and protectionist policies (Caetano 1984). Foreign capital sided with domestic business in 
opposing the Batllista reformism (Barran 2004).
23
 
Between neo-corporatism and pluralistic contestation (1930-1958) 
This period is important for the evolution of labor and business relations. The ISI model 
changed drastically the role of the state in the economy. The measures to discourage 
imports gave the state a set of resources which were usually used to protect certain 
sectors, often in the industrial realm. Therefore, bargaining and coalitional activity in the 
political arena during the period focused on sectoral “rent-seeking” from the state.    
It was during this period that the path of Southern Cone and advanced industrial 
political economies departed, following the long-lasting ISI model in the former region 
and  integration to the global market in the latter. Although the ISI model posed similar 
challenges to the state, business and labor in the four analyzed Southern Cone political 
economies; labor and business in Chile and Uruguay remained independent from the state 
while labor and business in Argentina and Brazil were coopted by populist governments.  
Organization and power of labor movements  
Labor in Chile was repressed and the FOCh was outlawed in 1927, only replaced by the 
CTCh a decade later, in 1936. Although this new central organization did not last long, it 
paved the path for the creation of the CUT and, with it, the emergence of an important 
labor-left coalition with Socialists and Communists. In contrast, labor in Uruguay 
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 For a detailed analysis of foreign investment in Uruguay during the period refer to: Jacob, Raul. 1979. 
Inversiones Extranjeras y Petróleo. Montevideo, Fundación de Cultura Universitaria.  
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remained sectorally and ideologically divided, mostly because of its excellent 
relationship with the Batllista sector of the Colorado Party and the sector-level collective 
bargaining model put in place since 1943. 
The democratic breakdowns in both Chile and Uruguay during the 1930s were 
triggered by the Conservatives and had negative consequences on labor. However, 
shortly after democracy was reinstated in the second part of the 1930s, the scenario 
turned in favor of labor, as left-of-center coalitions came into power. In Chile, labor 
participated in the coalition, in Uruguay it did not.   
Alessandri Palma’s second term was favorable to labor, and so the CTCh was 
created in 1936 to replace the FOCh.
24
 Its ideological orientation was socialist, 
communist, radical democrat, falangist,
25
 and independent, although its board of directors 
had a left-of-center inclination (Muñoz Gomá and Arriagada 1977). The CTCh 
participated on the left-of-center ruling coalition led by the Radical Party governments of 
Aguirre Cerda (1938-1942) and Ríos (1942-1946), but distanced itself progressively from 
Gonzalez Videla’s government until the complete break in 1948 after he banned the 
Communist Party.  
The labor movement remained centralized, and industrial relations moved from 
pure contestation to bargaining pluralism in the urban sectors. However, rural workers’ 
unionization was aborted as early as 1939 as part of the negotiations between Aguirre 
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 The CTCh was formed by nitrate, copper, coal, railroad and textile workers, claiming 200,000 members 
organized in 1,200 unions. 
25
 Falange Nacional was a Catholic center party that split from the Conservative Party in 1939. It remained 
mostly regional until it participated in 1956 parliamentary elections under the name of “Christian 
Democratic Party” (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) (Moulián 1986b). 
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Cerda’s government and the SNA to form the Corporation of Production Promotion 
(CORFO – Corporación de Fomento de la Producción) (Muñoz Gomá and Arriagada 
1977:39; Moulián 1989:38).  
The CTCh participated in the CORFO negotiations but would have only one 
member out of 23 on its board of directors. Muñoz Gomá and Arriagada (1977) use press 
reports to demonstrate that the CTCh organized fewer strikes during the Popular Front 
(FP –Frente Popular) coalition period (1938-41) than in the period between 1916-1925, 
even when strikes were not allowed in the latter but they were in the former. 
The level of organized labor activity was low between 1943 and 1953 for two 
reasons: the repeated conflicts between Communists and Socialists (1945-46), and 
Communist participation in Gonzalez Videla’s government (Moulián 1989). The 
reorganization process slowly began in 1948 and ended by forming the National 
Commission of Workers Unity (Comisión Nacional de Unidad Sindical) with the 
participation of 35 federations and unions represented by more than 2,000 delegates 
(Angell 1974, p. 222-226). 
As elsewhere in the region, Ibañez del Campo attempted to have organized labor 
represented by a government dependent organization, the National Federation of 
Independent Workers (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Independientes) (Salinas 
1980:146). This organization was short-lived, however, and the CUT, which conducted 
three general strikes against Ibáñez's government, remained as the undisputed umbrella 
organization for labor.  
The period between 1943 and 1951 in Uruguay is one of progressive social 
reforms led by the PC's Neo-batllismo, among which stand out are the creation of 
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centralized councils for wage bargaining (1943) and a law establishing gender equality 
(1946). In terms of growth-oriented strategies, Uruguay consolidated its ISI model and 
nationalized foreign owned services. 
At the same time, Neo-Batllismo unsuccessfully attempted to co-opt organized 
labor, in a populist-like top-down fashion, by creating the labor confederation Labor 
Batllista Action (AGB - Acción Gremial Batllista) (1947-1950). Although it did not take 
a formal part in the AGB, organized labor benefited from Neo-batllismo. For example, 
the creation of the Wage Councils (1943) encouraged labor unionization. However, labor 
organization remained atomized until the end of the 1950s. After the CGTU dissolved in 
the 1930s, the General Workers Union (UGT - Unión General de Trabajadores) was 
created in 1942 as a new Communist-led labor central association. During this period, 
public workers as a proportion of the labor force rose significantly, from 2.9 percent in 
1941 to 6.9 percent in 1955, signaling the entry of the "state as employer" as an important 
actor. 
Overall, the Uruguayan labor movement began a process of concentration 
triggered by the centralization of collective bargaining institutions, but it did not enter a 
process of centralization until the 1960s. The state became a central actor in terms of 
industrial relations, incentivizing negotiations between a divided and politically weak 
labor and a rent-seeking uncoordinated business.         
To sum up, the most important point during this period in terms of the labor 
movements in Chile and Uruguay is that they remained autonomous from the state. 
Organized labor in Chile and Uruguay departed from the populist cooptation pattern 
present in Argentina, Brazil and some southern European countries. Chilean labor 
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remained organized with high levels of centralization despite a hostile political 
environment with intransigent organized business and governments that still used 
repression as a strategy when the circumstances demanded. Chilean labor organization 
resembled the British Trade Union Confederation (TUC) in that it had reasonable levels 
of centralization with a high proportion of members (Luebbert 1993). In Uruguay, 
organized labor remained divided along ideological lines at a time when the political 
system was  led by a pro-labor liberal coalition, making Uruguay comparable to the 
French, Italian and even Finnish cases (although the Finnish movement had higher levels 
of centralization). The common aspect of all these cases is the high fragmentation as a 
result of ideological tension among groups (Crouch 1993).      
Business organization 
In Chile, business organization became more centralized after the so-called “First 
Socialist Republic” of 1932 (Arriagada 2004). Business formed the Commerce and 
Production Corporation (CPC) in 1934 but later abandoned this organization to focus on 
sectoral strategies after the Production Promotion Corporation (CORFO) was created in 
1939. In Uruguay, business reversed its centralization process, in part because 
institutionalized sectoral participation in decision making was granted by the government 
with the creation of the Import and Export Control Commission (CIE - Contralor de 
Importaciones y Exportaciones) between 1931 and 1941. 
Centralization and coordination processes were interrupted in both countries in 
the 1940s, as the environment changed radically for several reasons. First, the increasing 
protection of industrial sectors led to a split between rural and urban business. Although 
rural business continued to be politically influential, urban sectors took the lead in the 
 103 
1
0
3
 
[Typ
e a 
formation of political coalitions. Second, this divide was reinforced by business 
participation in the state’s decision making, which was organized this participation by 
sectors. Third, market protection (and control) institutions in which business sectors had 
formal participation provided the opportunity for rent-seeking strategies to slowly replace 
productive-seeking ones. This rent-seeking strategy also reinforced sectionalism because 
of control over finite resources for rent generation.          
There is no dispute among Chilean scholars about the decline of CPC and the 
expansion of sectoral associations between the 1940s and 1970s (Muñoz Gomá and 
Arriagada 1977, Arriagada 2004, Schneider 2004). The SNA, the main CPC partner in its 
first years, distanced itself from government protectionist initiatives, which also distanced 
this sectoral association from Sofofa. Rural sectors remained intransigent with respect to 
labor. The SNA unsuccessfully lobbied for suspending unionization efforts in rural 
sectors during Alessandri Palma’s administration, but were successful during Aguirre 
Cerda’s administration (Muñoz Gomá and Arriagada 1977, Arriagada 2004). The SNA 
blocked passage of a 1934 proposal to provide rural workers with a minimum wage, 
which was only passed in 1954. Rural unionization was passed even later, in 1967 
(Arriagada 2004:111).  
On the other hand, Sofofa, of which Aguirre Cerda was a member, distanced itself 
from Conservatives and strengthened ties with Liberals and with Radicals. This 
organization supported protectionism and the creation of Corfo, which was the vehicle 
for Chilean development, first under the ISI model and then during Allende’s socialist 
experiment. Businesses became rent-seekers instead of profit-seekers because negative 
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real interest rates made it possible to take out loans with a declining interest. Clientelism 
and corporatism also played a role in the success of rent-seeking strategies (Haindl 2007).  
Uruguayan business gained institutionalized decision making ability after Terra’s 
term in office from 1931 to 1938. Of particular importance was the creation of the Import 
and Export Control Commission,
26
 which operated until 1961 and controlled foreign 
exchange decisions, the main tool for economic policies that supported the ISI model. 
Participation in this Commission provided organized business with the possibility of 
controlling the economy through corporatist participation in the state (Zurbriggen 2006). 
CIU and CNC gained importance as some of their sectoral interests diverged during the 
industrialization phase. Government sided more often with the CIU, as it was interested 
in subsidizing industrial development to the detriment of importers. 
In the case of Uruguay, the incentives for organizational centralization created by 
the state through centralized bargaining institutions were offset by the incentives by a 
protected economy to promote sectionalism. Business in Chile followed a peculiar 
organizational path, with a centralized organization (CPC) languishing and sector 
strengths growing. The high levels of political influence that business had during the 
period allowed it to benefit from rent-seeking, and at the same time remain in a system of 
pluralistic contestation in the area of industrial relations, with an exclusionary attitude 
toward labor after 1948.  
Any comparison between post-war European business organization and the 
Southern Cone one, should consider the differences in the incentives posed by WWII in 
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 The Board of Directors of the Commission had 9 members: 4 business chamber representatives (CIU, 
CNC, CMPP, and one for FR and ARU), and 5 members from government (Zurbriggen 2006). 
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the European cases (Keohane 1984, Crouch 1993). However, some similarities can be 
identified. Business organization in Uruguay followed a path comparable to the one in 
Finland, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Italy, where important steps toward greater 
central involvement by employers’ associations were made, although in an unsystematic 
manner (Crouch 1993). In particular, Ireland and Uruguay are much alike during the 
period, with the establishment of centralized bargaining patterns in a context of divided 
labor and business sectorialism. 
Coalitional formation and political activity 
While Uruguay, led by the Reformist coalition in the Colorado Party, established 
centralized wage bargaining institutions for governing industrial relations, the Reformist 
and Populist ruling coalitions in Chile did not alter pluralistic bargaining. Bargaining 
among different pressure groups, including labor and business, was governed by rent-
seeking goals. Since the state managed a finite amount of resources and therefore had a 
limited capability to protect labor or business form the global market, universalistic 
oriented strategies were replaced by sector oriented ones within both labor and business. 
Then as the ISI model stagnated, industrial relations in both countries became 
increasingly acrimonious. 
In Chile, in contrast, the party system entered a process of change in its defining 
cleavages that led to the democratic breakdown in 1973. Elites, including business, had 
always relied on an exclusionary strategy with respect to the working class. However, 
with the progressive elimination of voting restrictions since the 1950s, this strategy 
became less sustainable. By the same token, an expanding electorate posed important 
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challenges to the existing parties in terms of representing an increasing set of demands, 
and that opened the door for party realignment or renovation. 
 
Table 13. Distributive coalitions during the ISI and sectoral corporatism period  
Year Coalition Political Actors Business Actors Labor 
Actors 
Strongly 
dominant 
Weakely 
dominant 
Uruguay 
Reformist  PC – Neo-batllista - AGB 1943-1951 1951-1958 
Conserva-
tive  
PN 
 
Industrial 
Chamber; 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
- 1933-1938 1938-1943 
Chile  
Reformist  Liberal Party 
(1932-38); Broad 
Front/Popular 
Alliance (Radicals, 
Communists (until 
1948) and 
Socialists) 
Sofofa (Liberal P. 
and Radical P.) 
CTCh  1938-1948 1932-1938 
& 
1948-1952 
Conserva-
tive  
Conservative and 
Liberal Parties 
Sofofa (Liberals) - - - 
Populist Military and 
Agrarian Labor 
Party 
SNA FNTI 1952-1958 - 
 
 
As the electorate expanded, elites began distancing themselves from the traditional 
Conservative and Liberal parties. Rural sectors led by SNA formed the Agrarian Party, as 
mentioned above, and in 1945 joined the newly formed Agrarian Labor Party to support 
Ibañez del Campo's candidacy in 1952. This populist coalition that dominated politics 
between 1952 and 1958, maintained an exclusionary and intransigent relationship with 
labor (Moulián 1986a). 
Although Ibañez del Campo had favored a developmentarist strategy in the past, 
the increasing ISI stagnation and inflation led him to hire US experts to develop a new 
stabilization program (Haindl 2007).  Only the short term recommendations of the Klein-
Saks mission were implemented, but the episode illustrates the Chilean political elite’s 
 107 
1
0
7
 
[Typ
e a 
geopolitical reference center. In terms of industrial relations, the Klein-Saks mission 
recommended that wage increases be lower than cost of living increases in the short-run 
and to be completely determined by the market in the long-run, which reinforced the 
model of pluralistic bargaining.   
Urban elites and business maintained an arm’s length relationship with the 
Conservative and Liberal parties. Alessandri Palma (1920 to 1924; 1925; 1932 to 1938), 
and later on Alessandri Rodríguez (1958 to 1964) were endorsed by these two parties but 
maintained a rather independent position during their presidencies (Moulián 1989, 
Arriagada 2004 and Haindl 2007). This coalition favored increased labor rights and 
electorate expansion, but it did not form a coalition with labor. There was not a liberal-
labor coalition.  
A middle class coalition led by the Radical Party was dominant during the 1940s, 
and it included organized labor as well as Socialists and Communists, but it slowly fell 
apart as it allied itself with the Liberals during the second part of González Videla’s term. 
This economic and political turn to the right allowed Christian Democracy to replace the 
Radical Party as the middle class representative and it created an opportunity for a class 
coalition uniting Communists, Socialists and the CUT that crystalized during the 1960s 
and would win the 1970 election by a narrow margin.
27
 
An expanding electorate in the 1960s strengthened this coalition (Moulián 
1986b). While the principle of proportionality decreased rural overrepresentation, the 
reincorporation of Communists to political life (1958) and the norm of mandatory voter 
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 Christian Democracy (1956) originated from the Falange Party (1939) that seceded from the 
Conservative Party. 
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registration (1962) expanded the electorate greatly. While the latter increased the 
electorate by an estimated 106 percent, the mandatory registration law increased it by 
another 135 percent (Moulián 1986b:23). Because of the 1958-1962 reforms, registration 
increased from 40 percent to 74 percent of eligible population, and the number of citizens 
voting doubled from 35.4 percent in 1961 to 62.9 percent in 1964 (Moulián 1989). Then 
the electorate increased by another 30 percent between 1971 and 1973 after the age 
requirement for voting changed from 21 to 18 years (19 percent in terms of registration). 
The party system in Uruguay remained fragmented, but while Colorado fractions 
stayed inside the Party, the Nacional Party voted to split after the creation of the 
Independent Nacional Party (PNI – Partido Nacional Independiente) in 1931, which 
grouped the anti-Herrerista sectors. Terra’s dictatorship, between 1933 and 1938, was a 
period of exclusionary policies toward labor and a slow change in relative influence 
between rural and urban business associations. During this period, however, business 
associations strengthened its access to institutionalized decision making; urban 
associations being stronger than rural ones. The conservative coalition was strongly 
dominant during most of this period, but then weakened during the transition period 
between 1938 and 1943.  
The period between 1943 and 1951 was one of a second wave of progressive 
social reforms, among which were the creation of sectoral Work Councils for negotiating 
salary and labor conditions (1943) and a law establishing gender equality (1946). In terms 
of growth-oriented strategies, Uruguay consolidated its ISI model and nationalized 
foreign owned services, including electricity, water, railroads and gas, among the main 
ones. Although sectoral corporatist approaches prevailed during the period, there was an 
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important attempt by President Batlle Berres (1947-1951) to fight against rent-seeking 
strategies. In particular, the government took over the Imports and Exports Control 
Commission (CIE) between 1949 and 1950 in order to reduce rent-seeking and practices 
of allocation of special benefits by business in the distribution of import quotas and 
foreign currency exchange rates (Zurbriggen 2006). The formal participation of 
organized business in economic institutions regulating the state continued to flourish. 
Zurbriggen (2006) finds that by the end of the 1940s, both the CIU and CNC had more 
than eighty delegates each in state commissions, plus their participation in the CIE.  
Organized labor benefited from the Neo-batllismo coalition, but did not take a 
formal part in it. There was no liberal-labor coalition in Uruguay, either. The creation of 
the Wage Councils encouraged a period of labor unionization in the public and private 
sectors. However, labor organization remained atomized until the end of the 1950s.  
The 1952 constitutional reform replaced the President by a National Government 
Council (Consejo Nacional de Gobierno) consisting of nine members, five from the 
majority party and four from the minority party.
28
. This reform had three important 
consequences: first, it allowed the Herrerismo sector to return to government (1958-
1966); second, the Herrerismo sector and the PC's Conservative sector in the Council 
slowed or blocked social reforms; and third, the Neo-batllista coalition was weakened as 
Batlle Berres opposed the reforms. No incumbent party fraction was reelected between 
1952-1966, which illustrates the weakness of the Reformist and Conservative coalitions, 
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 As members of the Council were proportionally distributed by the vote of Party Sectors within each 
party, the sector with the majority of popular vote did only hold a proportional majority in the Council. 
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as well as the inability of the political system to stop ISI stagnation or growing social 
discontent.  
To sum up, there is no experience of consociational government. Uruguayan 
centralized wage bargaining experience between 1943 and 1968 departed from pure 
pluralistic wage bargaining, but the weakness of labor due to internal divisions, the 
sectionalism of business and the preeminent role of the state did not allow for the 
development of consociational practices. On the contrary and in spite of having a united 
and politically active organized labor, Chile returned to exclusionary policies after 1948.  
Therefore, bitter divisions among organized labor, business intransigency or even 
government-business alliances for pursuing exclusionary policies, are present in the 
agrarian dominated political economies of Chile and Uruguay. These attributes led to the 
expected consequences in both cases. The labor movement in Uruguay began a process of 
centralization as pro-labor sectors in the Colorado Party weakened. In Chile, the 
exclusionary policies pursued by the Radical Party coalition since 1948 and continued by 
Ibáñez del Campo, triggered the formation of a powerful class coalition uniting 
Communists, Socialists and organized labor.       
Polarization, violent contestation, and exclusion (1959-1982) 
The importance of the contextual analysis of this period is not so much in identifying the 
issues that are the subject of bargaining, because the democratic breakdown produced a 
profound change in both bargaining dynamics and topics, but in understanding 
organizational and coalitional dynamics. From distributive issues centered related to 
production and welfare, bargaining issues moved toward political matters such as 
freedom and human rights. However, in order to understand the relationship among the 
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actors at the onset of the redemocratization period, it is important to understand how 
organizational patterns and coalitions evolved. 
Two important events affected institutional stability in the political and economic 
realms during this period: democratic breakdowns followed by military rule for 
prolonged periods (more than a decade in both cases), and the dismantling of the ISI 
model. ISI stagnation and the political failure to cope with the problem of low growth and 
high inflation brought with it a crisis of representation that unfolded in party 
fractionalization and centrifugal dynamics in a Sartorian sense (Sartori 1995).  
These events challenged the stability needed for developing collective goods 
institutions – that is, stable industrial relations schemes (Olson 1982). After 1973, 
bargaining and coalitional activity was largely suspended, controlled by the military 
governments or conducted behind the scenes.  
Organization and power of labor movements  
This period began with the centralization of organized labor in both countries and, for the 
case of Chile, active participation in the left-of-center political coalition with 
Communists and Socialists. However, the period ended with strong repression of the 
labor movement by the Bureaucratic Authoritarian regime. During the 1973-1984 period 
in Uruguay, and 1973-1989 in Chile, the labor movement was banned and thus union 
density and political power declined dramatically. However, in both countries labor 
movements remained active clandestinely.  
In Chile, CUT’s role in voicing the concerns of labor grew and its political power 
also increased until 1973. Rural unionization was finally passed in 1967, which began a 
period of intense organizing in rural areas, provoking intense conflict with rural business 
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(Haindl 2007) and an alignment with left-of-center class-oriented political parties. 
Organized labor actively participated on the Popular Unity (UP – Unidad Popular) 
coalition and Allende’s government (1970-1973), and was heavily repressed by the 
Pinochet regime. By the end of the period, its activity was purely clandestine and its 
relationship with left-of-center parties was distant.  
In 1959, Uruguayan labor began a process of centralization that ended with the 
foundation of the National Workers Organization (CNT – Convención Nacional de 
Trabajadores) between 1964 and 1966 (Rodriguez 1966). This was a landmark regarding 
labor capacity for political strategy, although it was only in the post-dictatorial period that 
organized labor formed a coalition with the left-of-center Broad Front (FA – Frente 
Amplio).
29
 Labor power concentration was also interrupted by the 1973 democratic 
breakdown which, as in the Chilean case, forced labor into clandestine activity, with the 
consequent loss of a political power and membership.    
To sum up, labor movements in Chile and Uruguay gained in organization and 
political power until the democratic breakdowns in 1973. However, the paths taken by 
labor organization paths diverged after the return to democracy. In Uruguay, labor 
maintained a centralized characteristic in spite of the challenges that neoliberalism posed 
on the movement. In Chile, on the contrary, the CUT failed to maintain a centralized 
labor organization, thus declining in strength while other labor organizations emerged. In 
other words, labor organization was not interrupted by authoritarian rule in Uruguay, 
while it was interrupted in Chile. There are two causes for this that will be analyzed in the 
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 For the 1971 election (the first one after the CNT formation), the working class vote for the PC and the 
PN combined came to slightly over 50 percent. FA vote composition for that election included 43 percent 
of upper and middle class vote (Collier and Collier 1991). 
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next chapter: the military government’s heritage in terms of labor laws and the 
willingness of left-of-center political parties to form coalitions with labor during the 
1990s and 2000s.      
Bureaucratic Authoritarian regimes in the Southern Cone are difficult to compare 
to Europe and the United States in terms of labor’s organization and power. Although 
Spain and Portugal would re-democratize during this period, previous authoritarian 
regimes lasted much longer than those in Chile and Uruguay. The change in power and 
organization of labor in Chile stands alone, given the unparalleled legal restrictions with 
which Chile emerged from military rule. On the contrary, Uruguayan labor rapidly 
reorganized and returned to former levels of membership, which resembles the cases of 
post-World War II Germany and Austria (Crouch 1993). After the return to democracy, 
the neoliberal global trend in the 1990s threatened labor in Chile and Uruguay, but their 
ability to form coalitions with left-of-center parties would mark their evolution during the 
period, as will be shown in the next chapter.     
Business organization 
Divisions within the business sector increased with the stagnation of the ISI model and 
the subsequent crisis of rent-seeking strategies brought about because the State was 
progressive unable to deliver special benefits. Industry was the most affected by this 
stagnation in both countries (Haindl 2007, Zurbriggen 2006). However, the transition 
from an ISI economy to an integrated global market had different characteristics in Chile 
and Uruguay, which shaped the incentives and strategies for business organization. While 
the Chilean military explicitly reshaped business incentives in order to revitalize the 
CPC, the Uruguayan military did not attempt such a thing while sectors continued in their 
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increasingly unfruitful and uncoordinated rent-seeking dynamic. The two military 
governments’ different strategies led to different outcomes in terms of how inter-sectoral 
conflicts were managed. In Chile, the military strategy favored business lobbying through 
the CPC, as it forced business to resolve their inter-sectoral conflicts before lobbying 
with government. In Uruguay, on the contrary, the military dealt with each sector 
separately, continuing the strategy of providing special benefits but in an increasingly 
scarce environment.   
As Arriagada (2004) states, the 1967-1973 period witnessed a series of changes 
that were critical for the Chilean business class. The progressive expansion of the 
franchise until universal suffrage was reached in 1971 proved to be particularly damaging 
for the right, whose strategies traditionally employed exclusionary tactics. Also, the land 
reform initiated by Frei Montalva and deepened under Allende threatened rural property 
rights not simply because of land expropriation but also because some land was occupied 
illegally (Arriagada 2004, Haindl 2007). Urban business was also seriously threatened by 
Allende administration’s nationalization of industries. In 1970 there were only 79 public 
firms, but by 1972 Allende’s government had expropriated 202 private firms and 
appointed interveners in another 350. CORFO was responsible for administering these 
businesses, controlling 561 firms in its peak (Haindl 2007).  
In the 1970s, business in Chile divided in an internationalized group led by the 
finance sector that pushed for a quick and radical economic opening, and a gradualist 
domestic capital led group (Silva 1993) also pushing for liberalization, but at a slower 
pace. Both groups supported the military coup and subsequent regime, but did not 
coordinate but rather competed for political influence. 
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CPC became relevant during this period because Pinochet’s regime refused to 
deal separately with each sector. Business sectors were asked to agree on a single 
development plan after 1982, which led to a bitter conflict between liberalization 
promoters and an industrial sector with protectionist preferences. The conflict was solved 
in favor of the first group, while SOFOFA followed as secondary actors although still 
inside CPC (Silva 1993). SNA, SONAMI and the finance sector led CPCs political action 
after 1982. This process of forced business reorganization is at the base of business 
political and industrial relations strategies from then to present. During the dictatorship, 
the CPC had a hegemonic role in restructuring the productive system, especially after the 
Social and Economic Council (SEC) was created to advice Pinochet in 1984 (Silva 1993). 
Business in Uruguay continued mostly uncoordinated, participating in Wage 
Councils until they were abandoned in 1968. Rural business recovered its capacity for 
political strategy after a period of decay with the formation of the Federal League for 
Rural Action (Liga Federal de Acción Ruralista) in the mid-1950s. As in Chile, rural 
economic groups were more enthusiastic about economic liberalization than industry and 
urban business (Zurbriggen 2006). However, different from Chile although heavily 
fragmented, the Colorado and the Nacional Parties continued to represent business 
sectors and channeled their political demands over the period. Foreign investment in 
Uruguay was almost nonexistent during this period, and the prominence of the primary 
sector in earning foreign exchange, as well as the absence of a sizeable finance sector, did 
not favor the formation of a strong internationalized capital sector as was the case in 
Chile.  
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Wage Councils were replaced by the Council on Wages and Prices (COPRIN – 
Comisión de Productividad, Precios e Ingresos).
30
 The continuity of a modified form of 
collective bargaining structure, albeit increasingly authoritarian and skewed toward 
business, and the absence of a concrete liberalization plan, allowed business to maintain a 
rent-seeking strategy even after the coup. The COPRIN was in place until it was replaced 
in 1978 by the National Direction for Costs, Prices and Income (DINACOPRIN – 
Dirección Nacional de Costos, Precios e Ingresos) in 1978. This new council set salary 
increases by decrees until the end of the military regime. Therefore, in terms of business 
organization and coordination, the Uruguayan military regime was just a parenthesis 
during which business groups, without direct involvement in the regime as in Chile, 
benefited from the favorable terms of industrial relations.  
To sum up, during this period business rent-seeking strategies based on sectoral 
competition over access to state-managed resources were affected by the progressive 
stagnation and crisis of the ISI model. However, the authoritarian nature of the political 
processes that unfolded in the 1970s put Chile and Uruguay on different paths of business 
organization while entering the global market.  
Coalitional formation and political activity 
The strength of the coalitions differed in the two countries, although centrifugal dynamics 
operated in both cases. Chilean politics began a strong turn to the left during the last 
years of the Christian Democratic government (1964-1970) and especially during 
                                                             
30 COPRIN was integrated by 5 delegates from the Executive Power, two from organized business and two 
from organized labor, although their delegates were selected by the government from a six candidate list 
these organizations had to handle. 
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Allende’s period. Both the Allende coalition and then the military one attempted to 
radically modify the ISI model, the former toward a socialist economy and the latter 
toward a liberal one. In Uruguay, politics also radicalized, but party fragmentation 
increased and the attempts to modify the ISI model were orthodox and unsuccessful. The 
main issues on which bargaining among the state, business and labor focused was the 
survival of “rent-seeking” strategies in a context of stagnation and increasing social and 
political unrest. In Chile, since the late 1960s, the economic model as a whole became a 
central bargaining issue inside the left-of-center coalition and between it and the right of 
center political parties and business.   
 
Table 14. Distributive coalitions during the ISI crisis and democratic breakdown 
Year Coalition Political Actors Business 
Actors 
Labor 
Actors 
Strongly 
dominant 
Weakely 
dominant 
Uruguay 
Reformist  Inexistent as such. 
High fragmentation, 
reformist actors are:  
FA 
PN – Wilsonismo 
- CNT - - 
Conserva-
tive  
PC – Pachequismo 
PC – Batllismo 
Commerce 
Chamber 
- 1973-
1985 
1966-
1973 
Conserva-
tive 
Military and minor 
Colorado Groups 
- - 1973-
1985 
- 
Chile 
Reformist  Christian Democrats Sofofa, 
Sonami 
- 1964-
1970 
- 
Reformist Popular Union 
(Socialists and 
Comunists) 
 CUT 1970-
1973 
- 
Conserva-
tive 
Liberal and 
Conservative Parties 
SNA  - - 1958-
1964 
Conserva-
tive 
Military CPC (since 
1982) 
Internationali-
zed capital 
- 1973-
1990 
- 
 
 
The rise of the Christian Democracy in Chile beginning in the late 1950s completely 
changed that country’s coalitional scenario. Christian Democracy replaced the Radical 
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Party as the strong party at the center of the political spectrum, and its refusal to form a 
coalition with either the Right or the Left had important consequences.
31
 However, after 
winning the 1964 election, internal conflicts between the “moderates” and the “rebels” 
ended with this latter splitting to form the Popular United Action Movement (MAPU - 
Movimiento de Acción Popular Unido) (Moulián 1986b). Meanwhile, the Radical Party 
moved to the right-of-center and formed electoral alliances in support of right-of-center 
candidates. 
After the 12.5% combined Liberal and Conservative parties vote in the 1965 
parliamentary election, these two parties merged, along with other minor parties, creating 
the Nacional Party (Moulián 1989). This inchoate party endorsed Alessandri for the 1970 
election, supported Pinochet’s coup and promoted military continuity in the 1988 
plebiscite. However, it lost its following almost completely after re-democratization and 
was disbanded in 1994. 
Since the early 1960s, Communists, Socialists and the CUT formed the Popular 
Unity coalition that endorsed Allende in the 1970 election (UP – Unidad Popular). This 
was a class alliance, explicitly excluding the Radical Party, with which left-of-center 
parties had formed alliances in the 1930s and 1940s. MAPU entered the UP alliance for 
the 1970 election. However, this coalition also suffered internal tensions between 
“Radicals” (rupturistas) and “Bargainers” (negociadores) as soon as the 1970 election 
was won (Moulián 1986b).   
                                                             
31
 Christian Democrat electoral vote increased steadily from 6.37% in 1956 to 22.8% in 1963, while the 
Radical Party remained in a 22% average and the right (Liberal and Conservative parties together) voted in 
the 24-31 percent range (Moulián 1989). 
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State participation in the economy increased after Christian Democrats created the 
National Planning Office (ODEPLAN – Oficina de Planificación Nacional), increased 
taxes, partially nationalized mines, and extended the land reform. This marked a 
departure from Alessandi Rodriguez’ liberalization attempt and the advice of the Klein-
Saks mission (Haindl 2007).  
It was during Allende’s term that an anti-socialist coalition crystalized (Silva 
1993). Threats to private property encouraged interest convergence between capitalists, 
landowners, the middle classes and opposition parties (and the military). Without 
exception, big business organizations favored gradualist liberalization and supported the 
military regime between 1973 and 1975. This gradualist period conformed to classical 
observations about authoritarianism in Latin America. At the same time, a radical 
internationalist group (Monday Club and the Brick, Chicago Boys) challenged the 
gradualists between 1975 and 1978, and eventually gained the military’s support (Silva 
1993). 
After the 1982 debt crisis and until 1988, a new pragmatic liberal coalition 
including internationalist and export oriented business (CNC, SONAMI, SNA) and 
finance sector organizations (ABIF – Asociación de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras) 
dominated the political scene. Industrialists accepted radical liberalization because the 
military gave them no other choice (Silva 1993). Overall, business participation in the 
military coalition was continuous, with a fluctuating balance in terms of business groups’ 
relative influence upon policies. Arriagada (2004) divides business action during the 
military regime into three periods. Between 1973 and 1976, the military was not 
susceptible to business influence because it was engaged in repressing dissidents. The 
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years between 1976 and 1982 marked the period of supremacy of the Chicago Boys, in 
which the military made it clear that it would not tolerate dissent from their policies. 
After the 1982 crisis and until the end of the regime in 1989 there was a period of 
pragmatism, with give and take between policymakers and the CPC. 
The change that took place in market institutions in Chile under military rule and 
the impact of the “Chicago Boys” doctrine should be regarded as unusual, being only 
possible because of the concentration of power in a military willing to be advised by 
intellectual elites trained in the United States under the “neoliberal” paradigm. It should 
be considered also that the new model’s ability to remain in place despite the deep post-
liberalization crisis that Chile went through during the early 1980s, is an equally unusual 
circumstance explained mostly by the length of military rule and the support the military 
retained among a significant part of the population. 
The liberalization period in Chile triggered a process of high industrial 
concentration. In the manufacturing industry, the number of firms employing 10 to 49 
workers grew 8.6 percent between 1985 and 1997, while the number of firms employing 
50 or more workers grew 54.7% during the same period (ENIA 2000). However, while 
the number of firms employing 10 to 49 workers grew another 9.4 percent between 1997 
and 2005, the number of firms employing 50 or more workers decreased by 4.5% during 
the same period (ENIA 2005). These figures suggest that the industry concentration 
process took place right after the liberal reforms pursued by the military government 
during the early 1980s, while it has not been substantively reversed since then. As Figure 
15 shows, this process of industry concentration in the manufacturing sector did not take 
place in Uruguay during the same period. On the contrary, Uruguay experienced a 
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decrease in number of large firms in the manufacturing sector between the early 1980s 
and late 1990s.  
 
Figure 15. Industry concentration in the manufacturing sector  
(1977-1978 = 100) 
 
Sources: Yearly Industrial Survey, Chile (years 1977, 1985, 1997, 2005). National Economic Census, 
Uruguay (years 1978, 1988, 1997, 2005) 
 
In Uruguay, the end of the second Nacional Party government in 1962 marked a period of 
party realignment, characterized by strong fractionalization and party defection 
(Gonzalez 1993). Until the coup there was intense inter-party mobility.
32
 However, the 
most important change during this period was the end of two-party dominance, as the 
newly formed Frente Amplio obtained 18 percent of the popular vote in the 1971 
                                                             
32
 In 1968, the sector Lista 99 of the PC, led by Zelmar Michelini, broke from the party to join the 
formation process for the left-of-center Broad Front (FA - Frente Amplio) coalition. In 1969, the former 
Senator of the PN and Ruralista Juan María Bordaberry joined the PC. Thus, the PC moved to the centre-
right. In the PN, the progressive sector led by Wilson Ferreira Aldunate gained majority, moving the party 
to the centre-left. 
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election. The FA was founded in 1968 by a merger of the Left Liberation Front Party 
(FIDEL – Frente Izquierda de Liberación), Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the 
Christian Democratic Party, “Lista 99”, “Lista 41” and other minor groups. The 
importance of this change in party politics was not evident until the next period, since 
democracy was suspended for 12 years until 1984.  
Labor continued its process of centralization until 1968 and did not participate 
actively in any coalition. Neither the Communist Party nor the CNT supported the 
National Liberation Movement – Tupamaros (MLN - Movimiento de Liberación 
Nacional). By the same token, neither the PC nor the PN supported military intervention 
and, after the coup all parties and the CNT were proscribed.  
After the self-coup that the Colorado government led by President Bordaberry 
triggered by closing down Parliament in 1973, Bordaberry attempted to suppress political 
parties and move to a plebiscitary militarized system, but the military removed him from 
office in 1976
33
. Then organized labor was proscribed and political parties were 
proscribed, but the military regime did not have wide support and civilian collaboration 
with the regime came mostly from a discredited PC right-of-center sector -Pachequismo-.  
The military regime did not accomplish much. It neither revitalized the ISI model 
nor decidedly turned to a neo-liberal model, as was the case of Chile. ISI stagnation 
continued while some liberalization was attempted by the military but without any 
                                                             
33
 As the plebiscite to allow the incumbent to be reelected was voted at the same time as the national 
election, Pacheco’s sector had two different candidates. Pacheco was the Presidential candidate if the 
plebiscite was ratified, and Bordaberry was the candidate if it was not. Thus, as the plebiscite was not 
ratified, 1971’s elections allowed taking office the candidate nobody voted, as Pacheco’s followers voted 
for Pacheco, pro-plebiscite voters voted to allow Pacheco a second term, and anti-plebiscite voters, mostly 
PN and FA voters, did not vote the PC .   
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success. Wage councils were substituted by the COPRIN then by the DINACOPRIN, as 
explained before. Therefore, even in an authoritarian setting there was still formal wage 
coordination, even when they were inefficient or rigged. Trade and foreign exchange 
policies were liberalized, which deepened the division between domestic industry and 
importers. 
To sum up, the combination of the economic model crisis with the political and 
institutional destabilization, in which nonpolitical actors (the military and the guerrillas) 
stepped into the arena, made it almost impossible to coordinate and negotiate a changing 
path. The history of repeated contestation and institutional instability reinforced 
preclusion of a democratic pattern to transform the political economy.   
The democratic transition and economic opening since the 1990s 
 Chile and Uruguay came out of the military periods in very different shape. While the 
military government in Uruguay was ineffective in coping with the economic crisis in 
general and ISI stagnation in particular, the Chilean military followed a well-designed 
plan toward a neoliberal integration into the global market using the Anglo-Saxon model.  
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Chilean military government created a strong alliance 
with organized business through the CPC and the novel right-of-center parties National 
Renovation (RN – Renovación Nacional) and Independent Democratic Union (UDI – 
Unión Democrática Independiente). Labor rights were reduced severely by a new set of 
labor laws in 1979, and labor organizations were strongly repressed
34
. Left-of-center and 
center political parties formed the Coalition for Democracy (Concertación para la 
                                                             
34
 A set of four decrees were passed in 1979, radically changing labor organization frameworks and 
collective bargaining. These were Legal Decrees No. 2756, 2757, 2758 and 2759. 
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Democracia), but excluded the Communist Party. This way, the class alliance between 
organized labor and left-of-center parties broke up to give way to a new center-left 
alliance between Christian Democrats and Socialists plus other minor parties. The pre-
1973 class alliance would not reemerge. At the same time, the so called authoritarian 
enclaves of the new democratic governments limited the options of left-of-center 
governments between 1990 and 2005 (Oppenheim 1993, Moulián 2002).   
Uruguay emerged from the military period without significant change in the 
stagnating ISI model except for straightforward liberalization via tariff cuts and partial 
tax exemptions on business sectors. Industrial relations during the first democratic 
administration resumed in the form they had until 1968, with the reinstatement of 
centralized wage councils, and organized labor movement rapidly gained more members 
and increased its ability to affect political decisions vis a vis a still fragmented organized 
business. This rapid rebuilding of pre-1973 institutions, even under a pressing 
international context favoring neoliberal polices, resembles similar processes under a 
comparably pressing international scenario in post-WWII Germany and Austria 
(Keohane 1984, Crouch 1991). It was only after 1990 that the novel PN government 
attempted to liberalize the political economy falling into line with the regional trend at 
the time (Alegre and Filgueira 2009). 
Conclusions  
This chapter has provided a comparative historical analysis of labor and business 
incentives to organize themselves and to develop strategies to meet their varying goals 
during the 20th century. Path-dependent processes have been identified and their 
evolution and eventual disruption analyzed. A lack of stable democratic institutions and 
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the highly protected economic model characterized Latin American developmental path 
during the 20th century. These factors generated incentives for labor and business 
organization and interaction that were different from the incentives for advanced 
industrial democracies after World War II.    
In business organization, the initial centralizing trend under an open market 
import-export growth model initially was discarded in favor of an ISI model.  The state-
managed highly protected economy since the 1930s allowed governments to deliver 
special benefits to powerful business sectors, mitigating their need to form a "peak 
organization". The rationale for this is that instead of confronting common market perils 
in which the state does not control the market but ally with labor and business to adjust, 
the state provided short term special benefits to some sectors either because of their 
organizational strength or their strategic importance. Once protected against market 
perils, these sectors began a process of differentiation with respect to other sectors that 
made cooperation among sectors unlikely.  
This process contributed to the divide between urban subsidized and rural export-
oriented business because of their conflicting interests with respect to taxation and 
government expenditure. The threat to property rights that Allende’s government posed 
on Chilean business encouraged them to overcome the urban-rural divide in order to fight 
a common enemy. However, once the military regime seized the government, the divide 
reappeared and was only mitigated by the decision to follow a liberal path toward 
integration into the global market, which helped some business groups and harmed 
others, neither of which had much political power to support or challenge the path. In 
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Uruguay, the rural-urban divide among business continued to govern their coordination 
patterns and political strategies; meanwhile, the economy stagnated under the ISI model. 
In analyzing labor’s organizational path, the state’s attitude toward labor shaped 
its organization and centralization. The exclusionary strategies followed in Chile 
encouraged the centralization of labor’s organizational structure. Exclusionary strategies 
toward labor increased during the Pinichet government.  In Uruguay, "peak 
organizations" were not formed until the 1960s because labor’s demands were channeled 
through an elite-based party system using a top-down approach.   
In Uruguay, the Batllismo and Neo-batllismo coalitions delivered a variety of 
benefits to a divided working class movement politically and organizationally incapable 
of challenging the liberal hegemony of these coalitions. The relationship between both 
PC sectors and labor closely resembles Luebbert’s (1987, 1991) Liberal-Labor alliance 
(Lib-Labism) in advanced democracies such as Switzerland, France and Britain at the 
time. However, the displacement of the Colorado Party to the right-of-center and the 
concomitant welfare and labor benefit retrenchment in the 1960s increased the need of 
organized labor to form an encompassing centralized organization to improve labor’s 
capacity for effective political action.   
The lack of cooperation between business and labor in both countries is a result of 
the fact that the incentives for corporatist arrangements were strong only when the actors 
were unable to outflank each other by using political leverage and legislative influence. 
That is, the level of cooperation was inversely related to the groups’ ability to achieve 
privileged access to government resources. Unstable institutional settings and a heavily 
protected economy were two factors that facilitated those groups’ abilities. These 
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dynamics were weakened when these economies entered the global market and the state 
lost the ability to provide special benefits. It was this change that weakened distributional 
coalitions and led to realignment in the new open market context, triggering a new 
process of conflict over a model for market competition. 
In terms of the effect of the international context on domestic politics, the 1929 
crisis had a much more important impact on these political economies than had the two 
world wars. This is quite different from Europe, where these wars constituted in many 
countries a time of forced cooperation between business and labor (Crouch 1991, 
Luebbert 1993). Also, the neoliberal period did not constitute the beginning of a liberal 
model of market capitalism in Uruguay but the beginning of its integration into the global 
market.  
 
  
Chapter 4. Political coalitions and market institutions in post-neoliberal Chile and 
Uruguay
 
 
“Lagos must choose between the distributive illusion and the telluric 
power of growth, (…) between commanding a government which either 
slows down the private sector or strategically allies with business.”  
Pedro Ibáñez, President of Corpora SA, at National Business Forum 2000 
(ENADE 2000). La Tercera, November 9
th
, 2000 
“We would have preferred the final draft to have more support from 
business and the opposition parties. (…) This [wage collective bargaining] 
law came to stay and any government attempting to remove it will have to 
confront the labor movement.” 
Fernando Pereira, PIT-CNT Coordinator, to El País, July 25
th
, 2009 
 
The Bureaucratic Authoritarian regimes in Chile (1973-1990) and Uruguay (1973-1985) 
inherited a stagnant ISI model. Although in both cases the political opposition and 
organized labor were brutally repressed, military governments followed different routes 
out of the ISI model. Along with the entire region, both countries were subject to the oil 
and debt crises and became highly dependent on international credit, most provided by 
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, with the explicit support of the United States (Stone 2002; Huber 
and Solt 2004; Brune, Garrett and Kogut 2004; Madrid 2005; Drezner 2007). Extensive 
programs of short term stabilization and long term structural adjustment were launched, 
and this neoliberal period was the beginning of the process of integration into the global 
market in Chile and Uruguay, but not necessarily upon the foundation of a liberal market 
economy.  
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In order to examine models of capitalism in Chile and Uruguay it is necessary to 
analyze how the distributive conflict among class and cross-class coalitions shaped the 
productive market institutions in the post-neoliberal period. The pages that follow do not 
argue that the institutional transformations during the neoliberal period failed to hold, 
particularly in Chile, where they were carried out by an unopposed military government, 
but that the main contribution of the neoliberal structural transformation is the integration 
of the two political economies into the global market, which was different in the two 
countries. In the case of Chile, the route toward a liberal market economy (LME) type 
was not modified during the post-neoliberal period. In Uruguay, the neoliberal period 
produced an economic opening to the global market, but Uruguay then returned to a 
Statist-Coordinated model of capitalism during the post-neoliberal period.  
Although the authoritarian nature of the institutional transformation in Chile and 
the authoritarian enclaves put in place by the military for the post-authoritarian period 
collaborated in the continuation of neoliberalism during the democratic 1990s, the nature 
of class coalitions in the post-authoritarian period is the proximate cause for the evolution 
of the Chilean model of capitalism. A similar argument can be made for Uruguay, where 
the military did not alter market institutions significantly. This chapter analyzes such 
coalitions and their bargaining over two key reforms in both countries: the tax and labor 
reforms (2001 in Chile, 2006 and 2008 in Uruguay).      
These reforms are of special interest because they are regulatory attempts over the 
two core issues that generate conflict in a production system -- the cost of labor and the 
source of revenues for redistribution. Both costs are imposed on the production process. 
These reforms were not the only ones during the post-authoritarian period, but are the 
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first ones during the post-neoliberal period in both countries. This is of particular 
importance in the case of Chile, where the Lagos government would be the first one since 
1990 in which the Concertación would have an effective majority in both Houses. There 
is wide consensus in the literature about the fact that the strong influence of IFIs on 
developing countries declined between the Russian and Asian crises in 1997 and 1998 
and the Argentinean crisis in 2001. In particular, the IMF was significantly discredited 
during the period and many countries, when possible, began to trade IMF debt for 
sovereign debt.   
Lagos’ term in Chile (2000-2006) and Vasquez’ term in Uruguay (2005-2009) are 
the first ones coming out of the crises in each country: the Asian one in Chile and the 
Argentinean one in Uruguay. These two governments are also the first left-of-center ones 
in both countries in the post-authoritarian period, with two Socialist Presidents. While it 
is true that the Concertación had been in office since 1990, the influence of the Socialist 
Party in the coalition grew after the year 2000.      
The distributive conflicts became evident in the debates over these reforms in 
both countries, in the strategies adopted by labor and business to influence the outcomes, 
and in the coalitions that were created or failed to be created. They provide the key 
elements to analyze the evolution of the capitalist model in each case. In particular, the 
reforms explain the evolution in this study’s four institutional spheres of relations: labor 
relations and labor markets, corporate governance and finance, skills formation, and the 
state redistributive effort. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first part analyzes labor and business’ 
political strategy capability at the onset of the reforms. The second part describes the 
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reform goals, contexts and bargaining processes. The various actors’ interests and 
lobbying strategies are presented, and then the bargaining process and short and long 
term coalitional arrangements among actors are discussed. The third part analyzes how 
coalitional conflicts over distribution shaped institutions in the four relevant spheres of 
relations in market capitalism presented in Chapter 2.  
Political strategy capability of labor and business at the onset of the reforms 
Before analyzing the reforms, Table 15 summarizes the situation of Chilean and 
Uruguayan business and labor in terms of political strategy capability as operationalized 
in Chapter 1 (Figure 2). At the onset of the reforms, labor in Chile and business in 
Uruguay are the weakest actors, as will be explained for each case.  
The weakness of Chilean organized labor in the post-neoliberal period is the 
consequence of the authoritarian regime’s policies, primarily the 1979 Labor Code. Its 
arm’s length distance with respect to the Concertación is due to the decision of the latter 
during the 1990s, when organized labor maintained a close relationship with the 
Communist Party. The closeness of Uruguayan organized labor to the Frente Amplio 
Party (FA) is a consequence of their joint opposition to the neoliberal economic reforms 
in the 1990s; although labor’s medium to low density over the period is also due to the 
wage bargaining suspension and other liberal policies in this period. The strength of 
organized business in Chile is also a consequence of policies of the authoritarian regime, 
in particular the government’s reluctance to negotiate separately with each sector and its 
interest in involving business in liberalization. 
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Table 15. Labor and business political strategy capability at the onset of reforms 
 Labor Business 
 Chile Uruguay Chile Uruguay 
Organizational 
centralization 
level 
Medium: Labor 
had two rival 
centrals since the 
CAT was formed in 
1995. In an already 
legal and coalitional 
hostile context to 
organized labor, 
there will be three 
rival labor centrals 
(CUT, CAT and 
UGT) and one other 
independent 
confederation 
(CGT) by the end 
of Lagos’ period.  
High: The PIT-
CNT will maintain 
itself as the only 
and uncontested 
labor central in 
Uruguay during the 
period. 
High: CPC is the 
uncontested 
business 
encompassing 
organization since 
the Pinochet’s 
regime forced 
business to 
centralize their 
demands and lobby. 
Low: Business 
sectors do not have 
an encompassing 
organization since in 
2002 the 
COSUPEM (1991-
2002) was 
dissolved. Conflicts 
between sectors 
were present during 
this encompassing 
attempt. 
Legal 
provisions for 
political action 
Low: Political 
strategy capability 
of labor is limited 
by a set of 
constraints imposed 
during the 
Pinochet’s regime, 
such as: 
- Employer’s right 
to replace a 
worker during a 
strike 
- Multi-RUT 
policy 
High: Organized 
labor has no legal 
regulations 
constraining its 
political strategy 
capability.  
High: Organized 
business has no 
legal regulations 
constraining its 
political strategy 
capability. 
High: Organized 
business has no 
legal regulations 
constraining its 
political strategy 
capability. 
Coverage / 
Density  levels 
Low: Organized 
labor represent 
between a 9 and 11 
percent of the labor 
force during the 
period. 
Medium: 
Organized labor 
represented about 
33 percent of the 
labor force during 
the period 1985-
1989; declining 
consistently during 
the following 
decade until 
reaching a 14 
percent in 2004. 
Between 2004 and 
2010 it increased 
consistently up to 
37 percent in 2011. 
Medium: CPC 
sectorial member 
organizations 
represent more than 
50 percent of firms 
in their sectors (as 
reported by the 
CPC). Small firms 
are 
underrepresented. 
Medium: Sectorial 
chambers represent 
more than 50 
percent of firms in 
their sectors (as 
reported by the 
different chambers).  
Small firms are 
underrepresented. 
Linkages with 
political 
leaders 
Low: Labor 
centrals relationship 
with political 
leaders is distant. 
High: PIT-CNT 
relationship with 
political leaders is 
close and ongoing.  
High: CPC 
relationship with 
political leaders is 
close and ongoing. 
Low: Sectorial 
chambers 
relationship with 
political leaders is 
distant. 
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In Uruguay, the weakness of organized business is a legacy from the ISI period, as shown 
in the previous chapter, and from its inability to coordinate among sectors as the ISI 
stagnation deepened. There were continuous conflicts between the political system and 
business, as many business sectors opposed the economic reforms in the 1990s and 
lobbied for maintaining benefits previously acquired. Therefore, as is shown in this 
chapter, the relationship between business and political parties, even right of center ones, 
is weak. 
Tax and labor reforms in Chile and Uruguay 
Left of center coalitions in government in Chile and Uruguay attempted to reform the tax 
and labor structures. Successful or not, these attempts provide insight into the evolution 
of class coalitions in both countries and, because of the particular timing in which these 
governments held office, the shaping of institutions under open market capitalism.  
In Chile, the labor reform effort was more extensive and conflictive than the tax 
reform effort. The labor reform brought up two particularly delicate issues for business 
and labor because of their direct effect on the ability of labor to organize, which was 
highly restricted by the Labor Code. These issues were the employer’s right to replace a 
worker during a strike, and the union’s intention to pursue wage bargaining for entire 
industries rather than on a firm-by-firm basis. Particular details for each reform are 
discussed in the four subsections below. The tax reform was less conflictive in the 
business-labor axis, but similarly conflictive in the business-government axis. The reform 
proposed to lower the value added tax (VAT) and the personal income tax rate while 
increasing the corporate tax rate.  
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The level of organization and centralization of business and labor in Chile, as well 
as their political strategy capability, is largely explained by the policies put in place 
during the military regime. Labor’s lack of density reflects the restrictive legal 
regulations provided in the Labor Code. The lack of political will of the Concertación to 
either remove these legal provisions or encourage political alliances with labor reinforced 
this legacy from the dictatorship. The strong centralized organization of business reflects 
the military’s explicit policy to avoid sectoral dialogue during the process of opening the 
political process, as is explained in chapter 3. Its strong political capability is due to a 
decade of successful negotiation and alliances with the military. 
In Uruguay both the labor and tax reforms imposed fundamental changes in 
market institutions, but the labor reform was less conflictive due to a monolithic position 
in the FA and a strong alliance between FA and the labor unions central, PIT-CNT. The 
tax reform, on the other hand, produced bitter internal conflicts among FA sectors, 
between the government and a divided business sector, and with white collar sectors 
unwilling to give up easily the many special tax benefits and exemptions gained mostly 
during the ISI crisis and its aftermath. The tax reform reveals the disincentives 
Uruguayan businesses had to form encompassing organizations because of the 
institutional framework in which they operated. This is also the opposite to the Chilean 
situation, in which the ISI institutional framework was abruptly dismantled and actors 
were forced to change strategies in an authoritarian setting. The level of organization of 
labor is explained by the lack of action of both military and democratic liberal 
governments to alter the regulations governing labor organizations. The changes in union 
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density levels respond to the changes in collective bargaining mechanisms, which pose 
different incentives for private sector workers to unionize. 
The analysis of these four reforms allows us to address the question of how 
political parties and organized groups shape the redistributive architecture in the post-
neoliberal period. In terms of coalition formation, they show how the left of center 
coalition creates an alliance with labor as well how weak the relationship is between 
organized business and right of center parties in Uruguay. In Chile, on the contrary, the 
left of center coalition did not ally with labor and there was a strong relationship between 
organized business and right of center parties. These coalitions give business and labor 
some political strategy capability in order to reshape the distributive architecture. In 
terms of institutional incentives on actors’ strategies, in particular for business, the 
analysis of the tax reforms in both countries completes the discussion initiated in chapter 
3 about the way in which the economy made the transition from ISI to the open market –
abrupt and imposed in Chile while gradual and bargained in Uruguay, and how that the 
nature of that transition encouraged internal coordination capacity in organized business, 
strengthening their political strategy capability in Chile while obstructing it in Uruguay. 
Labor reform in Chile during the Lagos administration (Law 19759) 
The Chilean Labor Code was radically reformed between 1978 and 1979, during the 
military government, including limitations to labor mobilization which affected its 
political strategy capability. The transformations followed a liberal model of industrial 
relations, privileging principles of efficiency and productivity over equality. This Code, 
still in place, and labor relations in general, were central issues in the four electoral 
campaigns by the Concertación presidential candidates between 1989 and 2006. The 
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Aylwin administration (1990-1994) enacted the most intensive reform, eliminating the 
most flagrant authoritarian regulations. However, the reform did not advance labor 
organization and mobilization rights. Unions were legalized and the requirements to form 
them as well as federations were softened. The possibility of voluntarily bargaining 
collectively at the industry level was included. In terms of contract termination, legal 
provisions were included to facilitate worker’s dispute of terminations (Volker 2002). 
Because of the government’s particularly weak situation in Chile during the 1990s, the 
Concertación sought wide consensus with the Alianza in most of its reforms, including 
the labor one. The topic of labor relations was especially sensitive for the political right, 
including business and the still powerful military.   
Labor relations have been the hardest topic to negotiate with the right during the post-
Pinochet period. Both the political right and business have retrograde views on labor 
relations. (Socialist MP, personal interview 2010) 
Therefore, labor rights remained restricted. The right to strike was heavily regulated, 
legal only under certain conditions and during the 30 days that last the bargaining period 
between the employer and the union. Moreover, the employer has the right to replace the 
striking worker for the duration of the strike; or simply to close the firm for 30 days, in 
which case workers are not allowed to benefit from unemployment insurance. 
Eliminating the employer’s right to replace a worker during a strike has been one of the 
two most important historical agenda issues for the small and divided labor movement. 
The other one is two efforts to extend collective bargaining, which is voluntary and at the 
firm level. The first is to allow inter-firm collective bargaining. Firms in Chile, mostly 
big ones, are allowed to have multiple tax identification numbers (RUT in its Spanish 
acronym); which is known as the “multi-RUT problem.” For example, the reader may 
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imagine a sizable department store which is allowed in Chile to divide itself for tax 
purposes and labor relations purposes so that the “shoe department” and the “children’s 
department” have different RUTs and workers bargain independently within their own 
department, thereby weakening the firm’s union, if it exists, compared to its strength if it 
were allowed to bargain at the firm level.  
The second effort of organized labor to improve collective bargaining is to lobby 
for the elimination of the employer’s right to offer an improved contract to non-unionized 
workers immediately after a collective bargaining negotiation has concluded. This 
practice is used as a unionization disincentive and is harmful to union interests. This 
problem, however, never reached the negotiation table in the post-authoritarian period, 
and it remains an issue for organized labor. As this was not a part of the reform effort 
during the period under consideration, it will not be discussed further. The other two 
issues will be referred to as the “replacement issue” and the “multi-RUT issue.”  
The “replacement issue” and the “multi-RUT issue” have been confirmed during 
interviews with labor leaders at three out of the four Chilean labor centrals.
35
 These are 
also noted in press releases and parliamentary documents during the Lagos labor reform 
debate (see the Appendix for a complete review of press releases and documents 
presented at parliamentary meetings during the period). Business was historically and 
consistently against any modification of the Labor Code. In the right of center, the 
Alianza Party and the Independent Democratic Union Party (UDI, Unión Demócrata 
                                                             
35
 Interviews with the Judicial and Parliamentary Issues Coordinator at CUT, General Secretary at CGT, 
and Directive at CAT (Santiago de Chile, 2010). Although the CGT is not a Central, but a Confederation, it 
does not recognize the authority of any of the three centrals, CUT, CAT and UGT, remaining therefore 
independent at the confederation level.     
 138 
1
3
8
 
[Typ
e a 
Independiente) have been consistently and radically against any reform, while the 
National Renovation Party (RN – Renovación Nacional) has been more open to dialogue 
and, during Lagos administration reached settlements with the Concertación regarding 
some issues. The left of center coalition had been internally divided on this issue, mostly 
but not always on party lines.  
A second attempt to modify the Labor Code was made during the last year of 
Frei’s administration, in 1999. This reform initiative, which failed to pass in the Senate 
because of the vote of two institutional senators from the Pinochet era, was the most 
comprehensive one sent to Congress by the Concertación.  It included the elimination of 
the “replacement issue” and the extension of collective bargaining to the sector level on a 
voluntary basis.  
We worked for 6 months on the reform text. Business was convinced to support the 
reform by their lawyers, who worked with us in drafting the initiative. The Concertación 
agreed, and even Frei agreed. The vote was favorable in the House, but in the Senate the 
right filibustered until the next day. During the night, right of center Senators visited the 
two institutional senators from the right that were voting for the initiative (Police force 
and Air Force) and convinced them not to vote. That was the closest we were from 
approving a substantive reform. It allowed negotiations at the sectoral level with some 
restrictions and the employer’s right to replace a striking worker was eliminated. Once it 
was rejected, we were not able to send it to Congress again for a year, and that was the 
last year of Frei’s term. (Christian Democrat MP during several periods and direct 
advisor to President Lagos during his term in office, personal interview 2010) 
The following year, during the presidential election run-off, the Concertación introduced 
the labor issue once again, which had the effect of adding tension to the relationship with 
organized business during the first two years of Lagos’ mandate (2000-2005). During 
Lagos’ presidency a new labor reform was approved but, after bitter negotiations, neither 
the “replacement issue” nor the “multi-RUT issue” was included. Finally, President 
Bachelet also campaigned on a promise of labor reform, which did not even make it to 
Congress because of internal differences in the Concertación.  
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Among the four reform attempts the Concertación made during its four terms in 
office, the Lagos one is the most helpful for understanding the evolution of the interests 
of organized actors’ and coalitions in post-neoliberal Chile. The Aylwin reform was 
made under the strict tutelage of a still powerful military and, although successful, was 
limited to the elimination of authoritarian regulation. The reform attempt under Frei was 
unsuccessful and the draft was prepared without being circulated outside a small group of 
technocrats before reaching congress (Campero 2004). The Bachelet effort, as explained 
above, was not even submitted to the congress.
36
        
The labor reform initiative proposed by President Lagos in his first year in office 
was being debated long before it was submitted to Congress (see Tables A1 and A2 in 
Appendix 1 for a detailed account of the chronology of events). President Lagos was the 
first Socialist President since President Allende, which generated discomfort and distrust 
among the business sector. However, the labor reform process had the unintended 
outcome of transforming the relationship between the Concertación and business from 
one of mutual distrust and fierce opposition to one of mutual trust and ad hoc alliances. 
This reform process also reinforced the relationship the Concertación governments have 
had with the labor movement since the re-democratization: distant.  
Lagos invited business leaders to dinner at his home, but never invited labor leaders. The 
President changes but the guests to La Moneda remain the same ones. Lagos had a strong 
discourse against corporatism, but at the end he fought labor corporatism, not business 
one. (Socialist MP, personal interview 2010)     
                                                             
36
 For a more detailed explanation of the labor reforms and reform attempts between 1973 and 2000, see 
Campero, 2004. 
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Soon after the reform effort was launched, both the Concertación and CUT, separately, 
began to develop internal conflicts over the two so--called “hard topics”: the 
“replacement issue” and the “multi-RUT issue.” On the other hand, both business and the 
Alianza were monolithically against the reform, and particularly opposed to the two “hard 
topics”. Nevertheless, the RN would eventually offer to vote for a draft without the hard 
topics in it. Inside the Concertación, a prominent group inside the Socialist Party pushed 
in favor of the “hard topics” from the beginning, while two DC Senators, Sen. Foxley and 
Sen. Boeninger, were the core of the resistance against the “hard topics” from the outset, 
conditioning their vote on their exclusion from the effort. (La Tercera, December 12
ve
 
and 18
th
, 2000; El Mercurio, December 16
th
, 2000). Similar to the situation of Frente 
Amplio in Uruguay during the tax reform discussion, in both cases these left of center 
governing coalitions had a parliamentary majority and the main conflict occurred inside 
the leftist coalition. In the Chilean case, the conflict occurred during and after the 
Concertación’s Convention, the “Santiago I” meeting, in December 2000. During the 
meeting, the Socialist Party successfully convinced government to include the “hard 
topics” in the reform initiative (Transcription of Santiago I meeting Official Document, 
La Tercera December 14
th
, 2000).  
However, the immediate opposition from the two DC Senators forced the 
Concertación to exclude them from the effort.  The opposition to state-interventionist 
policies within the Concertación generally came from the DC. By the end of December, 
the RN offered to vote for a proposal without the hard topics and other minor 
modifications, which reinforced the administration’s decision to leave the “hard topics” 
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out of the draft. The proposal was finally passed on September 2001 with the votes of the 
Concertación and the RN and without the two “hard topics”.   
If there is consensus with the right, great, if not…that is why majorities and minorities 
exist in a democracy. The important point is to approve a modern labor reform that 
protects workers. (President Lagos to La Tercera, December 15
th
, 2000) 
If the Concertación MPs agree, then both [hard] topics are included. If not, they are not. 
(Mr. García, Presidency General Secretary, to La Tercera, December 15
th
, 2000)    
With respect to the labor movement, Chile already had two labor centrals by 2000: the 
CUT, which remained the main interlocutor with government, and the CAT, which left 
the CUT in 1995 and primarily represented private sector workers. The CAT Board of 
Directors asserts that the central represents approximately 12 percent of unionized labor 
force, which is around 11 percent of the labor force (Personal interview with CAT 
directive, 2010). While the CAT supported the inclusion of the two “hard topics”, the 
CUT was divided, with CUT’s President, Mr. Martínez, considering their inclusion a sine 
qua non, but a minor wing leaded by Mr. Olivares willing to negotiate the “replacement” 
and “multi-RUT” issues with business instead of focusing on legislation. This “minor” 
wing was powerful; it had obtained 48 percent of the vote in the last CUT’s election (La 
Tercera, May 27
th
, 2001). The divide among these two groups increased until Mr. 
Olivares’ group abandoned the CUT to create a third labor central: the National Workers 
Union (UNT – Unión Nacional de Trabajadores). Another group left from CUT in 2001, 
the tourism and related service sectors confederation (COTIACh - Confederación 
Nacional de Federaciones, Sindicatos de Trabajadores de la Industria Alimenticia, el 
Turismo, la Gastro-Hotelería), to form an independent confederation, which remained 
apart from  any of the three centrals. Therefore, by the end of 2001 and during the 
following years, a small and weak labor movement became atomized, weakening itself.  
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The relationship between CUT and government “ended broken” (Socialist MP, personal 
interview 2010), and the Concertación never acknowledged any of the seceded groups as 
valid voices representing the interests of labor.  
At the end, pressure from business and right parties on government ended by convincing 
the Concertación and the government (…) with that sort of softening that government 
applied to key issues as inter-firm bargaining and the elimination of the replacement right 
during a strike, this reform is not good for us. (Mr. Martínez, CUT President. Cited in La 
Tercera, March 23
rd
, 2001, page 23) 
Organized business, represented by the CPC and with the particularly active role of 
Sofofa during the consideration of reform, opposed the effort from the beginning. 
Extremely well organized, business lobbied especially intensely against the “hard topics”. 
Between June and December 2000, Lagos met with the CPC Board of Directors in two 
occasions, once at his home and once at La Moneda (La Tercera, November 8
th
, 2000).  
In the first six months of 2001, Lagos met four more times with the newly elected CPC 
President, Mr. Ariztia, to talk about the labor reform, including one meeting at his home 
(La Tercera, May 23
rd
 and June 3
rd
, 2001).  
This reform the government is proposing is obsolete and has been removed in different 
countries. This reform is copied from European countries that have high levels of 
unemployment and many labor subsidies. It would be much better to apply a modern 
labor reform, like the United States one, which has low levels of unemployment and 
important growth levels each year. (CPC President, Mr. Ariztia, speech in the forum 
“Generación Empresarial”, cited in La Tercera, March 29th, 2001, page 24)  
Business focused its lobbying outside Congress, primarily focusing on establishing a 
direct relationship with President Lagos. It is clear that business followed the United 
States model, and even when the authoritarian vestiges present in the Chilean labor code 
are not considered, there is a strong emphasis on growth and efficiency goals over 
equality ones. More important, the Concertación ended accepting, as early as the first 
year of Lagos presidency, the liberal model of capitalism, restricting its redistributive 
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policies to the welfare system. The simultaneous negotiations on the labor and tax 
reforms (discussed below) ended up with the defeat of the Concertación’s attempt to 
include a few strategic coordination mechanisms in the market.  
The right parties’ argument has made its mark on the left. How are we to negotiate 
between different sectors with very different productivity levels? This reflects an 
important degree of ignorance, of parochialism that characterizes my fellow countrymen. 
Reading every day El Mercurio and La Tercera, for fifteen years, it is very difficult not to 
end up stupid. (Socialist MP, personal interview 2010) 
We are the offspring of the Popular Union, of defeat and collapse. We have two things in 
our genes: we reject inflation and fiscal deficit, and we are afraid of social disorder when 
there is a crisis. (PPD MP, personal interview 2010) 
The correct way of negotiating collectively is about redistributing productivity. This is 
why wage bargaining should be done at the firm level. You gain nothing with centralized 
collective bargaining except price distortions. (Lagos presidential advisor, personal 
interview 2010) 
For 25 years Chile attempted to build a certain form of social democracy with a liberal 
component in its productive structure. Chile has a liberal matrix. The idea of a republic is 
a thing that has lost ground in Chile, while in Uruguay it is everywhere. (Lagos’s 
presidential advisor, personal interview 2010) 
The economy operates with incentives and the Labor Code has no incentives to unionize. 
The Code favors free-market logic. The institutional order in Chile is not based on 
cooperative principles. (Former Labor Minister, personal interview 2010) 
The Concertación followed a center-right economic model with some emphasis in social 
policy. (Freedom and Development Think Tank advisor on Lagos’ labor reform, personal 
interview 2010) 
This analysis of the relationship between the Concertación and organized labor in the 
post-authoritarian period challenges the classification of the Chilean party system as a 
labor-based one, as Roberts (2002) claims it was for the pre-authoritarian period. This 
change precludes the possibility of a corporatist alliance between organized labor and the 
political left, which is necessary –although not sufficient– for sustaining strategic market 
coordination.  
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Finally, the evolution of the labor movement organization during the twenty-year 
period and, in particular, after the strong internal conflicts generated by the reform 
debate,  confirms the liberal path that labor relations are following in post-neoliberal 
Chile. An already small and weak movement, with very limited leverage with the 
Concertación and with almost no strategic capability, ended up by dividing itself during 
the Lagos administration. 
Labor reform in Uruguay during the Vásquez administration (Law 18566) 
The 2009 Law on collective wage bargaining law reformed the 1943 Law in two 
important aspects: first, it reorganized bargaining groups and added rural workers and 
domestic service as new groups. These changes were aimed at decreasing informality, 
particularly in the rural and service sectors. Second, it eliminated the exclusive 
prerogative of the Executive Power to open a negotiation round. The 1943 Law had 
granted this prerogative only to the Executive Power, resulting in the suspension of the 
negotiation rounds in 1968 during the Pacheco administration (for the period 1968-1985) 
and again in 1991 during the Lacalle administration (for the period 1991-2005). In both 
cases, President Sanguinetti in 1985 and President Vásquez in 2005 reinstated sectorial-
level collective bargaining by simply calling for a negotiation round. The 2009 Law 
allowed any of the interested parties to ask, in the event that a collective agreement is not 
reached, that the Executive Power call for a negotiation round, in which case the 
Executive Power has 15 days to make the call (Law 18566).  
 During the 1968-1985 interruption, mentioned in chapter 3, Wage Councils were 
substituted by other less plural (1968-1973) and less democratic mechanisms (1973-
1985), but nevertheless wage bargaining remained centralized (COPRIN and 
 145 
1
4
5
 
[Typ
e a 
DINACOPRIN). The suppression of Wage Councils between 1990 and 2005 was done 
following the neoliberal impulse to shape liberal market institutions. However, three 
alternative mechanisms to regulate wage bargaining, formal and informal, were put in 
place during the Lacalle administration or directly by sectoral organizations.  
First, some sectors continued bargaining voluntarily in a labor-management form. 
This was the case for the construction, metallurgic, transport, health and banking sectors. 
The usual condition for the continuity of collective bargaining in these sectors was the 
presence of a strong union, and in most cases there was a period of strong conflicts 
following the 1990 suspension of Wage Councils.  
“We never stopped bargaining salaries with SUNCA [construction sector’s union], with 
lights and shadows, since 1985 up until today. We had a fierce conflict back in 1993, an 
87 days strike that included the burning of trucks. After that conflict we decided to get 
together and bargain over salaries and we did it until the Councils were reinstated in 
2005.” (CCU President, personal interview 2010) 
In some of these sectors, like construction, the maintenance of sectorial 
labor/management bargaining has allowed the relationship between labor and business to 
mature, developing useful mechanisms for welfare and skills formation. This has been 
particularly important in order to coordinate actions at the sectorial level in terms of skills 
formation capabilities in the post-2005 period. The relevance of these experiences, like 
the one in the construction sector, lies in the fact that, after 15 years of firm-based and 
voluntary wage bargaining, business and labor in most sectors were not accustomed to 
bargaining over salaries or to coordinate strategies at the sector level.  
The construction sector, as well as many others, experienced an abrupt increase in 
its activity after the post-2002 crisis. Immediately after the crisis, the sector had 27,000 
workers nationwide, while by 2010 it had 51,000 (CCU Official Figures). The 
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Construction Chamber expects the sector to add about 10,000 more workers between 
2010 and 2015. In an economy with average unemployment figures of 6 percent, this 
represents a challenge in terms of labor availability and the importance of skills 
formation at the firm. Not meeting the challenges would imply a slowdown in the sector 
productivity and growth. However, CCU and SUNCA have been able to coordinate 
rapidly in order to set a joint strategy to launch several training programs, jointly funded 
and with government financing support. This sector is among the leading ones in terms of 
coordination, and both CCU and SUNCA acknowledge that the experience of ongoing 
coordination built the necessary confidence and coordination ability in order to rapidly 
adapt to the new institutional setting since 2005 and to meet the challenges of growth.  
We have an ongoing relationship with SUNCA and have put together a set of sectoral 
social programs: the Housing Fund, the Social Fund, which has been in place for fourteen 
years, the Dental Plan, the Vision Care Plan, and several school-enrolling support plans 
for workers’ children. We administrate them jointly, and both parts contribute to their 
funding. We have also launched a plan for skills formation with the direct support of 
President Mujica. We have 1,000 workers in training now and expect to have 3,000 by 
2012. SUNCA and CCU fund 50 percent of the program and the government provides the 
other 50 percent. Workers in training work 6 hours a day and complete 3 hours of 
training twice a week. (CCU President, personal interview 2010)     
Second, “bargaining tables” were instituted by the Lacalle administration to 
bargain over salaries of workers in public firms, not in the central administration, for 
whom collective bargaining mechanisms had not previously been available. These were 
not formal bargaining mechanisms but informal dialogue and consultation mechanisms, 
but they represented an improvement for workers in public firms. Once again, this 
initiative was preceded by bitter conflicts between the previous administration and public 
firms (1985-1989). These informal mechanisms remained in place until the public sector 
collective bargaining law was passed during Vásquez’s term.    
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Public workers had a discussion table with MEF [Economy Ministry], MTSS [Labor 
Ministry] and OPP [Planning and Budget Office] held at the MTSS. They were not 
discussion tables as such, but they were a place where workers could express their 
interests. Mr. Lacalle gave a good impulse to public firms bargaining tables. (Oil Public 
Firm [ANCAP] union leader, PIT-CNT leader and FA MP 2005-2009, personal interview 
2010) 
During the first Sanguinetti’s term we [ANCAP] began to “close the gas tap”. It was an 
excess and the government did react to it declaring the essentiality of the service [which 
precluded the union ability to strike] (Oil Public Firm [ANCAP] union leader, PIT-CNT 
leader and FA MP 2005-2009, personal interview 2010)  
Third, after suspending the Wage Councils and seeing a steady drop in salaries, President 
Lacalle asked government officials to establish informal negotiations with the PIT-CNT 
in order to stop the decline and turn it around. These negotiations were in place between 
1993 and 1995, and during the following administration there was a three year “National 
Dialogue,” organized by the Labor Ministry and with labor and business participation and 
aimed at creating a new labor relations framework. There was no final product, since the 
business sector favored voluntary firm level wage bargaining and labor favored a return 
to the sectorial level Wage Councils.    
There was a lack of coordination in the economic team. The Central Bank was 
orthodoxly monetarist. Real salary had dropped tremendously in the first months, induced 
by government. There was no element in the real economy fundamentals that required a 
15 percent drop. There was no logic for it, but it was useful for fiscal balance in the short 
term. Lacalle’s government popularity dropped immensely because of the salary drop. 
Lacalle then asked me to initiate informal dialogue with PIT CNT to recover some salary. 
Neither the Economy Ministry nor the Labor Ministry knew about this initiative at the 
beginning. We used to meet in an apartment in downtown Montevideo. We reached an 
agreement to recover real salary in two years. (OPP [Budget and Planning Office] 
Director 1993-1995, personal interview 2010) 
The Batlle administration (2000-2004) offered no initiative on labor topics, but 
nevertheless its two Labor Ministries continued a conciliatory policy in labor relations. It 
is important to acknowledge that the Colorado Party governments of Sanguinetti (1995-
1999) and Batlle (2000-2004) gave the PN, acting as the minor coalition member, the 
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Labor Ministry. This indicates the lack of importance, or at least the lack of concrete 
plans, these Colorado governments wished to promote. 
During my term as Labor Minister, around twenty percent of my activity was to call 
businessmen to ask them to rehire fired labor leaders. I had no legal provisions for 
pursuing this goal, but I called them anyway. (Labor Minister 2002-2005, personal 
interview 2010)  
Overall, during the fifteen years in which sectorial level Wage Councils were suspended 
there was no serious attempt to derogate the 1943 Law, and an Executive decree sufficed 
to reinstall sectorial level Wage Councils in 2006 during the first year of the Vásquez 
administration. With the bargaining rounds of 2006 and 2008, the reform of the 1943 
Law began to be discussed in the FA and later in Parliament.   
There was little dissent in the Frente Amplio with respect to the labor initiative, 
which was approved only three and a half months after it was sent to Congress. PIT-CNT 
had an active role in supporting the process and lobbying in Congress, and the only issue 
the government opposed was the exclusion of any regulation of the occupation of a firm 
by workers. This was excluded from the government’s draft as one of the two 
concessions made to business; the other was the incorporation of a peace clause by which 
labor cannot strike against issues that were agreed during negotiation rounds.  
The Colorado and Nacional Parties did not strongly oppose the reform. In the end, 
the Nacional Party MPs voted for the overall proposal and opposed some articles, while 
the Colorado Party MPs voted for some articles but opposed the overall proposal.  
Organized business strongly opposed the labor reform from the beginning, in 
particular opposing government involvement in bargaining, the mandatory character of 
collective bargaining, and the sector-level centralization. However, because of the FA 
held a majority in the House and Senate and the opposition lacked any interest in strongly 
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opposing the initiative, business complaints were not addressed.  Business’ lack of 
political strategy capability is illustrated by the lack of any response they had from the 
political system when organizing a forum in order to discuss alternatives to the reform. 
Business chambers organized this event and invited the House MPs while the initiative 
was being discussed at the House Labor Commission. The forum site had ninety nine 
seats prepared for the ninety nine members of the House. However, only the nine MPs 
working on the Labor Commission showed up to the event.  (El País, June 12
th
, 2008; El 
Observador, June 12
th
, 2008).  
Among business chambers, the National Chamber of Trade and Services (CNCS – 
Cámara Nacional de Comercio y Servicios) has historically been the most liberal oriented 
in the classical sense of “liberal.” A few days before the abovementioned forum, the 
proposal was going to be voted on by the House Labor Commission.  It did so before 
allowing the CNCS to present its views, even though CNCS had requested the 
opportunity to do so. The press noted that the reform was voted upon while the CNCS 
Board of Directors waited outside the hearing room (La República, June 11
th
, 2008; El 
Observador, June 11
th
, 2008; El Paíss, June 12
th
, 2008).  
From a long-term perspective, organized business in Uruguay was unable to either 
build strong inter-sector coordination or strong alliances with other groups in the political 
system. As early as the Lacalle administration, business was bitterly divided with respect 
to signing the Mercosur treaty, with industrial sectors opposed while the rural sectors 
firmly opposed tax increases. The relationship between the National Party and business 
was not good. President Lacalle even pushed business to form an encompassing 
organization, which they finally did but without much enthusiasm -- the Business 
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Superior Council (COSUPEM – Consejo Superior Empresarial). This organization was 
never strong and it disappeared during the 2002 crisis. Later, during and after the 2002 
crisis, business had an equally turbulent relationship with the Batlle administration.   
Rural sectors did not want to be taxed while trade sectors wanted an opening process. The 
industry sector did not want it; they have always been more protectionist. In the 1990s, 
business resistance to Mercosur was strong. (OPP [Budget and Planning Office] Director 
1993-1995, personal interview 2010) 
After the 2002 crisis, business was very aggressive in demanding for special treatment, 
with the exception of the CNCS. But the government did not have to give anything 
except conditions for competition. Towards the end of the period and because the country 
began to grow again, business was quieter. (Economy Minister 2003-2004, personal 
interview 2010) 
Overall, the Uruguayan party system during the post-authoritarian period also showed a 
shift from the previous period, when Roberts (2002) classified it as an elite based system. 
The alliance between the FA and PIT-CNT grew after the early 1990s and in particular 
after the 2002 crisis. While in Chile all but one Labor Minister during the four 
Concertación periods in office was an economist; the three Labor Ministers during the 
two FA administrations have been former labor leaders. Eduardo Bonomi (2005-2009) 
was a fishing sector leader; Julio Baraibar (2009) was a pharmaceutical industry labor 
leader, and also a transport labor leader in Sweden while in exile; and Eduardo Brenta 
(2010-present) was a textile sector leader.   
Business opposition to the labor reform was strong, but its political strategy 
capability was weak given its lack of ties or previous conflicts with almost all political 
sectors. The political opposition, which had preferred a liberal type of industrial relations, 
did not stand still against the initiative, although the FA majorities in both Houses 
probably operated as a disincentive to opposition.  Overall, during both centralized 
bargaining periods there continued to be extensive bargaining at the sector level. During 
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the first period, 1968-1985, alternative formal institutions were put in place; but even 
during the second period, 1990-2005, either voluntary bipartite strategies existed or 
governments relied on informal mechanisms to solve wage bargaining conflicts. In sum, a 
close look at the neoliberal period in both Chile and Uruguay reveals astonishing 
differences in terms of labor relations under seemingly similar formal contexts.   
Tax reform in Chile during the Lagos administration (Law 19753) 
Lagos’ tax reform (2001) was the second important attempt by the Concertación to 
modify the tax structure. The first and more comprehensive one was done during 
Aylwin’s term as part of the transition from the Pinochet regime (Boylan 1996, Weyland 
1997, Fairfield 2010). This tax reform was possible because the Concertación, which did 
not have a majority in Congress, agreed to moderate the initial proposal in order to obtain 
the vote from RN MPs (Weyland 1997). Initially, the Concertación proposed to increase 
the corporate tax rate, which was among the lowest in our pool of countries, from 10 to 
20 percent. However, after a period of intense negotiations with a reluctant business 
sector and the RN, the final draft established a temporary two-year increase from 10 to 15 
percent, plus a two point increase in the VAT, from 16 to 18 percent, and changes in 
personal income tax categories. The marginal income tax remained at 50 percent (Boylan 
1996). At the end of these two years, the Concertación managed to convince the 
opposition to keep the marginal corporate tax at 15 percent.  
Lagos attempted two new tax reforms during his first year in office, one oriented 
to reduce tax evasion and the other one, which is analyzed in this section, attempted to 
modify the tax structure along the line of Aylwin’s reform: a proposed increase in 
corporate marginal tax with a reduction in different categories of the income tax. Unlike 
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from the situation during Aylwin’s term, however, Lagos had a majority in both Houses 
and therefore agreements with right of center parties were not necessary, provided 
internal agreements were reached in the Concertación.  
This reform proposal was debated at the same time as the labor reform analyzed 
above and, as with the government strategy in presenting the labor reform proposal, the 
reform had to be pursued on the condition that a wide consensus had to be reached across 
the political spectrum (El Mercurio, May 31
st
, 2001). This condition imposed by 
President Lagos on the DC senators lobbying for the reform, Sen. Foxley, Sen. Bitar 
(PPD) and Sen. Boeninger, was designed to compel them to vote for an additional reform 
regarding tax evasion (La Tercera, March 22
nd
, 2001).   
“We will keep the promise of advancing this reform only if it has a generalized consensus 
that avoids transforming this in a new economic dispute” (Mr. García, Presidency 
General Secretary, to El Mercurio, May 31st, 2001). 
The tax reform, presented as fiscally neutral by the government, aimed to reduce the 
distortions in the Chilean tax system. The significant distance between the existing 45 
percent marginal income tax and the 15 percent corporate tax encouraged individuals to 
mask their personal income as business income on the top categories of personal income 
tax, thereby giving a major tax break to business owners (Mr. Eyzaguirre, Economy 
Minister, to the House. Hacienda Commission First Brief to the House, History of the 
Law 19753, page 21).  
The initial proposal was to reduce the marginal income tax from 45 to 35 percent. 
To compensate for the loss of tax income, the proposal included an increase in corporate 
tax rates from 15 to 18 percent. The proposal was a moderate one; as Fairfield (2010) 
notes, the proposed increase in corporate tax was still lower than the 20 percent proposed 
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years earlier by the Aylwin administration. As with the labor reform, the initiative was 
negotiated outside Congress and it took only one month to be approved once it had been 
sent to Congress. Only five groups lobbied Congress publically, including the CPC, the 
right of center think tank Freedom and Development, and three business groups related to 
the construction and housing sector with specific and minor demands (Table A6 in 
Appendix 1).  
Chile has high inequality and we tried to propose tax reforms to moderate inequality. We 
still need to eliminate tax exemptions for big capital. Corporate tax is too low; we need to 
increase it from 17 to at least 22 or 23 percent. (PPD Senator, personal interview 2010) 
The final draft sent to Congress proposed the following changes in the income tax. First, 
it proposed a boost in the upper boundary of the lower category, including 125000 
additional workers in it. This measure would have a cost of 41.3 million dollars. Second, 
a drop in the top category upper boundary from 35 to 32 percent, and two new categories 
on top of this one, one taxed at 37 percent and the last one at 40 percent. This will reduce 
the marginal income tax from 45 to 40 percent. This measure would have a cost of 63.5 
million dollars. Third, allowing housing deductions from personal income at a cost of 
45.2 million dollars. The government estimated that a million Chileans would benefit 
from these changes (Mr. Eyzaguirre to the House, Hacienda Commission First Brief to 
the House, History of the Law 19753, page 22-25). In addition, the initiative called for an 
increase in marginal corporate tax from 15 to 17 percent. This increase would balance the 
expected 150 million dollars reduction in tax collection caused by the above changes in 
personal income tax. Overall, government expectations were that this reform would 
reduce by about 30 percent or more the taxes paid by 80 percent of Chileans.   
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Organized labor did not participate in the discussion, but organized business 
supported the drop in income tax rates but opposed the corporate tax increase from the 
beginning, arguing that it would not be necessary since the proposed decrease in income 
taxes would be collected via VAT, given the consumption increase that the change would 
foster (El Mercurio, June 6
th
, 2001). Business leaders met immediately with President 
Lagos (CPC President, Mr. Ariztia) and vice-President Insulza (CNC President, Mr. 
Lihn) in La Moneda, as was the modus operandi for the labor reform. Business agreed to 
consider a 2 percent increase in marginal corporate tax after the meeting (El Mercurio, 
June 27
th
, 2001). However, sectoral business chambers leaders opposed an increase above 
1 percent (El Mercurio, July 27
th
, 2001). In terms of opposition parties, UDI immediately 
stated its unwillingness to vote for any increase in the corporate tax (El Mercurio, May 
31
st
, 2001), while the RN was only willing to support a 1 percent increase in the marginal 
corporate tax. Finally, the initiative was sent to Congress with a proposed lowering of 
marginal income taxes to 40 percent (not the initially proposed 35 percent) and 
reductions in all categories; and a 2 percent increase in the corporate marginal tax, from 
15 to 17 percent. It was rapidly approved by both the House and Senate. The reform 
became effective in January 2002, but the increase in the corporate marginal tax was be 
gradual; 1 point in 2002 and an extra half point increase each of the following 2 years (El 
Mercurio, August 9
th
, 2001).   
Overall, this tax reform pursued by the Concertación was a moderate one. 
Business lobbied aggressively from the beginning against an increase in corporate tax, 
and it thereby reduced the government’s ability to reduce the marginal income tax rate 
from 45 to 35 percent. Lobbying was centralized under the CPC and it was carried out at 
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the top of the government structure, directly with the President and Vice-president. 
Therefore, after twenty years of Concertación governments and two mild tax reforms, the 
tax structure and the state redistributive effort in Chile remained similar to the Liberal 
model it inherited except for the particularly low marginal corporate tax. However, this 
low corporate tax was created by the authoritarian Pinochet regime.     
The analysis of this reform serves as an example of the strong political strategy 
capability of Chilean business, which is based on a close relationship with right-of-center 
parties and its centralized encompassing structure. The strength of business is such that 
the Concertación coalition needed to bargain directly with business in addition to 
bargaining with right-of-center parties in order to pass the reform (this one and also the 
labor one). This strategic capability of business contrasts with its absence in Uruguay, 
which does not have an historical alliance with right-of-center parties and its 
organizational structure is segmented.  
Tax reform in Uruguay during the Vasquez administration (Law 18083) 
The 2006 tax reform in Uruguay was the first attempt to modify the tax structure after the 
return to democracy in 1985. There had been tax increases during the previous 
administrations, the most salient of which was one during the Lacalle administration 
(1990-1994) which increased income taxes, the VAT (from 21 to 22 percent) and 
employers’ contribution to social security (by 3.5 percent), among other minor 
modifications (Law 16107).  The increase in income taxes (Article 14, Law 16107) fell 
into three categories, 3.5, 5.5 and 7.5 percent. However, non-elected public employees 
would pay 5.5 percent in every case, workers in the banking sector would pay an extra 
1.5 percent in each category and professionals would be excluded from the tax increase. 
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This increment would be a central issue during the bargaining between different groups 
and the government during the 2006 reform (see Table A8 in Appendix 1). 
 Other parts of the initiative were aimed at white collar workers and professionals 
in two ways: first, it would eliminate parastatal funds by setting a cap on unemployment 
insurance premiums, and by granting other benefits on a sectorial basis. Secondly, it 
would more than double the tax burden for medium and high salaries from a maximum of 
7.5 percent under the previous regime to more than double.  
 Professionals were not taxed by the payroll tax or any personal income tax before 
2006 because they lobbied for special tax treatment in the form of a special 
“professional” flat-rate category instead of being classified in the general IRPF (Impuesto 
a la Renta de la Persona Fisica) proposed categories. This initiative did not prosper. 
“The ideal would be to control one by one each professional, but the cost-benefit 
relationship of this implies an excessive administrative effort in order to fight the “kings 
of the tax subterfuges” (Mr. Bergara, Economy Undersecretary in the Conference “The 
year of the tax reform” organized by KPMG. El Observador, April 5th, 2006) 
The 2006 tax reform was the fulfillment of the FA electoral campaign’s central issue: to 
substitute the payroll tax with a comprehensive income tax and to simplify the tax 
structure, eliminating 15 taxes. The reform was not presented or designed as fiscally 
neutral. The income tax had also been a central issue during the FA 1999 electoral 
campaign that the FA lost to the Colorado Party candidate Jorge Batlle.  
 After a year in office, President Vásquez and Economy Minister Astori sent the 
reform initiative to Parliament on March 16, 2006. The debate that surrounded the 
initiative lasted 10 months, until it was voted upon December 13. The implementation of 
the tax reform had to be delayed six months from January to June 2007 because of the 
unexpected length of the Parliamentary debate, which delayed preparations for the new 
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system. The 2006 initiative produced a strong divide inside the FA between Mr. Astori’s 
sector, the Uruguayan Assembly (AU – Asamblea Uruguay) and two minor sectors and a 
bloc formed by the MPP (Mr. Mujica’s sector), the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, 
and other minor sectors. This internal conflict would be the most important factor in the 
proposal’s debate, since the FA had majority in both Houses (see Appendix for several 
press releases on the FA conflict). 
 During the parliamentary debate of the initiative, seventy eight business, labor 
and white collar workers’ groups lobbied separately (in sixty five meetings with 
Hacienda Commission members in both the House and Senate) to maintain special 
benefits or exemptions (Table 16). The analysis of this initiative, therefore, is useful to 
understand the lack of ability of business to build an umbrella organization as well as the 
segmented nature of the tax structure inherited from the ISI, which educated groups in 
short term “rent-seeking” strategies instead of long term coordination ones, as analyzed 
in chapter 3. 
 
  Table 16. Sectoral organization atomized lobbying strategies 
Social Sector Organizations Delegations Lobby 
Business 42 34 
Avoid increases in employer's contribution to 
social security and corporate tax 
Workers 5 5 
Avoid publicly funded private social security funds 
taxing or elimination 
Professionals & 
other white collar 
workers 
15 14 Income tax exemptions and special benefits 
Cooperatives 5 4 Corporate tax exemption 
Retirees 11 8 Avoid being taxed by the income tax 
Total  78 65  
Note: This table is built from Table A8 in Appendix 1 in order to show the lack of capacity organizations 
from different social groups had to coordinate lobbying strategies. Lobbying interests are taken from the 
minute transcriptions of the Hacienda Commission meetings.    
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The conflict inside the FA focused on two issues: first, the MPP-led group wanted to 
raise the top limit of the lowest IRPF category, 0 percent tax, in order to include more 
individuals in it, and it opposed the elimination of the property tax. Second, this group 
also sought to include some sectoral exemptions -- specifically, to include the employer’s 
contribution to social security in a separate law and to maintain the exemption for 
employer’s contribution by cooperatives.    
“This reform seeks to generate stable, credible and consistent rules that facilitate decision 
making with respect to investment and employment in the long term. The actual tax 
regime is undermined by historical reasons or the action of groups of interest”. (Mario 
Bergara, Economy Undersecretary in the Conference “The year of the tax reform” 
organized by KPMG. El Observador, April 5
th
, 2006)  
After half a year of discussions and bargaining, the FA reached a compromise that 
included some concessions to the MPP-led sectors by lifting up the limit between the 
lowest and the following IRPF category and by eliminating the proposal to change the tax 
situation for cooperatives (Tables A7 and A8 in Appendix 1).    
 Organized labor sided mostly with MPP-led sectors during the conflict. In late 
June, when these opposing FA sectors presented an alternative document with 21 items to 
Minister Astori, the PIT-CNT called a four hour strike to emphasize its opposition to the 
FA’s economic policy (El Observador, June 22nd, 2006). Opposition parties opposed the 
initiative in general but once again did not represent an important obstacle to the FA 
majority.  
 Organized business did not oppose the initiative in general but opposed tax 
increases on the business sector. However, as the tax structure was full of special benefits 
for different groups, business did not engage in inter-sectoral coordination, as they would 
do for the labor reform two years later (Table A7 and A8 in Appendix 1). As Table 16 
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shows, almost all organizations asked the Hacienda Commission to have meetings so that 
they could present their perspective on the reform.  
“We will talk specifically about the impact of the reform on the rural sector. Even though 
this is specific of our sector, we consider that the ARU mission is to defend the interests 
of the rural sector.” (Mr. Mattos, ARU President, in the House Hacienda Commission; 
Commission Minute 60, June 14
th
 2006) 
“We believe there is confusion between the equality and egalitarianism concepts […]. In 
the case of the manufacturing industry, the reality is totally different to the one of trade 
sector or those that sell non-tradable goods or services. Therefore, this situation [making 
employer’s contributions to social secutiry the same in all sectors at 7.5 percent] is 
harmful for the industrial sector because it is not fair to tax similar sectors with different 
realities.” (Mr. Villamil, CIU General Manager, in the House Hacienda Commission; 
Commission Minute 55, June 1
st
 2006) 
This individualistic strategy represents, as also suggested by the Uruguayan labor reform 
discussion, the standard approach of the business sector. The following quotes illustrate 
the perception different actors had with respect to business’ inability to form 
encompassing organizations, in particular with respect to the business encompassing 
organization (COSUPEM) failure during the early 2000s.   
At the end of President Lacalle’s period and during President Sanguinetti’s second 
period, there was an attempt to form an encompassing umbrella organization: the Consejo 
Superior Empresarial [COSUPEM, Superior Business Council], integrated by seven 
chambers: CMPP, CIU, CNCS, CCU, Banks, ANDEBU and another one that I do not 
recall now. Both CIU and CCU were leading the initiative, but there was no opportunity 
to consolidate it because some of the chambers preferred to continue in a lonely path. 
There were some publications done by COSUPEM, but the initiative sank definitely by 
2001-2002, with the crisis. (CCU President, personal interview 2010)  
The COSUPEM had strong contradictions; each one looked after its own little business 
and there were huge problems with hegemony. For example, when the National Institute 
for Employment and Professional Training board of directors was formed [INEFOP], it 
had twenty one members: 9 members from government, 6 from business and 6 from PIT-
CNT. Business had to have 6 seats to be able to represent the whole sector, while PIT 
CNT had enough with 3. (Oil Public Firm [ANCAP] union leader, PIT-CNT leader and 
FA MP 2005-2009, personal interview 2010) 
The COSUPEM was dismantled when it faced the first problem. The FA government has 
a strategy of atomizing chambers instead of recognizing the largest ones as interlocutors. 
However, the economic opening has collaborated in improving synergy among chambers. 
(CNCS Directive, personal interview 2010) 
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Business does not understand the importance of building central institutions for 
bargaining. This is their most important weakness. In practice, CIU and CNCS coordinate 
and this palliates the lack of central institutions. (Labor Minister 2002-2005, personal 
interview 2010) 
COSUPEM did not work because of internal divisions in business sector. The extreme 
positions were the CIU, which was born protected by the state during the Batllismo 
period and then during the ISI; the CNCS has a strong liberal tradition. While the CIU 
always had to deal with the PIT CNT, the CNCS did not because FUECI [service sector 
labor federation] is a weak union. (Economy Minister 2000-2002; personal interview, 
2010) 
Overall, the most important obstacle for the tax reform came from the effort by different 
FA sectors to defend the interests of white collar workers and cooperatives against a 
universalization of the tax structure. Business had a similar strategy, but its lack of 
alliances with the political system and the segmented nature of its claims undermined its 
possibilities of success. Organized labor favored the new IRPF and had a minor role in 
the debate.  
 In a nutshell, the approved initiative included a corporate tax that remained at 25 
percent but with an extra 7 percent tax on distributed (not reinvested) profits. The 
personal income tax placed 80 percent of workers in its lowest category (0 percent tax). 
The property tax was scheduled to disappear gradually and professionals with high 
earnings would be able to decide whether to pay corporate (IRAE) or personal income 
(IRPF) tax. The employer’s contribution to social security was unified at a 7.5 percent 
flat-rate and the section of the proposal that envisioned changes in the tax on cooperatives 
was eliminated.  
 The reform exemplifies the effect that the segmented tax structure inherited from 
the ISI period had on the business coordination capability and, ultimately, on its political 
strategy capability. This tax structure problem extended to other segments of society such 
as white collar workers, professionals and cooperatives, among others, which also posed 
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a challenge to the FA, giving the nature of its coalition.  Different FA groups had to 
confront lobbying processes from sectors which, in many cases, were part of their 
electoral base. Finally, the top-down solution strategy adopted by President Vásquez 
favored the change in a universalist direction.  
Market spheres of relations: institutions and conflict over distribution 
After analyzing how actors and coalitions bargained over distribution in two relevant 
reforms, tax and labor, it has been shown how coalitional bargaining over distribution 
constitutes the base for the political structuring of market institutions in the four analyzed 
spheres of relations –labor relations and labor markets, corporate governance, skills 
formation, and the state redistributive effort. This analysis supports the argument about 
the importance of the neglected dimension of conflict over power and distribution for 
understanding market institutions evolution.   
Labor relations and labor markets 
The formation of market institutions is shaped by alliances among labor, business and 
governments (Fligstein 1990, 2001; Pontusson 2005). Chapter 2 compared the four 
Southern Cone cases with the advanced political economies to this respect, with some 
attention given to Chile and Uruguay. The historical comparative analysis in chapter 3 
and the post-neoliberal reform processes analyzed in the past sections allowed us to 
understand the institutional and coalition-related underpinnings of labor and business 
organization and long-term relationships in Chile and Uruguay.         
 Chilean labor relations and labor markets resemble the liberal type of market 
economies as characterized by the literature on neo-corporatism, welfare states and the 
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varieties of capitalism (Table 1 in chapter 1). Chile has decentralized wage bargaining 
and low employment protection. Unions are weak and confront a hostile regulatory 
environment. However, unlike advanced LMEs, business organization is centralized and 
its bargaining strategy is one of centralized corporatism.  
 In terms of political coalition formation with its natural partner, left-of-center 
parties, the CUT and Concertación had an uneasy relationship during the 1990s. After the 
transitional reforms during Aylwin’s term, the Concertación has maintained its distance 
from organized labor and the Communist Party. Organized labor had no participation in 
the failed labor reform under Frei and, as analyzed in this chapter, Lagos’ government 
developed an ad hoc alliance with business during his term, maintaining labor at bay. On 
the regulatory side, labor confronts a triple collective action barrier: salaries bargained 
with unionized workers can be improved for non-unionized workers by employers 
(thereby giving workers an incentive to stay out of the union); striking workers can be 
replaced or firms closed during strikes; and anti-union practices by employers remain an 
unattended problem.  
In spite of the particularities of the Chilean labor market regulations, born out of a 
regulatory scheme reformed under an authoritarian government, the fact that labor 
confronts regulatory barriers with respect to collective action is common in LMEs. In 
particular, the 1980s and 1990s were periods of intense regulatory reforms in this area, 
even outside Thatcherism and the United States under Reagan (Crouch 1993). In passing 
the 1990 Employment Equity Act, New Zealand did restrict labor’s political strategy 
capability, causing a reduction in union density of 22 percentage points among the labor 
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force in the five years between 1991 and 1996; from 42 to 20 percent (Huber and 
Stephens 2001).  
 During the 2000s, organized labor could not maintain unity and formed three 
labor centrals and an independent labor confederation. Therefore, with regulatory 
constraints, an arm’s length relationship with political left, and a process of 
organizational atomization, it is hardly possible for labor to successfully add some form 
of wage bargaining to the national political agenda, which is a necessary condition for 
CMEs, as shown in chapter 2. Labor is the weakest part of the Chilean labor relations 
system.  
 Business, on the contrary, is strong and has managed to maintain a high political 
strategy capability during the post-authoritarian period, even in a context of twenty years 
of uninterrupted rule by a left of center coalition. Chilean business capability to lobby 
directly with the Presidential office, as was the case during Lagos’ first two years in 
office with six personal meetings with CPC presidents, is an extraordinary example of 
this political strategy capability. Part of its success is owed to its encompassing 
organization, the CPC. However, this salient and uncommon characteristic with respect to 
advanced LMEs should not be allowed to obscure the liberal orientation of market 
institutions in Chile. As explained in chapter 3, the political relevance of the CPC is owed 
to Pinochet’s stipulation about the need for business to centralize in order to bargain with 
his regime. Once the organization had been encouraged and after it served as a 
coordination framework and lobbying vehicle, there was no need to dismantle it. 
Furthermore, considering that until the second part of Lagos’ term the Concertación was 
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seen as a serious threat to the model by business leaders, CPC remained a useful lobbying 
vehicle for blocking undesired initiatives.  
After more than twenty years in office we [Sofofa] built confidence; but it has been the 
opposition [Alianza] the one that has had a more consistent pro-business position. 
Equality is more important than growth for the Concertación. The Alianza, instead, 
having a very well defined view on the equality topic, is well aware that those problems 
are solved promoting growth. (Sofofa President, personal interview 2010)  
In Uruguay, on the contrary, Sanguinetti’s transitional government (1985-1989) 
reinstated labor rights to their pre-1968 level, provoking a rapid growth in union density 
of around 20 percentage points until it reached 37 percent of the labor force by mid-1987 
(Rodriguez et al. 2001). The neoliberal turn during the 1990s suppressed centralized 
bargaining institutions but did not affect labor’s political strategy capability from the 
regulatory side. As analyzed in the previous sections of this chapter, the neoliberal turn 
even continued certain voluntary bipartite bargaining schemes or put in place some 
informal schemes given the need to keep labor opposition at bay. On the coalitional side, 
FA and PIT-CNT began to strengthen its opposition alliance to neoliberal reforms as 
early as during Lacalle’s government (Caetano 2005). This alliance grew up to the point 
in which once the FA reached office, an important segment of labor leaders were given 
positions in government. FA has evolved to become a labor-based party during the last 
two decades; augmenting labor’s political strategy capability, but not without producing 
internal conflicts in a labor movement dominated by a Communist Party unwilling to 
abandon the capitalist critique.   
When FA won the election in 2005, it took away good and strong leaders from PIT CNT, 
thus leaving the movement headless and with less experienced referents. (FA MP and ex-
beverage union leader, personal interview 2010)    
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As shown in chapter 3 from an historical perspective and in this chapter from a process 
tracing perspective, Uruguayan labor relations have a corporatist matrix that was not 
successfully challenged during the neoliberal period. Although, as in the case of 
Mediterranean Europe, business still opposes this labor relations framework and would 
prefer to return to a voluntary firm level framework, Uruguay maintains and even has 
reinforced its historical Statist CME characteristics in this institutional sphere of 
relations. Meanwhile, Uruguayan business remains without an encompassing 
organization, with a weak political strategy capability and without any strong alliance in 
the political system. Business is the weakest link in the Uruguayan labor relations 
scheme.   
 Therefore, in comparing labor relations and labor markets in Chile and Uruguay, 
two conclusions emerge: first, it is an error to cluster both of them as examples of the 
hierarchical model. On the contrary, it seems more suitable to fit Chilean labor relations, 
authoritarian heritage aside, with the LMEs, while Uruguay, clearly belongs to the CME 
side and seems to be evolving in the direction of the Statist subgroup, given the persistent 
conflictive coordination with strong state intermediation and high leverage that statist 
workers have on PIT-CNT (Table 1, Chapter 1). 
Corporate Governance  
In terms of corporate governance, broadly defined as the internal organization of “the 
firm and the links between the firm and suppliers, competitors, customers and the state” 
(Fligstein 2001:170), evidence collected for this study, mostly interviews with business 
leaders and the analysis of organized business’ documents handed to Parliamentary 
commissions during the reform processes, is consistent with Schneider’s (2004, 2008, 
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2009) description of the Latin American type of firm, mostly family based, usually 
horizontally diversified in order to cope with common market crises and competing in 
primary sectors or other sectors with low technological incorporation.    
However, the main differences in terms of corporate governance between 
Uruguay and Chile is in the firms’ ability to control some of the firm’s internal and 
external environments “in order to manage and stabilize the interdependencies” (Fligstein 
2001:170). In terms of internal controls, among the three main types of problems 
identified in the literature, the separation of ownership and control tend not to be different 
in both countries – both have a family-owned predominant form. However, as family 
owned firms tend to evolve into other less patrimonial forms after one or two generations, 
this may be an interesting dimension to investigate in the future. Similarly, since most of 
the firms in both countries are medium-sized or small, once we set aside foreign direct 
investment, the division of labor between different levels of management is similar in 
both countries, as Schneider suggests (2008).  
However, it is in the relationship between employers and workers where Chilean 
and Uruguayan firms have different resources at their disposition to plan their strategies. 
As shown in the discussion on labor reforms, Chilean firms have a battery of legal 
regulations at hand to implement a hierarchical, unilateral strategy in which labor has 
almost no decision making capability. In Uruguay however, the role of unions and their 
stronger political strategy capability due to much more favorable labor rights regulations 
suggest that firms would have to set a more collaborative strategy in the medium term. As 
explained by a former Labor Minister during the Batlle administration, labor has had 
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leverage even with right-of-center governments in terms of labor ministers’ relationships 
with lobbies related to conflicts over employment termination.  
 
Table 17. Labor conflicts 2005-2009 
 Total number of conflicts Workers involved Day/worker cost Firm Occupations 
 
Chile Uruguay Chile Uruguay Chile Uruguay Chile Uruguay 
2005 101 114 11.209 381,900 99,931 392,914 0 29 
2006 134 154 15.602 881,342 195,344 862,581 0 36 
2007 146 161 17.294 971,891 163,770 1,037,859 0 30 
2008 159 146 17.473 1,276,482 202,178 1,315,983 0 20 
2009 - 104 - 736,817 242,508 551,028 0 18 
Source: Labor relations program at Catholic University in Uruguay and Chilean Direction of Labor.  
 
Table 17 shows how labor conflicts are higher in Uruguay than in Chile, including the 
occupation of firms by their workers, which is not legal in Chile and is not regulated in 
Uruguay. The columns showing workers involved in strikes gives a picture of the 
difference in terms of labor mobilization in both countries. The reader should take into 
account the difference in the labor force size, with the Chilean more than four times 
larger than the Uruguayan. This higher conflict level at the firm level is explained by the 
fact that Uruguayan labor has a stronger political strategy capability and therefore is 
much more capable of challenging management decisions. 
In terms of external controls, the analysis of the reforms presented above and the 
secondary data analyzed in chapter 2 allows us to compare business interdependences 
with respect to capital markets and the state. In terms of options available for financing 
firms’ endeavors, Chilean firms rely much heavier on the stock markets than Uruguayan 
(and even Brazilian and Argentinean) ones as shown in Figures 7 and 10 in chapter 2. As 
also shown in chapter 2, this difference is consistent with labor relations frameworks in 
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both cases. Moreover, the analysis of Chilean labor relations during the last two decades, 
in particular the employers’ prerogatives with respect to employment termination and 
wages makes the situation in Chile consistent with the characteristics that advanced 
LMEs in terms of both labor relations and stock market capitalization, as also shown in 
chapter 2.  
In the case of Uruguay, firms are less well positioned to capitalize in the stock 
market, at least in terms of their ability to terminate employment and aspects of 
remuneration. Not only is labor able to strike, but even to occupy the firm, an aspect of 
labor relations that remained unregulated during the reform and is presently the object of 
bargaining among labor, government and business at the ILO offices in Geneva. 
In terms of business interdependence with the state, as stated before, Chilean 
firms have been able to secure a favorable regulatory environment and have been able to 
maintain informal lobbying mechanisms with the Concertación leaders as well as strong 
ties with the Alianza. In Uruguay, on the contrary, business has not been able to secure 
the desired liberal regulatory environment, its lobbying strategies are fragmented, and it 
has not built a relevant coalition with the right of center parties.  
To sum up, at the national level at least, corporate governance in Chile and 
Uruguay differ significantly and those differences are relevant in terms of medium and 
long term political structuring of this sphere of relations. At the firm level, labor relations 
also differ and these differences, as explained above, are also relevant to our 
understanding of the paths over the medium and long terms. In both cases, and both in 
terms of political leverage and with respect to capital markets role in corporate financing, 
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a path dependence pattern with increasing returns that reinforce corporate governance 
practices is expected in both cases.        
Skills Formation 
There is not much vocational training in Chile or Uruguay, and very little data exist on 
vocational training during the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, businessmen interviewed in 
both countries reported that in-firm skills formation is also uncommon and when it exists 
it is only ad hoc. In both countries there is a perception among domestic businessmen that 
foreign firms may develop more opportunities for skills formation. This lack of training is 
consistent with the production structure profile in both countries, dominated by primary 
or extractive sectors producing commodities or, at most, agro-industrial vertical chains, 
like the meat processing industry, rice industry, and forest industries. These do not 
require high specialization levels except in a few cases like the forestry industry that are 
dominated by foreign capital or at most mixed capital and are not labor intensive.  
This is consistent also with Figures 11 and 12 (chapter 2) that show how the 
Southern Cone and Mediterranean Europe have relative low formal education levels with 
respect to advanced political economies, with Chile the exception given its high level of 
secondary education.   
In Uruguay, however, the increasing lack of a skilled labor force as a consequence 
of the combination of continuous emigration the country suffered during the 1990s and 
first half of 2000s, and the strong growth rates experienced during the second half of that 
decade, are pressing different sectors and government to seek a solution for a problem 
that may reduce growth rates if not addressed.  
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In the construction industry the lack of a suitable labor force is addressed at the 
sectoral level and with the government’s support The Uruguayan government, since the 
Vásquez administration, has also a skill formation governmental institute (INEFOP), 
whose purpose is to coordinate initiatives from the private sector.  
In other words, coordinated strategies in this sphere of relations are increasing in 
Uruguay, which is in line with international evidence about CMEs dominance over LMEs 
in terms of in-firm vocational training strategies. Although these strategies tend to be 
dominant in only certain industries, the example of the Uruguayan construction sector 
suggests that, independently from the profile of the productive structure, which in turns 
may depend heavily on the level of development of a political economy, vocational 
training strategies are most likely to appear when horizontal (i.e. among business in a 
sector) and vertical (i.e. business-labor) coordination has built a dense net of relations. If 
this is the case, then it is not the extent to which vocational training exists that is an 
important characteristic of a CME, but the latent net of relationships that would make it 
possible. This is consistent with the proposition about the suitability of identifying 
different subtypes of CMEs, which also allows for clustering together political economies 
at different levels of development.    
Redistributive effort by the state 
In comparison with their developed counterparts, Southern Cone political economies 
have a lower relative revenue level (Figure 13, chapter 2) and a less generous welfare 
state. In other words, their states make a comparatively lower redistributive effort. This 
difference could be explained by their different democratic trajectories during the 20
th
 
century and by their authoritarian periods dominated by right of center governments that 
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privileged efficiency over equality. However, at a lower relative level of revenue 
collection and welfare expenditure, there are meaningful differences within the Southern 
Cone group; in particular between Chile and Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Among 
them, Uruguay has the most generous welfare state as well as the strongest democratic 
record.  
 There are two main explanations for the tax structure changes in the region since 
the late 1970s. The first is the abandonment of the ISI model, which implied a revenue 
loss via elimination of quotas and lowering of tariffs. These revenue sources were mostly 
replaced by the introduction of a VAT. The second is the redistributive one that occurred 
in successive waves after democratization and in the context of the neoliberal structural 
adjustment or its aftermath. As we have seen, this second wave of reforms included the 
conflicts between organized groups. The outcomes of these reforms help us understand 
the effective redistribution effort that Chile and Uruguay have been able to make and, 
most important, to compare their redistributive behavior with ones made by other LMEs 
and CMEs.   
As shown in chapter 2 (Figure 13), comparing total average revenues from taxes, 
social and other contributions (excluding grants) in each country for the period 1990-
2010, Chile collects 23 percentage points of GDP while Uruguay collects 26.4 percentage 
points. This difference widens when comparing welfare state generosity in both cases: 
13.3 GDP points in Chile against 20.3 GDP points in Uruguay. However, the tax changes 
introduced by the FA government in Uruguay are not captured yet by the data, given the 
gradual implementation of the new tax structure beginning in July 2007.  
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 In both countries, left of center governments attempted to reform the tax structure 
in their first term in office with similar goals: moving to a more progressive tax system. 
However, the FA and the Concertación had very different results. The difference is 
explained not by the intentions of the governing coalitions but by their ability to bargain 
with the opposition and powerful social groups, in particular the business sector. In 
Uruguay the government also had strong opposition from the professional and white 
collar sectors which were unaccustomed to paying any salary or income tax.  
In this respect and analyzing the tax reforms in Argentina and Chile during the 
1990s, Fairfield (2010) challenges the assertion by Weyland (1997) and Lieberman 
(2003) that cohesion facilitates progressive taxation, whereas fragmentation hinders 
redistribution. Fairfield argues that business cohesion in Chile helped preclude 
progressive tax increases after 1990, while business fragmentation in Argentina gave 
policymakers much greater leeway for passing such reforms. My results are in line with 
Fairfield’s, but the argument is more complex than Fairfield suggests.  
I agree with Fairfield’s in the sense that a cohesive and politically strong 
organized business sector successfully blocked tax increases in Chile while a fragmented 
and politically weak business actor in Uruguay was unable to block the 2006 FA reform. 
However, the analysis of the tax reform in Uruguay also supports the argument made by 
Weyland and Lieberman about fragmentation hindering redistribution. As shown in 
chapter 3, organizational fragmentation in Uruguay was not the result of weak organized 
business but of strong business sectors that were able to guarantee for themselves special 
benefits during the ISI period. I have shown that this was also the case for Chile at the 
time. The fragmentation of business organization in Uruguay remained unchanged 
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because of the relative success business sectors had to maintain special benefits. These 
benefits hindered the effort at redistribution. 
The dispute about cohesion facilitating progressive taxation is, therefore, 
misleading. The reason is that it is not business organizational cohesion per se that 
facilitates progressive taxation, but the form of the tax structure that may facilitate 
progressive taxation when loopholes are few or do not exist, therefore lowering the cost 
to reach agreements between actors with different tax burdens.  
In Chile business cohesion was forced by the military regime, which also 
reformed the tax structure in order to eliminate special privileges and loopholes. Business 
had to adapt to this structure and, therefore, once the military regime was ousted the tax 
structure became functional for business interests. The CPC revival in Chile cannot be 
explained without Pinochet’s authoritarian enforcement, as shown in chapter 3. Although 
organized business blocked tax increases, the form of the tax structure, in which inter-
sectoral “rent-seeking” conflicts were mostly absent, made the reforms more progressive.  
The evidence on the Uruguayan tax reform, analyzed below, support this 
argument. Tax reform attempts, as shown for the cases of Lacalle’s reform and Vásquez’ 
reform, had to fight “rent-seeking” strategies from business and labor. Therefore, it was 
the previous tax structure filled with special benefits for different groups that impeded 
progressive tax reforms, even when business organization was fragmented. Therefore, the 
difference in terms of the redistributive effort made by the Chilean and Uruguayan states 
in the post-neoliberal period is due to the different political strategy capability relevant 
powerful sectors had in each case vis-a-vis government coalitions.   
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Institutional complementarities in Chile and Uruguay  
Two or more institutions are considered complementary when the presence of one 
increases the return to the other(s) (Hall and Soskice 2001). This last and short section is 
devoted to a discussion of how the four analyzed spheres of relations –labor relations and 
labor markets, corporate governance, skills formation and the state’s redistributive effort– 
complemented one another in Chile and Uruguay. As was shown in chapter 2, in 
comparing Chile and Uruguay with the broader pool of political economies, labor 
relations and corporate finance have a liberal type of complementarity in Chile in the 
sense that firm level wage bargaining and deregulated labor markets are consistent with 
capital provision mechanisms mainly concerned about current profitability. In Uruguay, 
on the contrary, the banking and bonds-based finance mechanisms are consistent with 
wage bargaining mechanisms that favor long term employment and higher wage 
increases.  
 Although skills formation is mostly confined to the formal sector in both 
countries, long term coordination between labor and business is consistent with sectoral 
level vocational training initiatives in non-specialized sectors, as the Uruguayan 
construction industry shows. Non-specialized sectors with medium or high employment 
rotation find it costly to invest in skills formation at the firm level because of the labor 
mobility problem. However, if costs and benefits are shared at the sector level, then firms 
have more incentives to participate in such initiatives. When coordination of labor 
relations sphere is present, then skills formation becomes possible. On the other hand, the 
absence of skill formation initiatives outside of the formal sector in Chile and most of 
Uruguayan sectors is consistent with liberal or Statist-coordinated models.    
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 Furthermore, also as shown in chapter 2, political economies with coordinated 
labor relations tend to have overall higher tax levels and to rely more on direct taxation 
instruments than political economies with uncoordinated labor relations. This difference 
is consistent with differences in terms of labor and business’ political strategy 
capabilities. The cases of Chile and Uruguay are also consistent with these 
complementary paths, with Chile having a strong business sector that defends indirect 
taxation mechanisms and opposes redistributive mechanisms. Uruguay, on the contrary, 
has a strong organized labor with close ties to a left of center party that favors the 
introduction of progressive direct taxation mechanisms and redistributive policies based 
on levels of expenditure.  
However, as in the Statist and Segmented-corporatist CMEs, universalism 
confronts strong segmentation pressures from privileged groups attempting to capture this 
expenditure and therefore undermine the effect of expenditure on inequality. Figures 13 
and 14 in chapter 2 showed these relationships clearly with a comparative lens.          
 The relationship between corporate governance and skills formation is mediated 
by the productive structure’s overall level of specialization, or at least by the existence of 
a couple of specialized sectors competing globally, factors that should be taken into 
account when comparing political economies at different levels of development. As 
above suggested, Chile and Uruguay primarily have non-specialized productive systems, 
and therefore they are expected to have few skill formation initiatives outside the formal 
education system. Since this set of relationships is consistent with the literature, we must 
conclude that the structuring of vocational skills formation initiatives in such contexts is 
highly dependent on the level of coordination present in the labor relations sphere.  
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 A similar situation occurs when analyzing the complementarities between types of 
corporate governance and the state’s redistributive effort. As suggested above and in 
chapter 2, corporate financing options tend to adapt to politically designed labor relations 
coordination mechanisms, or their absence, which in turn affect employment stability and 
labor regulation. The level of redistributive effort present in a political economy is also 
dependent on the political equilibrium born out of the conflict over the distribution of 
power between labor and business; which also set the possible paths for coordinating 
labor relations. Therefore, given the business dominated power equilibrium in Chile, it is 
reasonable to expect moderate redistributive efforts and, where economically attractive, a 
strong incidence of stock market capitalization mechanisms. In Uruguay, on the contrary, 
the labor dominated power equilibrium is consistent with centralized coordination 
mechanisms and strong redistributive efforts in terms of taxation levels. Consistent with 
advanced CMEs, the incidence of stock market capitalization mechanisms tend to be 
lower.  
 To sum up, this chapter has been dedicated to show how domestic conflict over 
power and distribution strongly affects the shape of market institutions in Chile and 
Uruguay and, therefore, that it is not possible to understand their models of capitalism 
without considering this analytical dimension. This political conflict is at the base of the 
evolution of market institutions.
37
  
                                                             
37
 In a democratic environment the conflict over power and distribution is dynamic because the equilibrium 
in actors’ political strategy capability varies both from election to election and because of groups internal 
organizational evolution. However, in some political economies this equilibrium tends to be more stable 
because of the permanence of certain coalition in office, while in others tends to be more instable because 
of high rotation. This argument builds on Huber and Stephens’ argument about the left-of center parties’ 
tenure in office as the main predictor of the advancement of social democratic reforms in Europe (2001). 
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In the next and final chapter, the conclusion, I connect the dots backward in order 
to argue that since the beginning of the post-neoliberal period, Chile should be considered 
a LME while Uruguay should be considered a Statist-CME.  Then I discuss the proposed 
new typology from chapter 1 and argue that it is more suitable for integrating developing 
market economies into the analysis of models of capitalism. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Esping Andersen (1990) also makes the argument about the class and cross-class coalitions being the most 
important cause of the differences among the three types of welfare states he identifies.  
  
Chapter 5. Conclusion
 
This Conclusion presents a summary of the principal arguments, findings and theoretical 
contributions from this dissertation. It also assesses the broader methodological and 
substantive implications that the argument and findings hold for the study of varieties of 
capitalism both in Latin America and in a cross-regional comparative context.    
Principal Findings and Contributions  
The main finding of this work is that Chilean and Uruguayan market institutions are 
evolving in different directions. Their models of capitalism are different.  Chile has a 
liberal market economy and Uruguay has a statist-coordinated market economy. This 
conclusion is based on the historical comparison of market institutions and the conflict 
over power and distribution, and the analysis of the market spheres of relations in the 
post-neoliberal period.  
Building on this finding, the dissertation makes three substantive contributions to 
our understanding of models of capitalism in Latin America and provided insights for 
cross-regional comparison. The first is a reconceptualization of the classification criteria 
developed by Hall and Soskice (2001) that allows for classifying new cases without 
stretching the concept of a model of capitalism. The second contribution is to incorporate 
into the analysis of models of capitalism the dialectic dynamics of coalition formation 
and conflict dynamics as process concepts. The third contribution is the re-
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conceptualization of Latin American models of capitalism based on the proposed new 
typology. 
These contributions also have substantial implications for the analysis of the 
varieties of capitalism. The first is that the dominant approach to the region, which 
postulate a single coherent model of capitalism in Latin America, does not hold. In 
addition to Uruguay, the data presented in this work suggest that Brazil and Argentina are 
also closer to the coordinated path than to the liberal path. The second is that it is possible 
and even desirable to link the cases of Chile and Uruguay to the typology proposed by 
Hall and Soskice (2001) by modifying its logical treatment and allowing for the 
consideration of subtypes of CMEs and LMEs.  
Improvement of the typology about models of capitalism  
The reconceptualization of Hall and Soskice’s typology is modifies the logical treatment 
of types, positing their differences are of kind, not of degree. The core type-concept in the 
typology is the form of coordination. Hall and Soskice identify two main forms of 
coordination: competitive and strategic. Competitive coordination is described as in the 
classic economic literature and corresponds to the LME type. Strategic coordination is 
heavily dependent on non-market relationships to coordinate production and develop core 
competencies; it and corresponds to the CME type (Chapter 1).  
The two types are mutually exclusive but also exhaustively exclusive. In other 
words, no third possibility exists. But by considering the difference between strategic and 
competitive coordination mechanisms as of kind, it is possible to identify subtypes of 
each type. This dissertation proposes the existence of four subtypes of coordinated 
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market economies: Corporatist-centralized, Corporatist-sectorial, Statist and Group-
Coordinated (Chapter 2).  
This logical treatment incorporates the other models identified in the literature 
into the conceptual framework as subtypes of the coordinated variety and, for the case of 
Chile and Uruguay, overcomes the regional trap of the ‘Hierarchical’ model. The 
question about the form of coordination in a particular model is a political question, not 
an economic one. This dissertation demonstrates that the different kinds of market 
coordination are grounded in different institutional configurations that respond to long-
lasting class and cross-class coalitional bargaining. Therefore, although the answer to the 
question about the form of coordination may reduce politics to a minimum of regulation 
and control, as it is the case in the ideal liberal market economy type; this fact does not 
transform the question into an economic question. This question, which has guided the 
comparison of the cases of Chile and Uruguay, is the one that relates model descriptions 
to conceptual frameworks. With this typological transformation and by drawing the 
attention into the flaws of leaving empirics and theory unconnected, this study has built a 
suitable conceptual framework to analyze new cases.   
Context and boundary conditions for historical causality 
In order to understand why a country coordinates strategically or competitively requires 
understanding the conflict over power and the distribution of power among the main 
actors of this political process. This process should be approached first from a 
comparative historical perspective, because only after we understand the historical 
underpinnings of business and labor organization and relations are we ready to examine 
how today’s business, labor and parties bargain over market institutional forms.  
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 Therefore, the second contribution is the consideration of contexts and process 
concepts for explaining dialectic dynamics of coalition formation and conflict over power 
and distribution over time. The analysis of the historical context in which labor and 
business organizations evolved and are related to each other and to the political system is 
of particular importance to our understanding of how contextual institutions and 
processes operate as constraints in the cross-regional context of comparison for the 
understanding of organizational evolution and labor relations (Chapter 3).  
Both the ISI model and the instability of democratic institutions, common factors 
in the cases that are analyzed outside the pool of advanced industrial democracies, 
affected labor and business organization differently than the open market model and 
democratic stability present in these developed countries since World War II. While 
democratic breakdowns made long term coordination between labor and business less 
likely, the ISI model favored sectorial-focused organizational strategies within business. 
 The contextual variables of economic regime and political regime operated as 
boundary conditions for business organization patterns and for patterns of coordination 
between labor and business. By protecting the economy and assuring institutionalized 
access to policy making for business on a sectorial basis, the ISI model discouraged 
business from maintaining a centralized pattern of organization. Therefore, in order to 
understand the different patterns of business organization in advanced industrial 
economies and in the Southern Cone, it is important to consider the boundary conditions 
of the economic regime.  
 Democratic instability is a contextual condition that is also important in order to 
understand the patterns of coordination between labor and business. The more unstable a 
 182 
1
8
2
 
[Typ
e a 
political context is, the less incentives business and labor have to coordinate in the long-
run, given that an unstable context may provide short-term unilateral advantages through 
changes in the rules of the game.    
 The historical analysis should be done at the national level, not at the firm level as 
Hall and Soskice, and Schneider and Soskice propose. Although it is possible to study 
some of the manifestations of the conflict over power and distribution at the firm level, 
mostly for LMEs, understanding CMEs requires referring to the national level dynamics 
in which organized labor and business lobby for their preferred form of market 
institutions and coordination mechanisms. This dissertation, therefore, analyzes these 
conflicts from a national level. The following subsections summarize labor and business 
organizational and bargaining patterns during the 20
th
 century.         
a. Labor organization and political strategy capability in Chile 
Labor in Chile was organized around a single encompassing organization between the 
early 1900s and 1995. The main cause of this was the hostile environment workers 
confronted from the state and business during most of the century. Labor organizations 
have not been divided along ideological lines as was the case for Uruguay, at least until 
the 1970s. This hostility from the state and business manifested itself as exclusionary 
strategies based on the limitation of the vote until the 1960s and legal restrictions for the 
political strategy capability of unions since 1979. 
Organized labor political strategy capability improved during its participation in 
the Broad Front government between 1938 and 1948, and again during its class coalition 
with the Popular Unity between the early 1960s and until 1973. It increased during these 
two periods because of the softening of exclusionary tactics from right of center sectors 
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that were kept at bay by these left of center coalitions, and the strengthening of linkages 
between union leaders and UP party leaders. However, in both cases these ‘labor springs’ 
were abruptly ended in the 1950s by a populist government and in the 1970s by a 
bureaucratic authoritarian regime. Exclusionary tactics were different in both cases, as 
analyzed in chapter 3.  
Labor’s weak post-neoliberal political strategy capability is explained by its 
organizational division (3 centrals and one independent confederation), legal restrictions 
introduced during the military regime, low density and weak linkages with left of center 
politicians.     
b. Labor organization and political strategy capability in Uruguay 
Labor in Uruguay was weakly organized along ideological lines between the early 1900s 
and 1964, which allowed for the existence of rival organizations. Although the dominant 
Colorado coalition delivered labor rights and pro-labor coordination mechanisms until the 
early 1960s, there was never a lib-lab coalition. The decline of this coalition’s political 
dominance made the political context more hostile for labor as the model ISI stagnated, 
precipitating the formation of an encompassing organization in 1964. However, the 
political activity of this organization was carried out clandestinely during the military 
regime until 1985.  
 Organized labor in Uruguay did not develop political strategy capability until the 
late 1960s, and even then the military regime reduced it again between 1973 and 1985. 
Since then, labor’s encompassing organization, the ability of its leaders to negotiate with 
FA leaders and even right of center parties’ leaders, as well as the lack of restrictive 
regulations during the 1990s, made it possible to maintain reasonable levels of political 
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strategy capability. Furthermore, this capability has increased since the year 2005 by 
means of an increase in density.   
c. Business organization and political strategy capability in Chile 
Business organization in Chile followed a centralized pattern until the ISI model replaced 
the export-import growth model in the late 1930s. However, the Pinochet regime forced 
them to centralize again. Since the mid-1980s, the business encompassing organization 
(CPC) has been a core actor for lobbying with government and labor. Forcing business to 
form an umbrella group encompassing broad interests and strategies was reinforced by 
the abrupt ISI framework dismantling and its replacement with a market based 
framework, eliminating particularistic benefits and discouraging “rent seeking” strategies.  
Business political strategy capability has been strong during most of the century, 
decreasing only during the Broad Front governments and Allende’s government, and 
partially during the populist period and Pinochet’s first years in office. Business’s high 
political strategy capability has been based on its adequate organizational pattern –
centralized before 1939 and after 1982, sectorial during the ISI, its continuous linkages 
with right of center parties and, when necessary, with the military, its reasonably high 
level of internal representation in the big business subsector, and the support of the above 
mentioned exclusionary strategies toward labor. Business remained strongly organized 
and with high political strategy capability in the post-neoliberal era, maintaining its close 
relationship with right of center parties but also by developing a good relationship with 
left of center ones as explained in chapter 4.    
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d. Business organization and political strategy capability in Uruguay 
Business organization in Uruguay also followed a centralized pattern until the ISI model 
replaced the export-import growth model in the late 1930s. The military regime in 
Uruguay did not reform the stagnating ISI economy and, different from Chile, did not 
force business to form an encompassing organization. As the economy stagnated, a 
sectorially divided business sector intensified its unfruitful “rent seeking” strategies. 
After an unsuccessful attempt to encompass interests and strategies in a peak 
organization, COSUPEM, business remained organized by sectors and without any 
relevant linkages to political parties.  
Political strategy capability has decreased for business since the 1960s because of 
its inability to restructure its organizational form in order to adapt to the new open market 
environment and the weakness of external incentives to do so, like the Lacalle’s 
government initiative to form an encompassing organization (COSUPEM). This 
organizational weakness has made it difficult to maintain close relationships with party 
leaders, even from the right. The liberal environment during the 1990s in terms of labor 
relations and labor market regulations masked their need for an encompassing, but the 
abrupt change in these conditions between 2005 and 2009 showed how organized 
business is politically weak and its organizational form is ineffective politically in the 
new context.    
Different routes into the global market 
The third contribution of this study is the re-conceptualization of Latin American models 
of capitalism based on a new typology. This dissertation contends that Schneider and 
Soskice’s assertion about a coherent Latin American model of capitalism is incorrect.  
 186 
1
8
6
 
[Typ
e a 
There are different LME and CME models. The analysis of conflict over power and 
distribution in Chile and Uruguay for the post-neoliberal period shows how market 
institutions in Chile and Uruguay are very different in the spheres of labor relations, and 
in the redistributive effort made by the state; and that there are also meaningful 
differences in the corporate governance sphere. Moreover, the analysis shows how these 
different institutions and the different complementarities they produce are comparable 
with the ones in the advanced political economies. Specifically, this study demonstrated 
that market institutions in Chile follow a liberal path, while market institutions in 
Uruguay should be classified in the corporatist path that gave birth to the coordinated 
path.  
 In terms of the labor relations sphere, while Chile has voluntary wage bargaining 
at the firm level, restricted rights to strike for workers and an overall restrictive set of 
legal provisions for political action by labor at the firm or national level, Uruguay has 
centralized wage bargaining at the sectorial level, pro-labor legislation in the labor 
relations sphere, and a state willing to participate in and even enforce coordination 
between labor and business.  
 In terms of the redistributive effort made by the state, as shown in chapter 4, 
although Chile and Uruguay have similar levels of tax collection, Chilean welfare state 
generosity (13.3% of GDP) is significantly less than the two thirds of the Uruguayan one 
(20.3%). This is consistent with the differences in welfare state generosity between 
liberal and coordinated political economies in advanced societies. 
 The differences in terms of corporate governance are mostly focused on financing 
strategies. Chilean firms tend to rely more on stock market capitalization than Uruguayan 
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ones, which tend to rely on banking. The particular strength of the public banking system 
in Uruguay provides a friendly environment for firms to seek financing throughout the 
banking system and public bonds.      
 In the skills formation sphere of relations the most important difference between 
our two cases comes from the net enrollment rates in secondary formal education, with 
Chile’s rate much higher than Uruguay’s. However, in-firm skills formation is low in 
both cases, partly because of their low level of sophisticated productive structures.   
The analysis of market institutions in Uruguay also suggests that more attention 
should be paid to cross-regional comparisons of models of capitalism, which the 
literature has not done sufficiently. The type of corporatism in which market institutions 
in Uruguay are based is similar to the Mediterranean European countries -- state 
corporatism as defined by Schmitter (1974). I define this model as a Statist model of 
capitalism, emphasizing the central role the state plays in sustaining corporatist 
institutions in the market spheres. Therefore, the analysis of these two cases has 
important implications for cross-regional comparison and is relevant for conceptual 
refinement. 
 In a context of stable democratic rule and integration into the global market, at 
least for these two cases, these proto-LME or proto-CME models should be expected to 
follow a path dependent route. However, as forecasting has not been a strong virtue in 
political science, it may be best simply to classify models as they are, explaining the 
routes followed to reach their current position and looking forward to surprises triggered 
by unanticipated new and complex events. 
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Comparative analysis of both cases: similarities and differences 
The organizational pattern of business was similar in both countries until the 1980s, and 
then the divergence in paths is explained by the incentive that the Pinochet regime posed 
on business to re-centralize, while this incentive was mostly absent in Uruguay. The 
comparative analysis showed how the economic models shaped business organizational 
patterns in similar manners in both countries up to the 1980s. These models are 
contextual causes of the organizational form of business, and the government’s strategies 
to adapt to these model changes are the proximate causes of business organizational 
changes. Government emphasis in improving labor rights under the import-export growth 
model triggered a business organizational centralization pattern, while government 
interventionist policies at the onset of the ISI model triggered the return of business to a 
sectorial pattern. Since the ISI stagnation and its ensuing crisis, in Uruguay the 
government did not provide any incentive for business to change its sectorial based “rent 
seeking” strategy, while in Chile the military led an abrupt model change that included 
forcing business into a centralized pattern again.       
In terms of labor organization, patterns are explained also by the government’s 
attitude toward labor, given that in both cases business has had an intransigent attitude 
during most of the periods under consideration. Confronting continuous hostility 
encouraged Chilean labor to centralize early on.  While the Uruguayan government’s 
interest in delivering labors rights and favorable coordination conditions without an 
interest in mobilizing labor did not create pressure for Uruguayan labor to unite that 
Chilean labor had. Consistent with this initial pattern, Uruguayan labor centralized its 
organization only when the context turned increasingly hostile.  
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The neoliberal transformation integrated both political economies into the global 
market, but did not necessarily shape the model of capitalism. In Chile, as the 
transformation occurred under an unopposed dictatorial regime, it created the opportunity 
to strengthen exclusionary tactics against labor’s political strategy capability and shaped 
a liberal type of labor relations. In Uruguay, on the contrary, the lack of political 
articulation of a neoliberal project by the military produced a gradual and nonlinear 
liberalization pattern organized in successive but disconnected attempts. 
Therefore, Chilean market institutions changed during the military regime in an 
orderly, pre-designed and unopposed manner, becoming one rare example of institutional 
displacement. There was a complete removal of old rules and a replacement by a 
completely different set of new rules. In spite of this institutional displacement, it is 
interesting to remember that Chilean elites, at least right of center ones and the business 
sector, had been attracted to classical liberalism during the 20
th
 century as exemplified, 
among other things, by the Kemmerer and Klein-Sachs missions as well as the Chicago 
Boys project (Chapter 3). Interestingly, in spite of the institutional displacement that 
occurred during the liberalization period, it is also possible to identify continuities, such 
as the elite’s taste for liberalism and its use of exclusionary tactics to keep labor out of 
political life. Chile should be classified, therefore, in the group of liberal market 
economies.        
In Uruguay, on the contrary, the neoliberal period produced a process of 
institutional layering, where new rules were introduced atop or alongside old rules during 
different reformist attempts. As most of these attempts were made in a democratic 
environment, opposition to changes in the liberal direction often moderated the original 
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projects or even derogated some of the new rules. Many corporatist arrangements 
survived the 1990s, although particularisms and privileges tended to be questioned as 
informality grew tremendously and adaptation to the global market required more 
competitive arrangements. Market coordination was sustained by the state, with bipartite 
coordination between labor and business a rare phenomenon. Still, as the coordinated 
model seemed to strengthen, bipartite coordination began to slowly flourish, starting at 
the formal and bounded environment offered by the Work Councils. Still, the case should 
be regarded as a case of state-corporatism and, because of that, as a Statist-Coordinated 
model of capitalism.    
Implications  
Methodological implications 
The analysis of Latin American models of capitalism and, in particular the comparison 
between Chile and Uruguay, has interesting methodological implications.   First, the 
analysis of the creation and evolution of market institutions should not ignore the 
historical dimension of the processes. Political science is historical; the analysis of 
context and boundary conditions in Latin American models of capitalism has proven 
important not only for the intra-regional comparison but also cross-regionally, where the 
contextual conditions tend to be different. 
A second contribution, related to the first one, is that quantitative work, 
comparative historical analysis and process tracing analysis should be brought into a 
dialogue. This nesting on quantitative and qualitative analytical tools has been 
underutilized by the literature on the varieties of capitalism.  
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Implications for the study of market institutions  
This dissertation offers a contribution to the analysis and understanding of the varieties of 
capitalism in Latin America, a region that has been understudied by the varieties of 
capitalism literature. The argument presented by this study challenges the postulate of 
convergence on the ‘hierarchical’ model, and it has substantial implications for the 
analysis of the formation and evolution of market institutions. 
 The classification criterion offered by means of the new typology built on Hall 
and Soskice’s work implies that the classification and analysis of developing political 
economies should be revised by better-articulating empirics with the conceptual 
framework. In other words, the models should clearly discuss the form of coordination in 
which they base their institutional formation and evolution.     
Second, the incorporation of the dialectic dynamics of coalition formation and 
conflict dynamics into the analysis of varieties of capitalism in developing political 
economies proved to be useful for understanding them. This is an argument already put 
forward by other scholars (Howell 2003; Watson 2003; Kinderman 2005; Pontusson 
2005). The implication is that the literature should make a greater effort to focus on the 
corporatist and pluralist approaches to institutional and state analysis. Both approaches 
are relevant for understanding the cases of Chile and Uruguay, but the varieties of 
capitalism literature has underplayed the importance of the corporatist approach. This 
dissertation has shown that market coordination forms and institutional 
complementarities could not be understood without analyzing the latent distributional 
conflict between class and cross-class coalitions. 
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This implies also the importance of setting the national level as the unit of 
analysis. In particular this is important for analyzing conflict dynamics relevant to the 
coordinated model of capitalism.  The findings presented here do not preclude us 
continuing to approach this puzzle from a firm-based perspective, but it suggests that a 
firm-based analysis is insufficient for a complete understanding of the dynamics of the 
coordinated model of capitalism.  
Third, the re-conceptualization of Latin American models of capitalism based on 
the proposed new typology implies that the region may follow divergent institutional 
paths for its integration into the global market. This opens the door for future research in 
the region, especially research that focused on the political economies at a lower level of 
development in which political and economic contexts have been different from the ones 
in Chile and Uruguay. Also, the qualitative differences found in terms of market 
institutions complementarities between Chile and Uruguay generates insights that 
facilitate more systematic comparisons with advanced industrial democracies.  
Finally, my findings imply that governments in the region should be more 
informed about the implications of various models of capitalism in other regions and 
avoid following either the Chilean or the Uruguayan path without seriously considering 
the socio-political foundations of their own countries and the leverage and limitations 
they pose for following one path or the other, or even a third and different one. 
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Envoi
 
I finish my doctoral training with this dissertation, but expect to study more cases in the 
near future in order to better understand the political foundations of market institutions. I 
am particularly interested in studying market institutions in Southern Europe. I plan on 
doing it for the next few years. Even though I need to bring this study to an end because I 
need to move on in my career and I have a job waiting for me, more research is necessary 
on this relevant problem of market institutions formation and evolution. As I move back 
to South America in order to begin my life as an “employed” scholar, I am grateful for 
the great six years I have been able to spend at the University of North Carolina in 
Chapel Hill, particularly for the tremendous amount of resources I had available and the 
academic and human quality of the professors with whom I have had the privilege to 
work.  
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Appendix One: Documentation on tax and labor reforms 
Chilean Labor Reform (Law 19759)  
Parliamentary Process and Related News 
Table A1. Chile: Press releases on Labor reform 
2000-
2001 
CONGRESS MERCURIO LA TERCERA 
1013  President Lagos has a meeting with his Cabinet and the CPC 
delegates at his house 
 
1108    Main gatherings between Lagos and business: 
March 7: 5 hours meeting at Centro de Estudios Publicos with 
more than 100 businessmen 
June 26: Lagos invited to La Moneda the 5 main business 
groups in the country to evaluate the economy. Business 
complaint about labor reforms. Five days before Lagos said to 
them: “Stop crying and begin working” 
October 12: Lagos invited to his house the directive board of 
the CPC. They talked about the labor reform and other topics. 
1109    Business asks Lagos to make a “golpe de timon” to avoid 
political pressures over Labor reform and other topics. It was in 
the Encuentro Nacional de la Empresa (ENADE 2000) 
Pedro Ibanez (President of Corpora SA): Lagos debe elegir 
“entre el espejismo de la distribución y la potencia telúrica del 
crecimiento, (…) entre dirigir un gobierno que frena al sector 
privado o un aliado estratégicamente con la empresa” (p.25) 
1112  Gary Becker, invited to Chile by Mont Pelerin Society, declares 
that Chile should liberalize the labor market and sell state 
assets. “Labor Reform  should move in a very different 
position” 
 
1118  Article about government sending the initiative via Senate and 
CUT opposing initiative. CUT do not want to negotiate with 
Lagos and opts by a strategy of lobbying in Congress while the 
Lagos’ labor reform initiates its legislative process. Last year, 
right before the election, another reform failed to pass that 
included the conflictive goal of extending collective bargaining. 
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law is being discussed  Lagos’ reform is milder because its conflictive topics are 
conditioned to find consensus in parliament, which is far from 
be reached at this time. 
Labor initiative does not consider the two main aspirations by 
the CUT: extension of collective bargaining and avoiding 
replacement of workers during strikes. 
1120 Executive sends 
message to 
Congress with Law 
initiative 
  
1201  CPC rejects the Labor reform initiative. Although it is much 
better than the one that failed to pass during Frei’s 
administration, the initiative makes the labor market less 
flexible and less free, increasing the costs for hiring. It is 
negative because it includes inter-firm negotiation and 
elimination of the ability to replace workers during a strike. 
 
1205 Santiago I meeting 
(Concertacion 
leaders and 
congressmen with 
government) ends 
  
1206   Labor Sub-secretary (Ljubetic) explains the contents of the 
Labor Law in a column in La Tercera 
1211   CPC President (W. Riesco) says that late president Frei’s labor 
reform, just before the election, had only electoral purposes. It 
was terrible.  
P.23 “…logicamente los empresarios guardan un sentido de 
lealtad [hacia Pinochet] y respeto muy grande con la persona 
que fue Presidente de la Republica y que llevo al país no solo a 
restituir la normalidad, sino que además le dio un nuevo camino 
de desarrollo a través de una verdadera revolución económica”.   
 
1211   Labor reform: government will include collective bargaining in 
initiative. Socialists lead the initiative. 
1213  Concertacion confronts internal disagreement over Labor Law. 
DC Senators are not willing to support inter-firm or industry 
level collective bargaining 
Ministries of Hacienda, Economia and Trabajo oppose Santiago 
I proposed changes to Labor reform. 
There is a brief of the whole process up to this date. See 
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separated chart. 
General opposition in business to the inclusion of collective 
bargaining in labor law initiative. Lack of confidence in 
government. Business considers that Concertacion has internal 
divisions. 
1214  Labor Ministry (Mr. Solari) says that if no accord is possible 
with opposition, Concertacion will vote law using its’ majority 
in Congress. Denominated “Hard topics” of collective 
bargaining and worker’s replacement during strikes are not 
included in initiative but still under negotiation. 
Ministry of Interior, Jose Insulza, received in his office in La 
Moneda, to CUT’s President to assure the government has not 
changed anything from the initiative.   
Institutional senator Boeninger (DC) refuses to send initiative 
modifications with “hard topics” without a consensus from the 
opposition. 
Mr. Lamarca (Sofofa): “No se la fuerza que tenga ese acuerdo 
politico. (…) Muchas veces las grandes asambleas de gente 
opinando no son los mejores consejeros y me imagino que el 
Presidente tendrá que meditar lo que va a hacer” 
Mr. Riesco (CPC): “el empresariado desde luego expresa su 
oposición a la voz de esos sectores más radicalizados y apoya 
una definición de este tema, que tiene que venir de quien tiene 
el mando de la nación” 
Official Santiago I document states: “incorporaremos el 
fortalecimiento de la negociación colectiva en la reforma 
laboral, incluyendo el pleno ejercicio del derecho de huelga”. 
(p.4) Socialist Party President, Mr. Nunez, leaded the inclusion 
of this paragraph in the declaration. 
 
(p.5) Alianza opposes completely. DC is divided. PS-PPD 
agree with inclusion but have minor differences. 
1215   Lagos defines government line: hard topics will be included if 
the Concertacion (majority in parliament) is willing to vote for 
it. Concertacion will not worry for the right-of center-position 
(“with Alianza or without Alianza”)  
Separate note: wall street has a negative view on inclusion of 
“hard topics” in reform initiative. Mr. Janda, from Morgan 
Stanley, said this may affect the flow of investments in Chile. 
1216  Socialist’s view dominated Santiago 1 meeting and government 
will include “hard topics” in initiative. However, DC senators 
(among them Sabag and Valdez) need to be convinced to vote.  
 
1218   DC Senator Mr. Foxley stands against the inclusion of the 
“hard topics” in the reform initiative. This sends a message to 
the right. 
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1219   RN open to negotiate with Concertacion without UDI. Ministry 
of Labor, Mr. Solari, says it does not exist a unique view in the 
Concertacion. “Hard topics” are the center of the negotiations. 
1226 Supreme Court 
answer Senate’s 
questions on law 
initiative  
 RN gives government an addendum to initiative in order to be 
considered. More labor deregulation is the main topic. RN says 
“hard topics” should not be included because it radicalizes the 
political process of negotiation.  
0103  Government moderates ambition on Labor reform. Presidency 
declares that inter-firm negotiation addenda to be sent to 
congress do not include negotiation outside the firm. Business 
happy but still worried.  
 
0110  CUT and CPC distances themselves in labor reform initiative 
after debating the initiative in Senate 
 
0115  Initiative needs to solve some in-constitutional articles (2) but 
also need special majority for some other articles; Supreme 
Court says.   
 
0126  Unemployment grows. Central Bank asks to advance the Labor 
reform. Parliament is discussing the “hard topics”  
 
0225  Boeninger declares that business know long ago that labor 
reforms will not add rigidity to markets. Believe reform will be 
passed in April or May. 
 
0308  Executive prepares message for Congress with the following 
changes: 
- Inter-firm Collective bargaining will be allowed but it 
is voluntary for business or labor (not mandatory if 
labor decides to bargain together) 
- Replacement of workers during strikes: will be more 
difficult (cost of 4 UF to be paid to the workers doing 
strike), but will not be prohibited. 
 
0320 Executive sends 
2
nd
 message to 
Congress with Law 
initiative 
  
0322   After a meeting between Lagos, his economic team and 
Concertacion Senators in Cerro Castillo (Presidential vacations 
residence), a substitutive initiative is sent to Congress. It is a 
pro-business initiative that resolves the “hard topics” in the 
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following way:  
a. Inter-firm Collective bargaining is allowed, but 
requires the two parts to do it voluntarily. 
b. Workers can be replaced during strikes but must 
receive a “compensation bond”. 
Some DC senators, pro-labor (Mr. de Gregorio and others), 
disagree and oppose. 
RN agrees and will vote the initiative. 
0323   CPC and CUT unhappy with new initiative.  
Mr. Martínez (CUT): al final la presión de los empresarios y la 
derecha terminó por convencer a la Concertación y al gobierno 
(…) con esa suerte de ablandamiento que le aplicaron a los 
temas clave como la negociación inter-empresa y el no 
reemplazo en caso de huelga, esas reformas no nos sirven” 
(p.26).  
0325  Proposed changes were sent to Congress as explained in 0308 
new. Executive wants to give priority to this law in Congress in 
order to vote it before Parliamentary elections (12/16).   
 
0328   Debate in Senate begins. Concertacion divided. Senators 
divided across parties, one group wants stronger collective 
bargaining mechanisms. 
0329 CUT, CPC, 
SOFOFA CNC, 
SONAMI, SNA, 
CChC, Consejo 
Minero, 
CONUPIA, CAT, 
COTIACH go to 
Congress 
In deciding the first inform, Concertacion is divided:  
- Favor of “hard topics” are socialist senators + DC De 
Gregorio 
- In favor of moderating “hard topics” (as it was 
approved): institutional senator DC Boeninger + 6 DC 
senators + 1 PS-PPD.  
- Against all the reform: opposition as a block 
CPC President, Mr. Ariztia, declared in a forum organized by 
“Generación Empresarial” that “la reforma propuesta por el 
gobierno es obsoleta y está en retirada en los distintos países. 
Esta reforma esta copiada de países europeos que tienen altos 
niveles de cesantía y muchos subsidios laborales. Sería mejor 
aplicar una reforma laboral moderna, como la de EEUU, que 
maneja bajos índices de cesantía y tiene un desarrollo 
importante cada año”. (p.24) 
“En estos momentos la relación laboral entre empresarios y 
trabajadores es de una armonía laboral estupenda, sin embargo 
en el proyecto todo está relacionado con conflictos, con crear 
problemas, con llenamos de funcionarios la Dirección del 
Trabajo que supervisaran todo”. (p.24) 
0331   CPC against labor protection during collective negotiations and 
labor replacement limitations during strikes. CUT against 
absence of inter-firm negotiations and labor market 
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liberalization.  
0402 Labor 
Commission’s first 
inform  
  
0403  DC party meeting willing to modify initiative in the direction of 
the 1999 initiative sent by President Frei, rejected by a double 
tie in the vote. This initiative includes the “hard topics”.   
DC, after party meeting, asks government to re-launch 1999s 
labor reform. 
0403  Santiago II meeting in the Concertacion is cancelled 
- Lagos had lunch with president of Concertacion 
parties, asking to vote together on the bill as it was 
sent to congress. 
- In the morning, Government General Secretary had a 
meeting with DC congress members at Palacio Ariztia 
- Afternoon: Insulza had a meeting with PPD and PS 
congress members 
- Afternoon: Economy Ministry Eyzaguirre had a 
meeting with DC Congress members   
 
0405   Interior Ministry, Mr. Insulza, in Business meeting Icare 2001: 
“el bienestar de la población se logra a través de políticas 
redistributivas y no de chorreo” 
Fundación Chile 21 (closet o Lagos) vicepresident, Mr. 
Schaulsohn (PPD), in same meeting: “la política tiene que ver 
más con la creación de riqueza que con la distribución. La 
lógica redistributiva puede trancar el crecimiento”. (p. 23) 
0410 General Discussion 
in Senate 
 RN and UDI decide to abstain from voting either in favor or 
against the law.  
0411 General Discussion 
in Senate 
  
0412  After 2 days of intense debate, Senate approved to rule on 
collective bargaining 24 in favor and 15 abstentions.  
Reform considers: la negociación voluntaria interempresas, 
aumenta la flexibilidad de las jornadas laborales, establece la 
prohibición con multa de 4 UF al reemplazo de trabajadores en 
huelga e incorpora nuevas normas de regulación para las 
empresas intermedias. 
Un grupo de senadores DC, PS y PPD, liderados por el 
institucional Boeninger quieren eliminar “las rigideces” del 
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proyecto. Otros que representan al sindicalismo, encabezados 
por de Giorgio (DC), intentarán reponer la negociación 
colectiva interempresa en forma obligatoria. 
0426  Growth of the informal economy and the problem of 
unemployment worry opposition parties.  
 
0429   CUT President, Mr. Martinez, travels to Washington DC to 
mmet with Secretary Zoellick, and AFL-CIO President, Mr. 
Sweeney. Topic is labor situation in Chile and labor reform. 
CUT President lobbied for US to support CUT in asking labor 
reform to fulfill ILO’s articles 87 and 98 on freedom for 
unionization and collective bargaining. The future TLC 
between Chile and US represents a good opportunity for CUT 
to lobby over these matters. 
Mr. Martinez also lobbied with labor leaders from Italy, 
Canada, Spain and France in lieu of the possible TLC between 
Chile and EU.  
0502   In Labor’s Day proclaim, Mr. Martinez (CUT President) 
announced mobilizations and a possible general strike against 
Lagos government. This signals the end of the “honeymoon”. 
CUT decided to mobilize against labor reforms in June. 12000 
people attended the discourse, the highest number since the 
return to democracy.   
0509 Executive and 
Senate’s inform 
  
0523   Lagos will meet with CPC President, Mr. Ariztia, Lagos and 
Ariztia met in three times already since the latter became CPC 
President in December 2001 (6 months). Meetings have been 
long and fruitful, declares CPC vocal.   
0525   President Lagos said no word about the Labor reform during 
the annual discourse in Congress on May 21
st
. The strategy is to 
take out this conflictive reform from the public debate and to 
approve it with the necessary changes to build a majority. 
Lagos wants it approved before September 18
th
. 
0526  Lagos had a meeting with business at Centro de Estudios 
Publicos and promised to make more flexible the labor reform. 
Business was satisfied and previous lack of confidence in 
government was modified. 
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0527   CUT is divided in two groups. The incumbent group is leaded 
by Mr. Martinez, and the challenger is leaded by Mr. Olivares. 
The challenger group denominates itself “realistas” and has 
milder views on “hard topics”. They had 48% of the vote in last 
election. 
0601   CUT and CPC establish a dialogue table. Mr. Ariztia and Mr. 
Martinez will meet and government participation is not 
expected. Topics will be not conflictive. If dialogue succeeds, 
then they will advance on conflictive topics. This is the first 
encounter after 8 years.  
0604 CUT, CPC, CAT, 
Confederacion 
Minera, 
COTIACH, 
CONSFECOVE go 
to Congress 
  
0606   Mr. Lagos and Mr. Ariztia meet in Madrid. Ariztia is satisfied 
with how labor reform is advancing in congress.  
0620 Labor 
Commission’s 
second inform 
  
0624   PS Senator, Mr. Ominami considers that there has been a truce 
between government and business, originated from the CUT-
CPC meeting and CPC-Lagos meeting. This need to evolve into 
accords, but the dialogue is good. 
0630   Government and CUT decided to form a commission to discuss 
the labor reform and accelerate its passing through congress. 
CUT moderates its position with respect to labor reform. 
0703 General Discussion 
in Senate 
  
0704 General Discussion 
in Senate 
  
0705   CUT angry with DC Senators Boeninger, Foxley and Zaldivar 
brothers because they facilitated the elimination of the changes 
that softened anti-union measures by employers. 
Labor Ministry, Mr. Solari, said these changes will be removed 
in the House.  
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0706   Government is angry with DC Senators that softened labor 
reform. Boeninger and Foxley are the center of the critiques. 
0709 Senate informs 
Representative 
House and sends 
the initiative 
  
0718   Ex Hacienda Ministry during Pinochet, Mr. Buchi, affirms that 
Labor and Tax reforms are the main obstacles to return to high 
growth rates. 
0728   Sofofa releases a study that suggests that Labor reform 
increases firm cost in 18 percent. (p. 28) Article explains which 
changes increase the cost of a firm. 
0802   Ex-Labor Ministry during Pinochet, Mr. Jose Pinera, affirms 
that Tax and Labor reforms are detrimental to employment 
levels. 
0804  Lagos wants Labor reform to speed up process. Labor Ministry 
Solari said “hard topics” are not being added again to the 
initiative. CPC satisfied, CUT unsatisfied. Anti-syndicalism 
controls will be added again (Senate already rejected them with 
opposition and DC votes) 
Government wants to approve the reform before September 
national festivities. CPC agrees but reminds government its 
discrepancies with the initiative. 
0818   Strong business protest with the provisions added in the Labor 
Commission affecting article 161.  
0820  Labor Commission added an article that allows workers fired 
by article 161 (firm restructure) to appeal in court. It will be 
voted in next plenary.  
SOFOFA against the modification.   
 
0821 CUT, CPC, CAT,  
CONSFECOVE, 
Consejo Minero, 
Asociacion Chilena 
de Clinicas, 
Fenabus go to 
Labor Commission 
in the House 
  
0821 Labor Commission 
H – 1st inform 
  
0831   CPC and CUT have strong discrepancies over Labor Reform. 
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CPC wants to suspend the initiative analysis in Congress while 
CUT wants to speed it up. 
0901   Sofofa asks to suspend reform initiative approval. Labor 
Ministry, Mr. Solari, responds that more rights to workers do 
not jeopardize economic growth. 
0904 House General 
Discussion 
  
0905   Initiative is passed in the House. Its vote was preceded by a 
meeting in La Moneda between President Lagos and CPC 
President, Mr. Ariztia. Initiative was passed in the house with 
15 amendments that softened its benefits towards labor. 
CUT President, Mr. Martinez, declared that although labor was 
not fully satisfied, the reform advanced 75% of its initial 
interests. 
0909  Law is going to be voted. Modification to article 161 failed and 
in exchange, there will be 433 new labor inspectors.  
CUT says this is the minimum that government can do. 
 
0911 Senate’s Hacienda 
Commission brief. 
Law is passed. 
Law vote is delayed because of DC party meeting. Division in 
DC. Reform is considered to be too pro-labor. 
Intense negotiations inside DC to convince some Senators to 
vote the initiative in the Senate. Ex-President Aylwin helped 
with negotiations. UDI also not sure if will vote. 
0912  Law is passed. Government wrote in a paper how certain parts 
of the law need to be interpreted (added in history of the law) 
and then DC voted the initiative. These parts of the law refer to 
conditions in which firing workers should be considered anti-
unionist; and about which information should be given to 
workers when negotiating.  
Government accorded with DC Senators and Law is passed. 
0914   Ex-President Frei not present in Congress to vote Labor 
initiative. Explained that trip to Brazil was planned long ago. 
0927 Executive 
promulgates law 
  
1005 Law is published   
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 Groups Lobby in Parliament 
Table A2. Chile: Lobby in Labor Commission for labor reform  
 
Organization Group Sector 
House / 
Senate 
Number 
of Visits 
Lobby 
1 
Workers Unitary Central (CUT) 
[Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores] 
1 
Workers’ 
central 
H-S 3 
Adequate the “firm” concept to include all units that operate 
under a same corporate direction; eliminate the possibility to 
replace a worker during a strike; mandate employers to share 
information about the firms’ benefits during a negotiation 
period; expand collective bargaining to allow inter-firm 
bargaining; eliminate the employer’s right to fire a worker 
because of “firm’s restructure” (article 161); strength 
sanctions for anti-unionist practices; establish a workers’ 
privilege during and 10 days after a collective bargaining 
period; eliminate the ability the employer has to offer a 
(improved) contract to workers not unionized right after a 
collective bargaining period has ended  
2 
Production and Trade 
Confederation (CPC) 
[Confederación de la Producción 
y del Comercio] 
1 
Encompassing 
Confederation 
H-S 3 
Reduce number of workers with union’s privileges; against 
inter-firm collective bargaining initiative; eliminate the 
proposed payment due to each worker that is replaced during a 
strike; eliminate the obligation to give employees information 
about the firms’ benefits during a negotiation period; 
eliminate the worker’s proposed exclusive right to call to 
collective bargaining; suppress the proposed elimination of 
the right to fire a worker because of “firm’s restructure” 
without compensation (article 161); elimination of the Labor 
Direction’s faculty to reinstate a worker whose firing is 
considered an anti-unionist practice, eliminate the proposed 
publication of sentences that confirm anti-unionist practices; 
eliminate the modification of the “firm” concept   
3 National Chamber of 1 Services and S 1 Idem CPC 
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Commerce, Service and Tourism 
[Cámara Nacional de Comercio, 
Servicios y Turismo] 
Tourism 
4 
National Mining Society 
(SONAMI) [Sociedad Nacional 
de Minería] 
1 Copper S 1 
Idem CPC 
5 
National Society of Agriculture 
(SNA) [Sociedad Nacional de 
Agricultura] 
1 Agro S 1 
Idem CPC 
6 
Chilean Construction Chamber 
(CChC) [Cámara Chilena de la 
Construcción] 
1 Contruction S 1 
Idem CPC 
7 
A.G. Mining Council [Consejo 
Minero A.G.] 
1 Copper H-S 3 
Idem CPC 
8 
National United Confederation 
of Medium, Small and Micro 
industry, and artcrafts 
(CONUPIA) [Confederación 
Nacional Unida de Mediana, 
Pequeña, Microindustria y 
Artesanado] 
1 Small Industry S 1 
Eliminate the proposed payment due to each worker that is 
replaced during a strike; against inter-firm collective 
bargaining initiative 
9 
Workers Autonomous Central 
(CAT) [Central Autónoma de 
Trabajadores] 
1 
Workers’ 
central 
H-S 3 
Adequate the “firm” concept to include all units that operate 
under a same corporate direction; eliminate the possibility to 
replace a worker during a strike; mandate employers to share 
information about the firms’ benefits during a negotiation 
period; expand collective bargaining to allow inter-firm 
bargaining; eliminate the employer’s right to fire a worker 
because of “firm’s restructure” (article 161); strength 
sanctions for anti-unionist practices; establish a workers’ 
privilege during and 10 days after a collective bargaining 
period; eliminate the ability the employer has to offer a 
(improved) contract to workers not unionized right after a 
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collective bargaining period has ended 
10 
National Confederation of Food 
and Tourism Unions and 
Federations (COTIACH) 
[Confederación Nacional de 
Federaciones y Sindicatos de 
Trabajadores de la Industria 
Alimenticia, Turismo, 
Gastrohotelería, similares y 
derivados] 
1 
Workers 
sectoral union 
S 2 
Worried about changes in contract’s specification of labor 
duties; worried about loosening of working day and extra-
hours payment regulation; in favor of inter-firm collective 
bargaining; in favor of the Labor Direction’s faculty to 
reinstate a worker whose firing is considered an anti-unionist 
practice   
11 
Industry Chamber (SOFOFA) 
[Sociedad de Fomento Fabril] 
1 Industry S 1 
Idem CPC 
12 
Chilean Working Rights and 
Social Security Society 
[Sociedad Chilena de Derecho 
del Trabajo y de la Seguridad 
Social] 
1 Think Tank S 1 
Technical suggestions to the Initiative 
13 
Development and Freedom 
Institute [Instituto Libertad y 
Desarrollo] 
2 Think Tank S 2 
Against anti-unionist firing tightening, against reduction in the 
weekly working load; against compensation for replacing a 
worker during a strike; against Labor Office jurisdiction in 
deciding when a firing constitute an anti-unionist practice; 
against unionized workers privileges;  worried about criteria 
to evaluate workers not working physically at the firm. 
Generally against the initiative. 
14 
Freedom Institute [Instituto 
Libertad] 
2 Think Tank S 1 
Mostly against the initiative. 
15 
Chilean Mining Confederation 
[Confederación Minera de Chile] 
2 
Workers 
sectoral union 
S 1 
Prohibit subcontracting in the mining sector or to give same 
rights to the subcontracted worker than to the contracted 
worker. Adequate the “firm” concept to include all units that 
operate under a same corporate direction; eliminate the 
possibility to replace a worker during a strike; mandate 
employers to share information about the firms’ benefits 
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during a negotiation period; expand collective bargaining to 
allow inter-firm bargaining; eliminate the employer’s right to 
fire a worker because of “firm’s restructure” (article 161); 
strength sanctions for anti-unionist practices; establish a 
workers’ privilege during and 10 days after a collective 
bargaining period; eliminate the ability the employer has to 
offer a (improved) contract to workers not unionized right 
after a collective bargaining period has ended 
16 
Comerce and Textiles National 
Confederation (CONSFECOVE)  
[Confederación Nacional de 
Sindicatos y Federaciones de 
Trabajadores del Comercio, de la 
Confección del Vestuario, de la 
Producción, Servicios y 
Actividades Conexas] 
2 
Workers 
sectoral union 
H-S 2 
Adequate the “firm” concept to include all units that operate 
under a same corporate direction; worried about the loosening 
of specification of a worker’s duties in the contract; worried 
about loosening of extra-hours treatment in initiative; against 
the coexistence between collective bargaining and collective 
contracts celebrated with non-unionized workers in the same 
firm; disagree with compensation to worker being replaced 
during a strike. Want to eliminate the replacement right.  
17 
Jobs Economy Program (PET) 
[Programa de Economía del 
Trabajo] 
2 ONG S 1 
Technical modifications to initiative 
18 
Bakery industry National 
Confederation (CONAPAN) 
[Confederación Nacional de 
Sindicatos de la Industria del 
Pan, Ramos Conexos y 
Organismos Auxiliares] 
2 
Workers 
sectoral union 
S 1 
Against lowering the maximum work-hours a year; against the 
cap in extra-hours allowed to work to each worker (2 a day); 
against the compensation for replacing a worker during a 
strike. 
19 
Health Sector Business 
Association [Asociación 
Gremial de Clínicas, Hospitales 
y otros Establecimientos 
Privados de Salud] 
2 Health S 1 
Against lowering the maximum work-hours a year to 2000; 
against the cap in extra-hours allowed to work to each worker 
(2 a day); against the compensation for replacing a worker 
during a strike.  
20 
Chilean Health Clinic 
Association [Asociación Chilena 
3 Health H 1 
Against lowering the maximum work-hours a year to 2000; 
against the cap in extra-hours allowed to work to each worker 
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de Clínicas] (2 a day); against the compensation for replacing a worker 
during a strike. 
21 
Urban Collective Transport 
Business Association [Fenabus] 
3 Transport H 1 
Against lowering the maximum work-hours a year; against the 
cap in extra-hours allowed to work to each worker (2 a day); 
against the compensation for replacing a worker during a 
strike. 
22 Adolfo Ibáñez University 3 
Academia 
Experts 
H 1 
Technical suggestions to the initiative 
23 Los Andes University 3 
Academia 
Experts 
H 1 
Technical suggestions to the initiative 
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List of news  
2000 – October 1st Labor Reform El Mercurio - Teaching appointment was less than expected by leaders 
2000 – October 4th Labor Reform El Mercurio - Government and minimum employment  
2000 – October 8th Labor Reform El Mercurio - Port workers preparing an undefined strike  
2000 – October 9th Labor Reform El Mercurio - Unions criticized health resources 
2000 – October 13th Labor Reform El Mercurio - Contacts will became closer between government and business men 
2000 – October 14th Labor Reform El Mercurio - Agreement between government and bus drivers do not stop truck stop  
2000 – October 15th Labor Reform El Mercurio - Salary Adjustment does not satisfy Magisterium 
2000 – October 31st Labor reform La Tercera – Unemployment and productive encouragement: how can Chile counteract high unemployment 
rates? 
2000 – November 8th Labor reform La Tercera – Businessmen require greater coordination between the government and Concertación.  
2000 – November 8th Labor reform La Tercera – Businessmen ask for coherence between Lagos and the Concertación.  
2000 – November 9th Labor reform La Tercera – Businessmen call for a “change of direction” to Lagos 
2000 – November 12th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Gary Becker: Chile needs total labor flexibility 
2000 – November 12th Labor reform La Tercera – What regulatory framework should be established for public companies? 
2000 – November 17th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Labor Movement in Chile Shows Progressive Weakening 
2000 – November 18th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Government searches for an agreement on Labor Reform  
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2000 – November 18th Labor reform La Tercera - Labor reforms go to congress without urgency 
2000 – November 18th  Labor reform La Tercera - Labor reform allows reducing working hours in a 10%  
2000 – November 24th Labor and tax reform La Tercera – Growth: a necessary condition but not enough 
2000 – November 28th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Collective agreements have more variables earnings  
2000 – December 1st  Labor Reform El Mercurio – Labor initiative disagreements 
2000 – December 6th Labor reform La Tercera - Which are the major changes included in the labor reform initiative?  
2000 – December 11th Labor reform La Tercera - Risco´s goodbye to the CPC 
2000 – December 11th Labor reform La Tercera – Risco´s confessions, outgoing president of the CPC  
2000 – December 11th Labor reform La Tercera – Risco´s confessions, outgoing president of the CPC (II) 
2000 – December 12th Labor reform La Tercera – Labor reform: government will include collective bargaining  
2000 – December 12th Labor reform La Tercera - The government gives in to the pressures and changes labor reform 
2000 – December 13th Labor reform La Tercera – Tightening of labor reform shakes the ruling party  
2000 – December 13th Labor reform La Tercera – Chronology: The vagaries of the Concertación to the initiative.  
2000 – December 13th Labor reform La Tercera – Labor reforms   
2000 – December 13th Labor reform La Tercera – Business confidence returns to the fore after change in labor reform. 
2000 – December 13th Labor reform La Tercera – Business confidence returns to the fore after change in labor reform (II). 
2000 – December 13th Labor reform La Tercera – Central Bank removed resources for University of Chile’s survey. 
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2000 – December 13th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Tensions for the increase of Labor Reform 
2000 – December 14th Labor reform La Tercera – Labor reforms: new signs of failure for the ruling party unity 
2000 – December 14th Labor reform La Tercera – The different positions in the Senate on the labor reform initiative 
2000 – December 14th Labor reform La Tercera – Tensions in the ruling party 
2000 – December 14th Labor Reform El Mercurio –Government will enforce their majority for Labor Reform  
2000 – December 15th Labor reform La Tercera - Lagos defines his position about changes in labor reform 
2000 – December 16th  Labor Reform El Mercurio – Regression in relation to Labor 
2000 – December 18th Labor reform La Tercera – Alejandro Foxley disagrees with the government and send signals to the right. 
2000 – December 19th Labor reform La Tercera – RN opens negotiation with government about labor reform 
2000 – December 22nd Labor and Tax La Tercera – What are the main conclusions that left the “Conclave Santiago I”?     
2000 – December 24th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Labor reform: basis for a consensus  
2000 – December 26th Labor reform La Tercera – Labor reform: the RN´s proposal  
2001 – January 3rd Labor Reform El Mercurio – Ups and downs of the Labor reform 
2001 – January 10th  Labor Reform El Mercurio –Differences in labor matters 
2001 – January 15th  Labor Reform El Mercurio – Persistent unemployment 
2001 – January 24th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Quorum to approve labor reform regulations increase 
2001 – January 26th Labor & Tax Reform El Mercurio – Reforms are the key to bridging the reactivation 
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2001 – January 31st  Labor Reform El Mercurio – Increasing regulations  
2001 – February 25th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Blot and new agenda: another proposal on human rights  
2001 – March 8th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Government decided to extend the collective bargaining 
2001 – March 13th Labor reform La Tercera – Work and productiveness  
2001 – March 22nd Labor and Tax La Tercera - "La Moneda" sends new labor reform and agree to low taxes 
2001 – March 22nd Labor reform La Tercera – Lagos replaces labor reform bill 
2001 – March 23rd Labor and Tax La Tercera - Complex world stage and slow recovery, causes shift in key reforms 
2001 – March 25th  Labor Reform El Mercurio – Government attenuated labor reform 
2001 – March 27th Labor reform La Tercera - Does the bill on labor reform represents the entire Concertación? 
2001 – March 28th Labor reform La Tercera - Complex debate begins in the Senate about labor reform 
2001 – March 29th Labor reform La Tercera - Two major private sector representatives urged the government to amend direction 
2001 – March 29th  Labor Reform El Mercurio – Labor commission on the senate: The idea of legislate about labor reforms was approved  
2001 – March 31st Labor reform La Tercera - A possible lower taxes on individuals, should it be compensated by raising companies’ taxes? 
2001 – March 31st Labor reform La Tercera - Employers and employees reject the government's new labor reform 
2001 – April 1st Labor reform La Tercera - How will high unemployment impact on the parliamentary elections? 
2001 – April 2nd Labor and Tax La Tercera - Are labor reforms and the anti tax evasion law a brake on economic recovery? 
2001 – April 3rd Labor reform La Tercera - DC´s council ask the government to get back to 1999 reform 
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2001 –April 3rd Labor reform El Mercurio – DC resets labor initiative of Frei  
2001 –April 3rd   Labor reform El Mercurio – Eternal labor reforms  
2001 –April 3rd Labor reform El Mercurio – Presidential offensive to reorder the agreement   
2001 – April 10th Labor reform La Tercera - Labor reform: RN and UDI inclines for abstention 
2001 –April 12th Labor reform El Mercurio – Senate approves to legislate on labor reforms 
2001 – April 14th Labor reform La Tercera – NO more labor rigidities  
2001 –April 26th Labor reform El Mercurio - Chile hazards further increase in the informal economy 
2001 – April 29th Labor reform La Tercera - The CUT will use the trade agreement with the U.S. as leverage with the government 
2001 – May 2nd Labor reform La Tercera - CUT announced demonstrations and ends "honeymoon" with Lagos 
2001 – May 23rd Labor reform La Tercera - Lagos contact businessmen to improve expectations 
2001 – May 25th Labor reform La Tercera - La Moneda tries to end up labor reform chapter 
2001 – May 25th Labor reform La Tercera - The regulations, bureaucracy and financing are suffocating the Pymes 
2001 – May 26th Labor Reform El Mercurio – Lagos tries to get the trust of business men   
2001 – May 27th Labor reform La Tercera – The more “realistic” wing of the CUT 
2001 – May 30th Labor reform La Tercera - Government attaches great urgency to labor and capital market reforms 
2001 – June 1st Labor reform La Tercera - Employers and employees created dialogue work table 
2001 – June 6th Labor reform La Tercera - The president and the president of the employers held a private conversation during an official 
visit to Spain 
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2001 – June 11th Labor La Tercera - Is it feasible an electoral agreement between the Concertación and the PC? 
2001 – June 11th Labor reform La Tercera - Unemployment: here to stay? 
2001 – June 14th Labor reform El Mercurio - New law search avoiding employment discrimination  
2001 – June 24th Labor reform La Tercera – Carlos Ominami: “The government and businessmen have generated a truce” 
2001 – June 24th Labor reform La Tercera - Carlos Ominami: “The government and businessmen have generated a truce” (II) 
2001 – June 24th Labor reform La Tercera - Carlos Ominami: “The government and businessmen have generated a truce” (III) 
2001 – June 30th Labor reform La Tercera – CUT open space to labor reform consensus  
2001 – June 30th Labor reform La Tercera – CUT open space to labor reform consensus (II) 
2001 – July 5th Labor reform La Tercera - With strong recriminations of CUT, the Senate cleared labor reform bill 
2001 – July 6th Labor reform La Tercera - Government's discomfort with DC senators that "moderated" labor reform 
2001 – July 16th Labor reform La Tercera - Labor reform: challenges and obstacles 
2001 – July 28th Labor reform La Tercera - Business costs will rise up to 18% because of labor reform 
2001 – August 4th Labor reform La Tercera - Government seeks to dispel uncertainty and gives urgency to labor reform 
2001 – August 4th Labor reform El Mercurio – Government hurries Labor Reform  
2001 – August 4th   Labor reform El Mercurio – Emphasis on Labor Rigidities 
2001 – August 11th Labor reform La Tercera - Government tries to get consensus on labor reform bill 
2001 – August 18th Labor reform La Tercera - PS motion triggers strong rejection of the business sector 
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2001 – August 20th Labor reform El Mercurio – Limiting layoffs would affect employment  
2001 – August 23rd Labor reform La Tercera – The CUT returns to the street 
2001 – August 31st Labor reform La Tercera - Employers and employees make deeper their discrepancies on labor reform 
2001 – September 1st Labor reform La Tercera – Ricardo Solari: “greater rights for workers do not compromise economic growth” 
2001 – September 2nd Labor reform La Tercera – Juan Claro: “There is a lack of clarity and consistency on the government initiatives” 
2001 – September 4th Labor reform La Tercera – Sergio Mejias: “The episode of the 99 can happen again” 
2001 – September 5th Labor reform La Tercera - Chamber of deputies passed to the Senate labor reform 
2001 – September 5th Labor reform La Tercera - Labor reform one step from becoming law 
2001 – September 5th Labor reform La Tercera - Surprising meeting of Lagos and Ricardo Ariztía at La Moneda 
2001 – September 9th Labor reform La Tercera - What effects will have the labor reform over employment? 
2001 – September 9th Labor Reform El Mercurio - The third time is the charm  
2001 – September 11th                 Labor Reform El Mercurio - Labor reform expands because of conflict of DC Senators  
2001 – September 11th Labor reform La Tercera - Labor reform faces key vote in Congress 
2001 – September 11th Labor reform La Tercera - Labor reform faces key vote in Congress (II) 
2001 – September 12th Labor reform La Tercera - Congress passes labor reform after agreement between the government and senators from DC 
2001 – September 12th                 Labor Reform El Mercurio - Congress: The labor reform is ready to be a law 
2001 – September 13th Labor reform La Tercera - The keys of the new labor reform 
 216 
 
2
1
6
 
[Type a quote from the 
document or the summary of an 
interesting point. You can 
[Typ
e a 
2001 – September 14th Labor reform La Tercera - Frei defends his absence from the labor reform vote 
2001 – September 14th Labor reform La Tercera - The day after labor reform for small and medium business 
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Uruguayan Labor Reform (Law 18566) 
Parliamentary Process and Related News 
Table A3. Uruguay: Press releases on labor reform 
2009 PARLIAMENTARY 
PROCESS 
LA REPUBLICA EL PAIS EL OBSERVADOR 
0520 Initiative is sent to 
Congress, house begins its 
analysis.   
CIU goes to Labor 
Commission (Commission) 
   
0531  Business opposes government 
involvement in collective bargaining, 
mandatory negotiation, negotiation 
over labor conditions, and firm 
occupation. They want the inclusion of 
a peace clause (union’s inability to 
strike over an issue already accorded 
during a negotiation round).  
Business opposes occupations and 
government involvement in in 
collective bargaining. They want a 
peace clause.  
 
0602  PIT-CNT defends tripartite collective 
bargaining and critique the internal 
democracy of business chambers.   
  
0603 Labor Ministry goes to the 
Commission 
PIT-CNT goes to the 
Commission 
   
0604    PIT-CNT and opposition are in 
conflict because of collective 
bargaining initiative. Labor Ministry, 
Mr. Bonomi and the PIT-CNT 
executive secretariat goes to labor 
commission in the House to discuss 
the initiative. Mr. Bonomi declared 
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that the government wants to pass the 
initiative this same year. For that 
reason some concessions were made to 
business, such as eliminating the 
chapter on occupations regulation from 
the initiative.  
PIT-CNT leader, Mr. Castellanos, 
states that this law is the most 
important Congress has in its hands 
since the 1943 collective bargaining 
one. 
Opposition National Party MP, Mr. 
Iturralde, says that government is 
siding completely with labor. 
Opposition Colorado Party MP, Mr. 
Hackenbruck, says that wider 
consensus should be sought.    
0607    Business plan to create an alternative 
initiative for collective bargaining 
0610 CNCS goes to the 
Commission 
   
0611  Government voted Initiative favorably 
in commission but opposition voted 
negatively. Regulating firm-
occupations was opposed by 
government, firms and workers (for 
different reasons) 
Commission voted Initiative one day 
before the meeting between Business 
chambers and deputies from all parties. 
FA takes out chapter on firm-
occupation regulation. 
New political confrontation because of 
collective bargaining initiative as 
Labor Commission voted initiative 
right before receiving CNCS leaders, 
who were waiting for the meeting right 
across the hall. Also, the vote comes 
the day before a forum organized by 
business in which they were going to 
expose an alternative initiative.  
0612   Business organized fórum was atended 
by only 9 deputies out of 99 invited 
(only members of Commission 
attended). Commission votes before 
receiving business. OIT has two 
observations to the Initiative.  
Multiple business complaints for small 
political audience. Business invited 
individually the 99 deputies. Only the 
members of the labor commission 
were there.  
PIT-CNT will do a partial strike on 
June 8 in support of the initiative and 
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will congregate in front of Parliament.  
0613    FA wants to vote the initiative as soon 
as possible. Opposition parties and 
business complain about the initiative 
and PIT-CNT leader, Mr. Castillo, 
declares that there are three aspects 
that are no negotiable: first, the 
initiative must be approved soon; 
second, collective bargaining must be 
tripartite; third, minimum wages 
should be established by economic 
sector.  
0615   Business (the 24 chambers) totally 
opposes the Initiative. Industry 
Chamber (CIU), Construction 
Chamber (CCU) and Service Chamber 
(CNCS) starts to lobby together 
 
0616    Employers afraid of a raise of informal 
work. Business says that reform will 
affect employment more than wages. 
0617 CMPP, ANDEBU and 
ITPC goes to the 
Commission 
  There may be a bipartite dialogue with 
respect to labor law. PIT_CNT offered 
to meet with business to discuss 
initiative. They offered to meet either 
at the ILO or in Montevideo.  
0620   CNCS calls to an urgent meeting with 
its 115 affiliates. 
Labor law in campaign. Business in a 
new offensive against labor law. CIU, 
CNC and CCU met with P. Nacional 
pre-candidates, Mr. Larranaga and Mr. 
Lacalle separately. Pre-candidates 
positioned themselves against the law 
initiative after meetings. Government 
did not intervene in dialogue, but PIT-
CNT critiqued PN pre-candidates. 
0622  CIU, CNCS and CCU interview with 
FA pre-candidates Carambula and 
Mujica 
 Business chambers asked for meetings 
with FA candidates. 
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0623   Business have support from Blanco 
and Colorado Pre-Candidates, and are 
talking with FA ones 
Business (CNC and CIU) talked with 
Mr. Mujica about labor law. Senator 
Mujica served a barbecue at a friend’s 
house for business leaders. Mujica will 
ask around and do research about the 
law. 
0624    Business aligned against collective 
bargaining law. 
0625    Business offensive to stop collective 
bargaining law. Waiting government’s 
response to ILO’s questions on reform. 
In January, business raised their 
concerns to ILO 
0701 CCU and many other 
business organizations go 
to Commission 
   
0706    PIT CNT strike in support to collective 
bargaining law 
0708    Collective bargaining law changed 
after business complaints. Labor 
Ministry, Mr. Bonomi states that 
bargaining over working conditions 
will be voluntary. 
0709   PIT-CNT in partial strike and 
manifestation and discourse in front of 
Legislative Palace 
MPP signals approach to business with 
Mr. Bonomi’s decision. 
0714    Vazquez government changes Labor 
Ministry for electoral purposes. New 
Ministry is Mr. Baraibar. 
0715 Initiative voted (Passed) in 
Labor Commission 
(House) 
Ministry Bonomi: 700 hundred 
collective agreements signed. 90% 
were consensus between business and 
labor.  
 Data provided by Ministry Bonomi is 
strong argument against opposition 
and business. Mr. Bonomi criticizes 
business for opposing labor reforms.  
0721  Business says it will call an 
employer’s strike against the reform. 
PIT-CNT call labor to go to Parliament 
for the voting day in CCRR 
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0722    Business bet on senate to stop 
collective bargaining law. 
0724    Business interests defeated in the 
House. Changes proposed by PN MPs 
were rejected by the FA majority in 
the house. 
0725   PIT satisfied, Business will lobby in 
Senate for changes or derogation 
 
0726    Government and PIT-CNT underpins 
collective bargaining law. Business 
will begin another round of meetings 
with political parties. 
0804    Majority of FA is willing to accept 
inclusion of peace clause in collective 
bargaining law.  
0805    FA voted peace clause despite of labor 
and business opposition to it  
0807 Labor Commission in 
Senate receives 3 business 
Chambers: CMPP, CNCS 
and CIU 
   
0813   Blancos and FA agree in adding a 
“Clausula de paz” to the initiative. 
“Gallinal clause”. CIU does not agree 
with it, wanted more. 
FA and PN agree in labor initiative 
once the peace clause is included. PN 
will vote the initiative.  
0814    Bargaining law was approved with 
political consensus. 
0815 Senate Votes reform. 23 
votes in 25 
   
0818    Collective bargaining law is approved 
against business will. 
0819  Colorados voted some articles but not 
the initiative in general. Blancos voted 
the initiative in general but against 
some particular provisions.  
  
0901 House vote initiative with    
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modifications made in 
Senate 
0903    Collective bargaining initiative is law 
0911 Executive promulgates the 
initiative 
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Groups Lobby in Parliament 
Table A4. Uruguay: Lobby in Labor Commission for labor reform  
 
Organization Group Sector 
House/ 
Senate 
Visits Lobby 
1 Industry Chamber [Camara de Industrias del 
Uruguay] (CIU)  
1 Industry HS 2 Against centralized and mandatory collective bargaining. In 
particular, against considering occupations as an extension 
of the strike right. Against including labor conditions as part 
of collective negotiations. Against the obligation to 
negotiate with sector unions if there is no firm union. 
2 PIT-CNT 2 Union 
central 
H 1 Oppose exceptions to collective bargained agreements (Art. 
12). Oppose taking out of initiative the chapter 5 referred to 
the regulation of occupations. 
3 National Chamber of Commerce and Service 
[Cámara Nacional de Comercio y Servicios del 
Uruguay] (CNCS) 
3 Wholesal
e and 
retail 
HS 2 Total opposition. 
4 Exporters Chamber [Camara Mercantil de 
Productos del Pais] (CMPP) 
4 Merchant
s 
HS 2 Against considering occupations as an extension of the 
strike right. Against the possibility of firm co-management 
and against state intervention in collective bargaining. 
5 Uruguayan Broadcasters Association [Asociacion 
Nacional de Broadcasters Uruguayos] (ANDEBU) 
5 Media H 1 Want finite period for negotiation and want a "peace clause" 
to be included in initiative 
6 Transport Association [Intergremial Transporte 
Profesional de Carga del Uruguay] (ITPC)  
6 Transpor
t 
H 1 Against State intervention in collective bargaining. Against 
including labor conditions as part of collective negotiations. 
7 Private Constructers Association [Asociación de 
Promotores Privados de la Construcción del 
Uruguay] (APPCU) 
7 Construc
-tion 
H 1 Against State intervention in collective bargaining. 
8 Uruguayan Construction Chamber [Cámara de la 
Construcción del Uruguay] (CCU) 
8 Construc
t-ion 
H 1 Against centralized and mandatory collective bargaining. 
Against State intervention in collective bargaining. Against 
considering occupations as an extension of the strike right. 
Against including labor conditions as part of collective 
negotiations. Against the obligation to negotiate with sector 
unions if there is no firm union. 
9 [Press Organziation] Organización de la Prensa del 
Interior (OPI)  
9 Press H 1 Worried about within sector asymmetries (between large 
and small firms) in firms and negotiation results. 
10 Regional Construction Federation[Coordinadora 
de Industria de Construcción del Este] (CICE) 
10 Construc
-tion 
H 1 Want the construction sector to be included in the Tripartite 
Superior Council at the national level.  
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11 Uruguayan Construction League [Liga de la 
Construcción del Uruguay] 
10 Construc
-tion 
H 1 Want the construction sector to be included in the Tripartite 
Superior Council at the national level. 
12 Tourism Chamber [Cámara de Turismo] 11 Tourism H 1 Against centralized and mandatory collective bargaining. 
Against State intervention in collective bargaining. Worried 
about within sector asymmetries (between large and small 
firms) in firms and negotiation results. 
13 Navigation Center [Centro de Navegación]  12 Transpor
t 
H 1 Against State intervention in collective bargaining. In favor 
of including a “peace clause”. Against the requirement to 
share information with workers. Against including labor 
conditions as part of collective negotiations. Against the 
possibility of firm co-management. 
14 Micro and Small Firms Association [Asociación 
Nacional de Micro y Pequeñas empresas] 
(ANMYPE)  
13 Small 
firms 
H 1 Worried about within sector asymmetries (between large 
and small firms) in firms and negotiation results. Against 
State intervention in collective bargaining. Against the 
obligation to negotiate with sector unions if there is no firm 
union. 
15 Fisher boats building Chamber [Cámara de 
Armadores Pesqueros del Uruguay] (CAPU)  
14 Fishing 
industry 
H 1 Against State intervention in collective bargaining. 
16 Fishing Industry Chamber [Cámara de Industria 
Pesquera del Uruguay] (CIPU) 
14 Fishing 
industry 
H 1 Against State intervention in collective bargaining. 
17 Merchant Navy Chamber [Cámara de la Marina 
Mercante Nacional]  
15 Transpor
t 
H 1 Particular problem with the definition and payment 
requirements of extra-hours when working in a ship in the 
sea. 
18 Labor Law Institute [Instituto de Derecho Laboral] 16 Academi
c  
H 1 Technical opinion on the law. 
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List of news  
2009 – May 31st  Labor reform La República – Alternative initiative: Cameras limit participation of the State only for the Wage Councils 
2009 – May 31st  Labor reform El País – Collective bargaining. Initiative violates property rights and international conventions 
2009 – June 2nd  Labor reform La República – PIT – CNT reported “maneuver to return to the labor precariousness”  
2009 – June 4th  Labor reform El Observador – PIT – CNT and opposition are in conflict because collective bargaining  
2009 – June 5th Labor reform La República – Antel and Sutel signed a historical collective agreement 
2009 – June 7th Labor reform El Observador – Business men go for a different collective bargaining initiative  
2009 – June 9th Labor reform El Observador – Ministry of Labor deactivate seven potential conflicts a day 
2009 – June 10th  Labor reform El Observador – Wage increase between 3% and 6% will reach 800.000 persons in July  
2009 – June 10th Labor reform La República – PIT – CNT will be alert  
2009 – June 11th  Labor reform El Observador – New political confrontation because of collective bargaining  
2009 – June 11th Labor reform La República – Collective bargaining: articles on occupations eliminated 
2009 – June 11th Labor reform El País – Frente Amplio hurries collective bargaining law and come up against blancos 
2009 – June 12th Labor reform El Observador – Multiple business complaints for small political audience 
2009 – June 12th Labor reform La República – From Geneva. The minister Bonomi ruled out any fundamental changes to the initiative of collective 
bargaining 
2009 – June 12th Labor reform El País – Few members of parliament are motivated to discuss with businessmen about the labor reform 
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2009 – June 13th  Labor reform La República – PIT – CNT proposed to employers to open dialogue 
2009 – June 13th Labor reform El Observador – One law in the eye of the storm  
2009 – June 15
th  
Labor reform El Observador – Industrial employment accused the coup 
2009 – June 15th Labor reform El País – Businessmen start meetings with pre-candidates 
2009 – June 15th  Labor reform El País – Larrañaga and business chambers agree on critics of collective bargaining law 
2009 – June 16th  Labor reform El Observador – Employers are afraid of a raise of informal work  
2009 – June 17
th 
Labor reform El Observador – There may be bipartite dialogue about labor negotiation law 
2009 – June 20th Labor reform El Observador – Collective bargaining law has been installed in the campaign  
2009 – June 20th Labor reform El País – New offensive from businessmen because of collective bargaining 
2009 – June 21st Labor reform La República – Chambers business asked for meetings with candidates from Frente Amplio 
2009 – June 22nd Labor reform El País – Businessmen with Mujica and Carambula: dialogue about bill  
2009 – June 23th Labor reform El Observador – Mujica has analyzed collective bargaining with business men 
2009 – June 23rd Labor reform El País – Mujica will consult about collective bargaining 
2009 – June 24th Labor reform El Observador – Business men are aligned against the law of collective bargaining 
2009 – June 25th Labor reform El Observador – Business offensive to stop collective bargaining law  
2009 – July 6th Labor reform El Observador – PIT – CNT strike in support to labor law  
2009 – July 8th Labor reform El Observador – Labor initiative was changed after business claim  
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2009 – July 9th Labor reform El País – Deputies. The law will be approved later this month 
2009 – July 9th Labor reform El Observador – Signs of approach of MPP to business men    
2009 – July 10
th 
Labor reform El Observador – Leaders of PCU and PIT-CNT rejected Mujica’s proposal 
2009 – July 13th Labor reform El Observador – It is believed that rules inhibit companies to open to the market 
2009 – July 14th  Labor reform El Observador – Labor initiative in the spotlight, Vázquez praises Bonomi 
2009 – July 15th Labor reform El Observador – Bonomi made a strong stop to opposition and business men 
2009 – July 15th Labor reform La República – Bonomi: 700 collective agreements were signed, 90% consensus 
2009 – July 20th  Labor reform El Observador – Supply chain concept causes problems to negotiate  
2009 – July 21st  Labor reform La República – Collective Bargaining: Employers propose strike in protest of the law 
2009 – July 22th  Labor reform El Observador – Companies bet on the Senate to stop the labor law 
2009 – July 24th  Labor reform El Observador – Business men were defeated on deputies chamber    
2009 – July 25th Labor reform El País – PIT CNT: collective bargaining “came to stay” 
2009 – July 26th  Labor reform El Observador – Government and PIT-CNT underpins labor law  
2009 – August 4
th 
Labor reform El Observador - The majority of Frente Amplio is willing to accept peace clause of collective bargaining law. 
2009 – August 5th Labor reform El Observador – Frente Amplio voted peace clause despite the rejections of unions and business sectors  
2009 – August 13th Labor reform El País – Consensus between Frente Amplio and Blancos to add a new article 
2009 – August 13th  Labor reform El Observador – Collective bargaining: agreement to include the peace clause 
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2009 – August 14th Labor reform El Observador – Bargaining law was approved with political consensus 
2009 – August 17
th 
Labor reform El Observador – Law resisted by business men will be voted tomorrow on the Senate  
2009 – August 18th Labor reform El Observador – Labor law without the Ok of business sector  
2009 – August 19th Labor reform El Observador – Electoral rivals approved in the Senate controversial labor law 
2009 – August 19th Labor reform La República – With changes, Senate approved law of collective bargaining 
2009 – August 27th Labor reform El Observador – Lacalle tries to entice business men with tax pact 
2009 – September 3rd Labor reform La República – Collective bargaining initiative is law 
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Chilean Tax Reform (Law 19753) 
Parliamentary Process and Related News 
Table A5. Chile: Press releases on tax reform 
2001 CONGRESS MERCURIO LA TERCERA 
0526   Business is against the government initiative to collect 3% of 
private contributions to private health insurances to finance part 
of its public health reform. 
0531  General Secretary of the Presidency, Mr. Garcia, reminds that 
government has not forgotten the promise of reducing taxes on 
individuals. However, the two conditions on which the reform 
was proposed –wide congressional support and fiscal neutrality- 
are not met yet. The reform initiative comes from DC Senators 
Mr. Foxley and Mr. Boeninger, and PPD Senator Mr. Bittar. 
The formula proposed for these three Senators is to reduce 
marginal income tax from 45% to 35% and lower levels of the 
tax by 10 to 15%. To compensate this fiscal reduction, they 
propose to increase corporate marginal tax from 15% to 18%. 
Mrs. E. Matthei, UDI Senator and member of the Hacienda 
Commission has stated that neither she nor the UDI will support 
an increase in corporate tax (which is among the lowest in the 
world).   
 
0601  DC Senator and Senate’s Hacienda Commission President, Mr. 
Foxley, disagrees with Mr. Garcia and states that the 
congressional consensus condition is met. Mr. Bittar states that 
a marginal income tax of 45% is excessive in comparative 
terms and invites to evade.  
 
0606  The 9 institutional Senators, the Concertacion ones and the RN 
ones have agreed to proceed with the tax reform. However, 
many of them consider that increasing corporate marginal tax is 
not necessary because an increase in consumption, fueled by 
lowering the income tax will increase fiscal collection via VAT. 
Banking Association President, Mr. Sommerville agreed with 
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the cut in income taxes, but disagreed with the proposed 
increase in corporate marginal taxes. 
0607  Hacienda Ministry, Mr. Eyzaguirre, required business 
consensus on initiative before proceeding with it. Mr. Foxley 
disagreed.  
RN President Mr. Piñera and CNC President Mr. Lihn are 
willing to accept 1 point increase in marginal corporate tax (15 
to 16%). Mr. Lihn had a meeting in La Moneda with vice-
president Insulza. 
 
0627  CPC President, Mr. Ariztia, considers that a 3 points increment 
in marginal corporate tax is not feasible for business, but an 
increase of 1 or at most 1.5 points could be in the negotiation 
table. This was said after a meeting between Mr. Ariztia and 
President Lagos.  
 
0704  After reaching consensus between Government and DC, Mr. 
Eyzaguirre said that Concertacion has 6 days to present 
initiative in Parliament. Increases in corporate tax may reach 2 
points, while income taxes would be reduced in all the 
categories. 
 
0710 Executive sends 
message to 
Congress initiating 
the initiative 
discussion 
Chairs of economic departments at University of Chile, 
Catholic University and Andres Bello University have different 
views on the reform. The last two believe that the reduction 
from 45% to 40% in marginal income tax is too small and that 
the reform is purely redistributive instead of being oriented to 
maximize economic efficiency.   
 
0711  Business is against the reform. Sofofa President, Mr. Claro; 
CNC President, Mr. Lihn, and SNA President, Mr. Santa Cruz 
are against any corporate tax increment that exceeds 1 point. 
CPC President, Mr. Ariztia will manage the negotiations with 
government.   
 
0712  Different alternatives appear to avoid increasing business tax. 
Increasing diesel tax or cigarettes and alcohol taxes are among 
them. Another idea is that the State should compensate the 
reduction in tax collection via reducing public expenditure.   
 
0718 First Brief. 
Hacienda 
Commission in the 
 Hacienda Ex-Ministry during Pinochet, Mr Buchi, stated that 
the reduction on income tax will be useless to reactivate the 
economy.  
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House 
0718 General Discussion 
in House. House 
sends initiative to 
the Senate. 
  
0801 First Brief. 
Hacienda 
Commission in the 
Senate 
 Labor Ex-Ministry during Pinochet, Mr Jose Piñera, stated that 
the 2 points increase in corporate marginal tax will hurt social 
security funds (AJP).   
0807 General Discussion 
in Senate. 
  
0808 Senate sends 
initiative to the 
House. 
Senate approves initiative as sent to congress. Marginal income 
tax will be reduced from 45% to 40% and corporate income tax 
will be increased from 15% to 17%. Mr. Foxley declares that 
80% of people paying taxes will have a reduction of 30% in 
what they pay. 
 
0808 General Discussion 
in House. House 
informs Senate 
about approval of 
proposed 
modifications. 
  
0808 House sends 
approved initiative 
to the Executive. 
  
0809  Reform begins in January 2002 and increase in corporate 
marginal tax will be of 1 point, completing the 2 points with a 
.5 increase each of the following 2 years.  
 
0831 Law is 
promulgated 
  
0928 Law is published   
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 Groups Lobby in Parliament 
Table A6. Chile: Lobby in Hacienda Commission for tax reform  
 
Organization Group Sector 
House / 
Senate 
Visits Lobby 
1 
Development and Freedom Institute [Instituto 
Libertad y Desarrollo] 1 Think Tank H 1 
In favor of reducing marginal income tax and to 
allow deductions for home renting (want it across the 
board). Against increasing marginal corporate tax 
2 
Private Housing Commitee [Comité de la 
Vivienda Privada] 
1 Housing H 1 
In favor of allowing deductions for home renting for 
income tax. 
3 
Housing Financing Company [Hipotecaria 
Construcción] 
1 Construction H 1 
In favor of allowing deductions for home renting for 
income tax. 
4 
Chilean Construction Chamber  (CChC) [Cámara 
Chilena de la Construcción]  1 Construction H 1 
In favor of reducing marginal income tax and to 
allow deductions for home renting. Against 
increasing marginal corporate tax 
5 
Production and Trade Confederation (CPC) 
[Confederacion de la Produccion y el Comercio] 2 
Production & 
Wholsale and retail 
S 1 
In favor of reducing marginal income tax and to 
allow deductions for home renting. Against 
increasing marginal corporate tax 
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List of News  
2001 – April 22nd  Tax reform La Tercera - Is there a liberal current transversal to political parties? 
2001 – May 26th   Tax reform La Tercera - The government's strategy to restore confidence among businessmen 
2001 – May 26th   Tax reform La Tercera - The government's strategy to restore confidence among businessmen (II) 
2001 – May 26th   Tax reform La Tercera - Change in the composition of the U.S. Congress, complicates the FTA with Chile 
2001 – May 31st    Tax Reform El Mercurio – Minister Alvaro García: Obstacles to low people taxes persist 
2001 – June 1st        Tax reform El Mercurio - Foxley demands to the Government to make the tax rebate  
2001 – June 6th   Tax reform El Mercurio - Senate support to tax rebate 
2001 – June 7th Tax reform El Mercurio - Business consensus is asked for a low of tax    
2001 – June 11th Tax reform La Tercera - Is it feasible an electoral agreement between the Concertación and the PC? 
2001 – June 27th Tax reform El Mercurio – In two weeks tax rebate will be define 
2001 – July 4th Tax reform El Mercurio - Six days to refine tax rebates 
2001 – July 10th  Tax reform El Mercurio - Tax rebate help mortgage debtors 
2001 – July 10th   Tax reform El Mercurio – Everything about the tax rebate  
2001 – July 11th Tax reform El Mercurio – There is no consensus about initiative of tax rebate  
2001 – July 12th Tax reform El Mercurio - Analysts propose other corrective measures: The Alternatives for not raise business Tax 
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2001 – July 18th Tax reform La Tercera - Labor and tax reforms overrules the high growth 
2001 – July 24th Tax reform La Tercera - What are the implications for the Concertación of the electoral agreement between the PC and PS?  
2001 – August 2nd  Tax reform La Tercera - Labor and tax reforms go against employment 
2001 – August 8th  Tax reform El Mercurio – Persons rebate tax was approved  
2001 – August 9th  Tax reform El Mercurio – Tributary low starts on next January 
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Uruguayan Tax Reform (Law 18083) 
Parliamentary Process and Related News 
Table A7. Uruguay: Press releases on tax reform 
2007 PARLIAMNETARY 
PROCESS 
EL PAIS LA REPUBLICA EL OBSERVADOR 
0302  Government announces that proposed 
2 points decrease in VAT will only be 
a 1 point decrease in order to 
compensate for the deduction planned 
in the income tax to provide universal 
health care for children under 18. 
COFIS tax (3%) is eliminated. 
  
0306    Tax reform is presented by 
government. It eliminates 15 taxes and 
corporate taxes are unified in a one tax 
of 25% (5% less than actual tax) 
0307  Government confirms children health 
insurance deduction from IRPF 
(proposed income tax). 
Initiative includes lowering VAT and 
many deductions to income tax. 
Professional will be able to deduct up 
to 30% of taxes.  
Tax reform benefits the poor and 
allows tax deductions for the wealthy.  
0308  Government confirms that more than 
60% employees and retirees would not 
pay the new tax (IRPF) 
 Reform lowers tax collection in 0.43% 
of GDP. A main idea is to simplify tax 
structure, making it more just.  
More than 60% of people will not pay 
taxes under the new system. VAT is 
extended to most products and 
different exemptions are eliminated. 
0310    Communists, Socialists and MPP want 
more people to be included in the 
IRPF first category (tax exemption) 
(around 80% of Uruguayans). VA 
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opposes the elimination of the 
Patrimonial tax.  
0311   Corporate tax from 30 to 35%; VAT 
from 23 to 22% among other changes 
proposed in the initiative. 
Government wants to approve 
initiative before august 1
st
 in order to 
launch the reform by January 1
st
 2007. 
BCU proposed autonomy generates 
confrontation inside FA. 
0312   Wine producers (INAVE) state that 
reform will destroy wine sector by 
eliminating its tax exoneration. 
 
0313  Marginal corporate tax (IRAE) would 
be lowered from 30% to 25%.  
Employer’s contributions to Social 
Security (“Aportes Patronales”) will 
be unified in 7.5%. Service and trade 
are now taxed with 12.5%, while 
manufacturing industry is exonerated.   
  
0316 Executive sends final 
version of initiative to 
Congress. The House 
begins analyzing it. 
Economy Ministry, Mr. Astori advice 
FA MPs to be cautious with proposed 
changed to IRPF, reminding of the 
failed income tax initiative during 
Nacional Party government installed 
in 1961 and eliminated in 1974.  
MPP sector will ask Mr. Astori to take 
the Employer’s contribution to Social 
Security out of the reform to be 
analyzed separately. 
There is debate on proposed changes 
on Central Bank (BCU) management: 
separating BCU president mandate 
from electoral mandate; to have a 
strong consensus in BCU directorate 
to remove the bank’s Finance Chief; 
and to strengthen the coordination 
between BCU and Economy Ministry 
(“to align BCU with governments 
macroeconomic objectives without 
Executive send initiative to Congress 
and expects to have it approved by 
August. 
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affecting BCU’s autonomy”)    
0317  There is strong opposition to initiative 
from opposition parties and some 
sectors inside FA. 
  
0322   Mr. Astori tries to explain the reform 
in a difficult FA’s internal 
environment. Also, opposition to 
changes in BCU autonomy level and 
FTA with US.  
 
0325  IMF advice government to gradually 
apply the reform in order not to 
jeopardize tax collection levels given 
that Uruguay needs to repay debt 
during 2007 and 2008.  
Cooperatives (Cudecoop) opposes 
initiative. 
 
0331    Economy Ministry, Mr. Astori, 
promise family deductions to IRPF to 
be incorporated progressively in the 
medium run.  
Unemployment grew to 13.4%. 
0402    70% of households will be net winners 
under the new tax system. Reform will 
impose a transfer of 1.6% of income 
from highest quintile households to 
the other 80%. This top quintile will 
be taxed 7% instead of actual 2.3%.  
Top quintile will pay 80% of the 
collected tax.  
New income tax (IRPF) will collect a 
2.2% of GDP, instead of 0.87% of 
previous income tax. 
0405    Economy Undersecretary, Mr. 
Bergara, states that the idea is to make 
some taxes uniform across the board: 
employer’s social security 
contribution and professional 
contributions are two taxes that are 
particularly segmented.  
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0407   Mr. Astori had a meeting with 
Socialist Party to inform about the 
IRPF initiative. 
 
0409   Wine producers are worried about the 
future of the sector because of the 
proposed end of tax exonerations.  
 
0416  Mr. Astori explains that the tax reform 
eliminates 15 taxes, rationalizing the 
tax structure. 70% of households will 
pay less taxes, 20% about the same 
and only 10% will pay more taxes 
with new IRPF 
  
0420 Economy Ministry and 
advisors visits House’s 
Hacienda Commission to 
explain initiative 
Mr. Astori calls business to build from 
their discrepancies but to avoid 
narrowing views to their particular 
interests. 
 Mr. Astori asks business to support the 
reforms given that the country is 
growing and more investment is 
expected.  
IMF asks to be fiscally responsible.  
0421  Internal division in FA for reform. 
MPP and Communists would not vote 
for the Initiative as it stands now. 
There is internal division in Socialist 
Party and VA sector wants to soften 
requirement for sectorial pension 
funds. 
  
0423  Strong critics from opposition PN and 
PC to IRPF Initiative. Ex-Economy 
Ministry, Mr. Alfie, says it will hurt 
teachers, health workers, public 
workers and middle class. 
  
0424  Banks and bank’s employees (AEBU) 
lobby to lower IRPF taxes on financial 
system and to get funds from 
government for the banking private 
employees’ fund, now in distress. .  
 Ex- Economy Ministry during PN 
Lacalle’s government (1990-1995) 
states that tax reform is a bad signal. 
He criticized the proposed income tax 
and the elimination of financial 
investment SA (Anonymous Societies) 
(SAFI). 
0427 Wine industry (Group 1 in    
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Table A4) visits House’s 
Hacienda Commission. In a 
separate meeting, a 
regional merchants 
organization also visits the 
Commission (Group 3 in 
Table A4) 
0429    Because of internal discrepancies in 
FA, two aspects of the initiative are 
under revision: adding health 
deductions for retirees from income 
tax and suspending the cooperative 
sector exemptions elimination.  
0430   Cooperatives declares that this reform 
will lead to the dismantlement of 
cooperatives in Uruguay 
 
0503 Cooperatives’ Federation 
(Group 3 in Table A4) 
visits House’s Hacienda 
Commission visits House’s 
Hacienda Commission. In a 
separate meeting, the main 
urban transport company 
also visits the Commission 
(Group 4 in Table A4) 
   
0504 Different Workers 
organizations visit House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
(Groups 6-10 in Table A4) 
   
0510 Rural organizations visits 
House’s Hacienda 
Commission  
   
0511 Rural organizations and 
cooperatives visits House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
 Accountants, Economists and 
Administrators Association 
(professionals) propose to substitute 
the IRPF that affect them for another 
tax. 
Mr. Bergara states that tax 
modifications do not increase fiscal 
pressure, assuring that this is the first 
time this happens in Uruguay. 
 240 
 
2
4
0
 
[Type a quote from the document or 
the summary of an interesting point. 
[Typ
e a 
0512    Ministry Astori sends modifications to 
the initiative to Congress:  
- Health deductions for retirees 
were added 
- Patrimonial tax will be 
eliminated gradually in a 
period of 15 to 20 years 
- Tax to wine will be gradual 
- VAT increase in transport 
will not impact in public 
transport costs 
0516   Rural sectors against employer’s 
contribution to social security (they do 
not pay). Banking sector against the 
same thing and other taxes to finance 
sector. 
 
0517    VA sector inside FA proposes 5 
changes to the tax initiative and says 
will no vote it if modifications are not 
added. MPP and Communists support 
VA.  
- Add an IRPF category with 
lower tax burden between the 
actual 1
st
 and 2
nd
 categories 
- Add more health deductions 
for retirees and public 
servants 
- Maintain patrimonial tax   
- Avoid VAT increase in 
transport to be translated in  
public transport users’ costs 
- Tax capital rents by the same 
criteria as income rent 
0518 Professional, transport and 
cooperatives visits House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
   
0522   A study made by Colorado Party  
 241 
 
2
4
1
 
[Type a quote from the document or 
the summary of an interesting point. 
[Typ
e a 
states that the top 10% of the 
population will pay less than they do 
today, and that the IRPF is done with 
the purpose of increasing tax revenue 
0524   Government economic team denies 
the reform punish the middle class the 
most and also that it is done with the 
purpose of increasing tax revenue 
 
0525 Workers, transport, press & 
health firms visits House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
   
0601 Professional pension funds 
and industry visit House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
   
0606   Government is worried about the 
timing of the reform. There is already 
a draft Fas House MPs agree on.   
 
0607 Ministry of agriculture 
visits House’s Hacienda 
Commission 
FA still has strong internal divisions 
on Initiative. Some sectors want 
cooperatives to be exempted from 
7.5% of employer’s contribution to 
social security (“Aportes patronales”). 
Agriculture Ministry, Mr. Mujica, is 
bargaining with farmers on taxes.   
  
0608 Various industry sectors 
visit House’s Hacienda 
Commission 
   
0609   Economy Ministry, Mr. Astori, 
declares that government has not 
contingency plan for the case this 
reform is not passed in Congress.  
 
0610    President Vasquez sides with Ministry 
Astori in Tax reform but ask the 
economic team to be receptive to 
claims of other FA sectors in order to 
pass the initiative. 
0611  MPP, PS, VA and DA sectors   
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declared they would not vote IRPF 
initiative as it stands now. MPP stands 
against Central Bank autonomy and a 
FTA with US. DA, PS and VA 
disagree with taxes for cooperative 
sector.  
AU, NE and Alianza sectors stand in 
favor of the reform.  
0612  Cooperatives and farmers mobilize 
against the reform. 
Intention letter with the IMF was 
divulgated today. Government has 
agreed to slow down the reform 
agenda, including the tax reform. 
CINVE, a think tank, states that 
increase in employer’s share of social 
security in the industrial sector and 
other sectors is offset with exports. 
Therefore, this tax change will affect 
more non-exporter industries. 
0612    FA decides to put in “stand by” the tax 
reform voting in Congress because of 
some FA sectors’ discontent (PS, PC, 
MPP, VA). These sectors analyze an 
alternative initiative to be sent to 
parliament.  
0613  Only AU and Alianza stands in favor 
of reform. Other FA sectors (majority) 
will send a document to Mr. Astori 
with an alternate initiative. The main 
counter-points are: a. to include more 
households in the lower category of 
IRPF (tax  = 0%); b. to make a gradual 
lowering of corporate tax from 30 to 
25%; c. eliminate any mention to 
cooperatives; d. allow retirees to 
deduce health insurance from tax; e. 
maintain urban transport “aportes 
patronales” exoneration  
MPP, NE, Socialist Party and VA do 
not want Mr. Astori’s initiative and 
have proposed a series of changes (19) 
to the initiative. Mr. Astori informed 
that was accepting 15 out of 19 
proposed changes. However, some of 
the ones are not being included are 
essential for the four abovementioned 
groups: a. to include more households 
in the lower category of IRPF (tax  = 
0%); b. to make a gradual lowering of 
corporate tax from 30 to 25%; c. 
eliminate any mention to cooperatives; 
d. allow retirees to deduce health 
insurance from tax; e. maintain urban 
transport “aportes patronales” 
exoneration 
 
 243 
 
2
4
3
 
[Type a quote from the document or 
the summary of an interesting point. 
[Typ
e a 
0614 Rural and professionals 
visit House’s Hacienda 
Commission 
   
0615 Farmers and retirees visit 
House’s Hacienda 
Commission 
Mr. Astori opposes proposed changes, 
arguing that FA initiative will be 
dismantled without this reform. Also, 
Mr. Astori defends the initiative of 
“autonomy” of the BCU, widely 
resisted in the left and inside the BCU.  
 Ministry Astori will meet with FA 
senators and state that without the 
reform, the Fas economic 
transformation initiative will be 
defeated.  
Colorados and Blancos support 
Central Bank autonomy increase.  
0616    Mr. Astori and FA MPs will continue 
negotiating over the reform. Astori 
says that many of the proposed 
changes need also a initiative to 
finance them. Astori seems to have 
won a round with MPs.  
0619   In a meeting, the day before, the 
economic team and the most important  
MPs from the four groups that 
proposed the 19 changes met in order 
to negotiate the last four 
disagreements.  
 
0620    FA MPs meeting with Astori is 
suspended. Tax reform dissent inside 
FA increases. 
0621 Judges association visits 
House’s Hacienda 
Commission  
   
0622   The alternative tax initiative presented 
by four FA groups has now 22 points 
instead of 19.  
Most FA sectors are against Astori. 
President Vasquez said he would 
decide on the initiative. There is a 21 
points alternative document proposed 
by FA sectors.  
PIT-CNT mobilizes opposing to 
government’s economic policy. 
0623   Rural sector declares that will pay 
more with the proposed tax reform. 
FA MPs propose an alternative reform 
initiative. Astori’s sector opposes the 
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Sector will pay between 6.6 and 8% of 
the product in taxes. 
alternative initiative.  
0630  Farmers and wine producers 
mobilization to avoid taxes on wine 
and fruits.  
  
0705    House Commission stops receiving 
groups until the FA decides its internal 
conflicts on the initiative.  
0714    Bank employees (AEBU) considers 
that the reform reduces taxes on banks 
and that this would be positive for 
expanding credit (which will be 
cheaper) 
0717  Ex-PN Ministry, Mr. Ramirez, 
declares that it is not clear how the 
health reform will be financed and 
which is the relationship between it 
and the IRPF 
Some voices inside FA state that 
maybe FA should consider the 
stability of the coalitions before than 
the reformist impulse, in particular 
with respect to IRPF. 
 
0719   FA has an initial internal agreement to 
continue with the tax reform and 
suspend all other reforms initiatives 
until 2007 
 ECLAC study confirms that Uruguay 
is among the countries in Latin 
America with the highest fiscal burden 
(25% of GDP Uruguay and 24% LA 
mean). Uruguay also has the highest 
VAT in the region 
0720 Cooperatives and 
professionals visit House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
  President Vasquez defined 
government priorities for 2006. The 
tax reform is among them. 
0723    In a time of internal tension in FA 
because of tax reform, Economic 
Ministry, Mr. Astori, gives support to 
a set of reforms proposed by 
Agriculture Ministry, Mr. Mujica.   
0726 Professionals visits 
House’s Hacienda 
Commission 
  MPP sector will vote tax reform, but 
reminded about the 23 points that a 
group of sectors wanted to discuss 
with Mr. Astori. 
0727 Tourism and small   Economy Undersecretary, Mr. 
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business visit House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
Bergara, denied that tax reform may 
be prejudicial for Argentinean 
investment in the country. 
0802 Rural federations visit 
House’s Hacienda 
Commission 
   
0803 Banks, tourism and 
construction visit House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
   
0804    FA MPs insist in voting the budget 
(where the tax reform is included) 
point by point. Mr. Astori against that 
initiative.  
0807    PI MPs against reform and say that 
reform will hurt FA 
0809 Food and service sector 
visits House’s Hacienda 
Commission 
   
0811  Rural organizations against reform. 
Four main points: “aportes 
patronales”, taxing cooperatives, VAT 
on fruits and tax on wine 
  
0814   Bank association believes that the 
reform would favor “off-shore” 
operations  
FA groups ask for more changes in the 
tax reform 
0815   FA without internal agreement on tax 
reform 
 
0816 Press workers and stock 
market visit House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
   
0817 Banks and retirees visit 
House’s Hacienda 
Commission 
  There will be a FA “head of list” 
meeting. Mr. Astori proposed changes 
to the tax reform but sectors did not 
decide yet if they are satisfied with 
them. 
0822  Farmers mobilize against the reform 
with support of P. Nacional and P. 
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Colorado 
0826  MPP and Mr. Astori are closer to 
agreement. Mr. Astori agrees to 
modify second category of IRPF, to 
exonerate wine’s tax and to make 
gradual corporate tax lowering from 
30 to 20%. 
  
0901   A study by Professionals Associations 
states that the reform will have a 
strong impact on this group’s 
earnings, reaching an extra 5% of their 
net income.  
 
0902   FA President, Mr. Brovetto, send to 
parliament a reform proposal with a 
compromise between the two parts in 
the party. The proposal assures the 
funds for the health reform.  
 
0903  President Vasquez, Mr. Astori and Mr. 
Mujica closer to pact a final version of 
the reform. Chapter on cooperatives is 
mostly eliminated. Corporate tax will 
be of 25% if benefits are reinvested, 
and 32% if not. This will pay for the 
health reform. 
  
0905    Tax reform will be approved in 
Parliament. FA sectors satisfied with 
changes introduced to the initiative. 
0906   Worried about timing, the 
government’s economic team accepts 
some relevant changes in the tax 
reform. Mostly about corporate taxes 
(Corporate tax will remain in 25% but 
will be another 7% tax on distributed 
(no reinvested) utilities.) and wine 
taxes. 
 
0908    The final reform draft is getting ready. 
Most sectors agree and MPP decides 
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on Monday. 
0912    MPP wants some changes in final 
draft 
0913    Reform will be voted in early October. 
Government expects to launch the 
IRPF in January 2007. 
0918    CNCS against 32% of corporate tax 
on services and commerce. 
0925  Public firms’ contribution to social 
security will drop from 24.5% to the 
unified 7.5%.   
  
1003  Agreement in FA on IRPF reform. 
Cooperatives will be subject of a new 
independent law initiative. Corporate 
tax will remain in 25% but will be 
another 7% tax on distributed (no 
reinvested) utilities.  
Opposition from business and labor to 
initiative.  
FA is ready to vote the initiative.    
1011  Opposition will call Mr. Astori to 
Congress.  
  
1012 CIU, ARU, FR, CNCS, 
University Graduates 
Association, Real State 
Associations visit House’s 
Hacienda Commission 
   
1017 The Executive sends an 
addendum to the initiative 
to parliament. 
   
1021   Communist MP, Mr. Lorier, states that 
tax reform may suffer new changes in 
the Senate. 
 
1101 Hacienda Commission in 
Senate begins analysis of 
initiative as was approved 
by the House 
   
1103   There is little doubt that the senate  
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will modify some aspects of the 
reform.  
1108   Economic team is not favorable to 
new modifications in the Senate. 
 
1110  FA votes in favor of Mr. Astori after 
his appearance in Congress because of 
an opposition vote.   
 Mr. Astori in Congress to explain tax 
reform. PI MP, Mr. Posada, 
commands the plea. 
1121 Twelve organizations from 
the different sectors visit 
Senate’s Hacienda 
Commission (see Table 
A4) 
   
1123 Four organizations from 
the different sectors visit 
Senate’s Hacienda 
Commission (see Table 
A4) 
   
1128 Economy Ministry, Mr. 
Astori visits Senate’s 
Hacienda Commission. 
Also, CIU, CNCS and 
seven other organizations 
from banking and Real 
Estate sectors visit the 
Commission.   
   
1129  IRPF will begin on July 2007.  IRPF will begin in July 2007 
1205 Two organizations from 
professional and retiree 
sectors visit Senate’s 
Hacienda Commission. 
   
1206  Business agree on delaying IRPF 
collection, beginning on july 2007 
AU-FA Senator, Mr. Baraibar, states 
that the reform will be voted as it is in 
Senate on Decmeber 12
ve
  
 
1213 Law is voted.     
1229    Mr. Astori and the government’s 
economic team visits for the first time 
the PIT-CNT headquarters to explain 
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the tax reform and the overall FAs 
economic strategy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Groups Lobby in Parliament 
Table A8. Uruguay: Lobby in Hacienda Commissions for tax reform  
 
Organization Group Sector 
House / 
Senate 
Visits Lobby 
1 Cellarmen Center [Centro Bodegueros] 1 Beverages  H 1 Against derogation of tax exoneration 
2 Wine Producers National Organization [Organizacion 
Nacional Vitivinicultores] 
1 Beverages  H 1 Against derogation of tax exoneration 
3 Wine National Institute (INAVI) [Instituto Nacional del 
Vino] 
1 Beverages  H 1 Against derogation of tax exoneration 
4 CREA group of wine producers [Grupo CREA de 
Viticultores] 
1 Beverages  H 1 Against derogation of tax exoneration 
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5 Regional Merchants Association from Durazno [Delegación 
de Comerciantes de Durazno] 
2 Merchants H 1 Want to have a minimum amount of 
revenue not taxed by new tax (like a first 
category with 0%) 
6 Uruguayan Cooperatives Confederation (CUDECOOP) 
[Confederacion Uruguaya de Entidades Cooperativas] 
3 Cooperative H 1 Against derogation of tax exoneration 
7 Urban transport company (CUTCSA) 4 Transport H 1 Against social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
8 Taxi Owners Association [Gremial Unica del Taxi] 5 Transport H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
9 Health workers union (CAFUCA) 6 Health workers H 1 Against elimination of semi-public 
pension fund [caja paraestatal]; and 
against IRPF 
10 Banking workers  private collective fund [Servicio Mutuo de 
Bienestar Social de Funcionarios y ex Funcionarios 
Bancarios] 
7 Banking workers H 1 Against taxing semi-public pension 
funds 
11 Regionl Press Organiation (OPI) [Organizacion de Prensa 
del interior] 
8 Press H 1 Against derogation of tax exoneration 
12 Municipal Workers Welfare Fund  [Servicio Mutuo de 
Bienestar Social de Funcionarios y ex Funcionarios 
Intendencia Municipal Montevideo] 
9 Municipal 
workers 
H 1 Against elimination of semi-public 
pension fund [caja paraestatal]; and 
against IRPF 
13 Formal workers and retirees organization (ANDA) 
[Administracion Nacional de Afiliados] 
10 Formal sector 
workers and 
retirees 
HS 2 Against derogation of tax exoneration 
14 Rural Promotion National Commission [Comision Nacional 
de Fomento Rural] 
11 Agro H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
15 Acountants, Economists and Administrators Organization 
[Colegio de contadores, Economistas y Administradores del 
Uruguay] 
12 Professional H 1 Want special IRPF category 
("professional rent") 
16 Transport Umbrella organization [ANETRA] 13 Transport H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
17 Federated Rural Cooperatives [Cooperativas Agrarias 
Federadas]  
14 Coop HS 2 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
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18 Legislative branch workers social assistance service 
[Servicio de Asistencia Social a los Funcionarios del Poder 
Legislativo]  
15 Public servants H 1 Against elimination of semi-public 
pension fund [caja paraestatal]; and 
against IRPF 
19 Metropolitan Area transport company (COPSA) 16 Transport H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS]; and to keep 
14% VAT instead of proposed 22%. 
20 Uruguayan Newspapers Association (ADYPU) [Asociación 
de Diarios y Periódicos del Uruguay] 
17 Press H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS]; and to keep 
VAT exemption 
21 Collective Health Institutions (IMAC) [Instituciones de 
Asistencia Medica Colectiva] 
18 Health workers H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS]; Against 
taxing semi-public pension fund [caja 
paraestatal]; and against IRPF 
22 Industrial Chamber (CIU) [Cámara de Industrias del 
Uruguay] 
19 Industry  HS 3 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
23 Notaries Social Security Fund [Caja Notarial de la Seguridad 
Social]  
20 Professional H 1 Want to tax sell-buy process by land 
registry value 
24 Bank workers Pension Fund [Caja de Pensiones y 
Jubilaciones Bancarias] 
21 Retirees H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
25 Retirees’ organization Montevideo 22 Retirees H 1 Do not want to pay IRPF 
26 Retirees’ organization Maldonado 22 Retirees H 1 Do not want to pay IRPF 
27 Frigorific Industry Association (ADIFU) [Asociacion de la 
Industria Frigorifica del Uruguay] 
23 Industry union H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
28 Freight transport Union [Intergremial de Transporte 
Profesional de Carga del Uruguay] 
24 Transport H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS]; and want 
VAT to be lowered  from 14 to 10% 
29 Beer and non-alcoholic beverages firms Association [Centro 
de Fabricantes de Bebidas sin Alcohol y Cervezas] 
25 Beverages  H 1 Eliminate tax to beer (as wine have it 
exonerated) 
30 Beer and non-alcoholic beverages firms’ workers federation 26 Beverages  H 1 Same level of taxation than wine, Wine 
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[Federacion de Obreros y empleados de la Bebida] to pay Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s as they do. 
31 Uruguayan Rural Association [Asociacion Rural del 
Uruguay] 
27 Agro HS 3 Keep Patrimonial tax exemption; 
Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
32 Professional Soccer Players Federation 28 Sports H 1 Want to keep sport-transactions tax  
33 Public Communication Company workers’ social security 
fund [Servicio Mutuo de Asistencia Social de Funcionarios y 
Ex-Funcionarios de ANTEL] 
29 Retirees H 1 Do not want to pay IRPF 
34 Regional Horticultural Association [Mesa Horticola de 
Salto]  
30 Agro H 1 Want to keep VAT exemption, not 
paying proposed 10% VAT to flowers 
and vegetables 
35 Retirees National Association [Plenario Nacional de 
Asociaciones de Jubilados y Pensionistas] 
31 Retirees HS 2 Do not want to pay IRPF 
36 Housing Cooperative Federation (FECOVI) [Federación de 
Cooperativas de Vivienda] 
32 Coop H 1 Against VAT on house construction 
loans 
37 Uruguayan Lawyers Association [Colegio de Abogados del 
Uruguay] 
33 Professional HS 2 Want special category "professional 
rent", Against judicial taxes 
38 Uruguayan Notaries Association [Asociacion de Escribanos 
del Uruguay] 
34 Professional H 1 Different particular aspects related to 
sell-buy process 
39 Uruguayan Travel agents Association [Asociacion Uruguaya 
de Agencias de Viajes] 
35 Tourism H 1 Want corporate tax (IRAE) exoneration 
40 Coordinadora de Entidades de la Union 36 Minorista H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
41 Uruguayan Victims of Usury Association [Asociacion 
Nacional de Afectados por Intereses de Usura en el 
Uruguay] 
37 Finance H 1 Do not want to pay IRPF 
42 Rural Federation [Federacion Rural] 38 Agro HS 4 Complete opposition 
43 Uruguayan Private Banks Association [Asociacion de 
Bancos Privados del Uruguay] 
39 Banking sector HS 2 Do not want to pay corporate tax 
(IRAE); against bank deposits taxation 
44 Uruguayan Tourism Rights Association [Asociacion 
Uruguaya de Derecho de Turismo] 
40 Tourism H 1 Against taxing free-shops for foreign 
tourism 
45  Uruguayan building private developers Association (APCU) 
[Asociacion de Promotores Privados de la Construccion en 
41 Construction H 1 Against elimination of VAT exoneration 
or, if need to pay VAT, the propose to be 
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Uruguay] exonerated from the patrimonial tax  
46 National Chamber of Food [Camara Nacional de 
Alimentacion] 
42 Food H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
47 Merchants Chamber (CMPP) [Camara Mercantil de 
Productos del Pais] 
43 Trade H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s modification [Aportes 
patronales BPS]; against patrimonial tax 
exoneration elimination  
48 Third Age Homes Association [Hogares de Ancianos] 44 Retirees H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS]; against 
elimination of VAT exemption  
49 Regional Broadcasters Workers Association [Asociacion de 
Trabajadores de la Comunicacion de San Jose] 
45 Press H 1 Want to pay special tax [monotributo] 
instead of IRPF 
50 Professional Insurance Advisors Association (APROASE) 
[Agrupación de Profesionales Asesores de Seguros] 
46 Services HS 2 Want to pay special tax [monotributo] 
instead of corporate tax (IRAE) 
51 Montevideo Stock Exchange [Bolsa de Valores de 
Montevideo] 
47 Finance H 1 Oppose 12% cap on interests 
52 Uruguayan Banks Association [Asociación de Bancarios del 
Uruguay] 
48 Banking H 1  
53 Professional and retirees retirement funds assocation 
[Asociación de Afiliados a la Caja de Jubilaciones y 
Pensiones de Profesionales Universitarios] 
49 Professional 
Retiree 
HS 2 Do not want to pay IRPF 
54 Banking retirees Association [Asociación de Jubilados de 
Caja Bancaria] 
49 Banking Retiree H 1 Do not want to pay IRPF 
55 Notary retirees Association [Asociación de Jubilados de Caja 
Notarial]  
49 Professional 
Retiree 
HS 2 Do not want to pay IRPF 
56 Uruguayan retirees Association (ONAJPU) [Organización 
Nacional de Asociaciones de Jubilados y Pensionistas del 
Uruguay] 
49 Retirees HS 2 Do not want to pay IRPF 
57 University graduates Association [Agrupación Universitaria 
del Uruguay] 
50 Professional HS 3 Want to be able to choose between 
paying corporate tax (IRAE) or income 
tax (IRPF) 
58 Regional Housing Sector Association [Sector Inmobiliario y 
Afines del Departamento de Maldonado] 
51 Housing/Touris
m 
H 1 Particular issues related to housing taxes 
59 Farmers Confederation [Confederación Granjera]  52 Agro HS 2 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
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[Aportes patronales BPS] 
60 Uruguayan Commerce and Service Chamber [Cámara de 
Comercio y Servicios del Uruguay] 
53 Minorista HS 3 Want to keep Tax Exonerations, do not 
want to pay corporate tax (IRAE) 
61 Rural Promotion National Commission [Comision Nacional 
de Fomento Rural] 
54 Agro S 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
62 Uruguayan Pig Producers Association [Asociación Uruguaya 
de Productores de Cerdos] 
54 Agro S 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
63 Uruguayan Forestry Industry Society [Sociedad de 
Productores Forestales del Uruguay] 
55 Agro S 1 Want to keep Tax Exonerations 
64 [Comisión Administradora del Fondo Complementario de la 
Industria Periodística] 
56 Press S 1 Against taxing semi-public pension fund 
[caja paraestatal]; and against IRPF or 
IRAE 
65 Coordinadora de Jubilados y Pensionistas del Uruguay (part 
of PIT-CNT) 
57 Retirees S 1 Do not want to pay IRPF 
66 Financing Entities Chamber [Cámara de Entidades 
Financieras] 
58 Finance S 1 Want to keep Tax Exonerations 
67 Uruguayan Banking Employees Association [Asociacion de 
Empleados Bancarios del Uruguay] 
59 Banking S 1 Do not want to pay IRPF 
68 Punta del Este Real State Association [Asociacion de 
Inmobiliarias de Punta del Este] 
60 Housing/Touris
m 
S 1 Want tax on sector to apply to all 
business in sector 
69 Regional Real State Chamber [Camara Inmobiliaria de 
Maldonado] 
60 Housing/Touris
m 
S 1 Want tax on sector to apply to all 
business in sector 
70 Uruguayan Real State Chamber [Camara Inmobiliaria 
Uruguaya] 
60 Housing/Touris
m 
S 1 Want tax on sector to apply to all 
business in sector 
71 National Auction and Real State Agents Association 
[Asociación Nacional de Rematadores y Corredores 
Inmobiliarios] 
60 Housing/Touris
m 
S 1 Want tax on sector to apply to all 
business in sector 
72 Regional Retirees Federation [Federación de Asociaciones 
de Jubilados y Pensionistas del Interior] 
61 Retirees S 1 Do not want to pay IRPF 
73 Uruguayan Poultry Farmers Association [Asociación de 
Avicultores del Uruguay] 
53 Agro H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
[Aportes patronales BPS] 
74 Honorary Cooperatives Commission [Comision Honoraria 
del Cooperativismo] 
53 Coop H 1 Want to keep tax exemptions and against 
Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s exoneration derogation 
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75 Uruguayan Judges Association [Asociación de Magistrados 
del Uruguay]  
62 Professionals H 1 Want to keep sectorial tax exonerations 
76 Public Ministry Judges Association [Asociación de 
Magistrados del Ministerio Público] 
62 Professionals H 1 Want to keep sectorial tax exonerations 
77 Uruguayan Business Confederation [Confederación 
Empresarial del Uruguay] 
62 Entrepreneurs H 1 Against Social Security employer’s 
contribution’s modification [Aportes 
patronales BPS] 
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List of News 
 
2006 - March 2
nd  
IRPF El País - IVA lows down 1% with the IRPF reform 
2006- March 3
rd  
IRPF La República - There will be deductions of 30% to professional honorees  
2006 - March 3
rd 
  IRPF El País – the government postpones health reform to focus on IRPF 
2006 – March 6th  IRPF El Observador- The tax reform was presented: IRPF deduction per child. 
2006 – March 7th  IRPF El Observador - Tax reform benefits the poor and IRPF reduction benefits the rich 
2006 – March 7th  IRPF El País – expenses in health per son will not pay rent   
2006- March 8
th
   IRPF El País – government claims that 60% will not pay new tax  
2006 – March 8th  IRPF El País - Multiple deductions to ease the burden of income tax   
2006 – March 8th  IRPF El País - Multiple deductions to ease the burden of income tax II 
2006 – March 9th  IRPF El Observador - IRPF payers must make annual affidavits 
2006 – March 10th IRPF El Observador - Ruling party legislators proposed several adjustments to the tax reform 
2006 – March 10th  IRPF El País – Danilo Astori interview: a change in rent would affect others taxes 
2006- March 11
th
  IRPF La República – DGI will have 1.6 million to make an informative campaign  
2006- March 12
th
  IRPF La República – Inavi says that tax reform will sink the wine sector 
2006 – March 13th IRPF El País (Economy and Market) – Facing the tax reform  
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2006- March 15
th
 IRPF La República -The Executive submitted today the tax reform initiative to the Parliament 
2006 – March 16th  IRPF El País – Astori asked caution to frentistas legislators to discuss the reform  
2006 – March 16th  IRPF El Observador – Ruling party legislators planned some changes on the reform without altering it essence 
 
2006 – March 17th  IRPF El País – The tax reform was presented to the parliament    
2006- March 22
nd
 IRPF La República -The economic team tries to explain the reforms in a difficult environment  
2006- March 23
rd
  IRPF La República -Mario Bergara:  "We cannot afford a failure" with tax reform  
2006- March 25
th
  IRPF La República - The cooperativistas question the tax reform 
2006 – March 25th  IRPF El País – FMI urged caution to cut taxes and run public spending 
2006- March 26
th
  IRPF La República -Deputy Alfredo Asti: This will be the year of reforms 
2006 – March 27th IRPF El País (Economy and Market) – Carlos Borba: Tax Reform: myths and milestones  
2006 – March 27th IRPF El Observador - Crédit sees strong expansion in Uruguay; warning about effects of IRPF 
2006 – March 31st IRPF El Observador - IRPF per household in the long term 
2006 – April 2nd  IRPF El Observador - Tax reform:  the poorest are who win 
2006 - April 3
rd
  IRPF El País (Economy and Market) –   Javier de Haedo:  Still unfair 
2006 - April 3
rd
 IRPF El País (Economy and Market) – Carlos Borba: Tax Reform:  myths and milestones II 
2006 - April 4
th
  IRPF El Observador – “Care must be taken with the actions in pursuit of equity” 
2006 – April 4th IRPF La República –Astori informed the socialist party about the contents of the tax reform 
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2006 – April 5th  IRPF El Observador – (editorial) “Tax clouds”  
2006 – April 5th  IRPF El Observador - The low of rates after the tax reform will not be immediate 
2006 – April 8th  IRPF El Observador - The justice of the reform  
2006 – April 9th IRPF La República –There is a warning that tax reform puts in danger future of wine industry 
2006 - April 16
th  
IRPF El País – Astori sector makes public the instructions of the new tax reform  
2006 - April 20
th   
IRPF El País – Astori asked for a new dialogue 
2006 - April 20
th   
IRPF El Observador -Astori asked businessmen for solidarity and support to the reforms 
2006 - April 21
st    
IRPF El País – Frente Amplio is divided because of the tax reform    
2006 – April 23rd  IRPF El País – Blancos and Colorados attack the new tax  
2006 – April 24th  IRPF El País – Banks and guilds: changes to the reform 
2006 – April 24th  IRPF El Observador – De Posadas: tax reform is a bad sign 
2006 – April 29th  IRPF El Observador - Deduction on health for retired people is being evaluated  
2006 – April 30th  IRPF La República - Cooperative argues that the tax reform leads to their dismantling 
2006 – May 11th IRPF La República – The Association of Accountants proposes replacing the income tax that affects them. 
2006 – May 11th IRPF El Observador - State reform will take years and will be discussed more than the tax reform 
2006 – May 12th  IRPF El Observador - Government will relieve taxes to retirees 
2006 – May 12th  IRPF El Observador - Government will relieve taxes to retirees (II) 
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2006 – May 13th  IRPF El Observador - Astori “back to class” to explain the reform 
2006 – May 16th IRPF La República – Tax Reform: BPS contributions of the agricultural sector and banks are suspended 
2006 – May 17th  IRPF El Observador - Tax reform has a tough hurdle: la vertiente 
2006 – May 22nd IRPF La República – According to Colorados, with the tax reform the collection would raise U$S 12 million more than currently  
2006 – May 24th  IRPF La República – Economic team explained the tax reform in Liverpool Club 
2006 – June 1st  IRPF El Observador - Economy Ministry proposes to increase IRPF on capital income 
2006 – June 6th  IRPF La República – There is already a draft of agreement about tax reform in deputies. 
2006 – June 7th   IRPF El País - agreement about tax reform is still distant 
2006 – June 8th  IRPF La República – Last adjustments in the tax reform will be known today 
2006 – June 9th  IRPF La República – Astori wants the prices to go down after tax reform 
2006 – June 10th  IRPF El Observador - Vazquez supports Astori, but calls for flexibility 
2006 – June 11th  IRPF El País - MPP, Vertiente Artiguista and socialist party JAQUEAN ministry of economy. 
2006 – June 12th IRPF La República – FMI agreed with the government to postpone the reforms timing, including tax one 
2006 – June 12th   IRPF El País - Tax reform:  unions are planning mobilizations 
2006 – June 12th  IRPF El Observador - The ruling freezes the tax reform 
2006 – June 12th  IRPF El Observador - The ruling freezes the tax reform (II) 
2006 – June 12th  IRPF El Observador - Export: the gun to relieve the tax burden 
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2006 – June 13th IRPF La República – Four sectors of Frente Amplio raised further reforms in the tax reform. 
2006 – June 13th   IRPF El País – Frente Implies groups ratify the decision of changing the reform    
2006 – June 14th  IRPF El Observador - FA respond to Astori that is possible to raise more 
2006 – June 14th  IRPF La República – Monday 19th and Friday 30th, the two critical dates for Tax Reform 
2006 – June 15th   IRPF El País - According to Astori, without reforms the official Initiative aborts  
2006 – June 15th  IRPF El Observador - The government between “several fires" 
2006 – June 15th IRPF El Observador – Astori:  without the reforms, the economic transformation will be aborted 
2006 – June 16th  IRPF La República – Members of Finance of the FA today analyzed tax reform 
2006 – June 16th  IRPF El Observador - Astori won the first round to deputies about the reform 
2006 – June 16th IRPF La República – Astori defended the tax reform in the FA: there is agreement in 15 of the 19 items 
2006 – June 18th IRPF La República – Astori: “substantive reforms are the ones that difference us from previous governments” 
2006 – June 20th  IRPF El Observador - Increasing disagreement on tax reform 
2006 – June 20th  IRPF El Observador - FA cancelled the meeting with ASTORI 
2006 – June 22nd  IRPF La República – Now Danilo Astori alternative initiative has 22 points 
2006 – June 22nd  IRPF El Observador – All against Astori 
2006 – June 22nd  IRPF El Observador – All against Astori (II) 
2006 – June 22nd  IRPF El Observador - PIT-CNT mobilizes against the economic policy of the FA 
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2006 – June 23rd  IRPF El Observador - Tax reform: new proposal from deputies of FA 
2006 – June 23rd IRPF La República – With the tax reform the agricultural sector will pay more, so will the large landowners and SA 
2006 – June 30th   IRPF El País – the rebellion of farms in the capital  
2006 – July 3rd  IRPF El Observador - The government was asked for a new debt swap 
2006 – July 4th  IRPF El Observador – Opinion column: Tax reform  
2006 – July 5th  IRPF El Observador - Most sectors maintain their demands for tax reform 
2006 – July 8th IRPF La República – Astori expressed his preoccupation because of the slow discussion in parliament about the reform 
2006 – July 14th  IRPF El Observador – Tax reform will benefit the banking 
2006 – July 17th  IRPF La República – Maybe it's time to put before stability than reformist conflict 
2006 – July 17th  IRPF El País (Economy and market) – the illegitimate son of the reform (Gonzalo Ramirez) 
2006 – July 19th IRPF El Observador - Uruguay is one of the Latin American countries with higher tax burden 
2006 – July 19th IRPF La República – There is a beginning of agreement to approve tax reform and move the others reforms discussions to 2007 
2006 – July 20th  IRPF El Observador - Vazquez defined legislative priorities with parliamentarians 
2006 - July 23
rd
  IRPF El Observador - On a key moment, Astori winks Mujica 
2006 – July 26th  IRPF El Observador – MPP votes tax reform 
2006 – July 27th  IRPF La República – DGI is getting prepared 
2006 – July 27th IRPF El Observador - Bergara denied that tax reform causes damage to Argentine investments 
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2006 – August 4th IRPF El Observador – Astori:  “you can not talk about lack of flexibility” 
2006 – August 5th IRPF El Observador - Astori is the center of criticism from trade unions and the FA 
2006 – August 7th IRPF El Observador - Ivan de Posadas: "The government is Robin Hood" 
2006 – August 7th IRPF La República – Interview to Asti:  80% of Uruguayan will have more incomes thanks to the tax reform  
2006 – August 11th IRPF El País – Rural unions against the reform  
2006 – August 13th IRPF El Observador – “Revenues, income and work” 
2006 – August 14th IRPF La República – For banks, tax reform favors the operating "offshore" 
2006 – August 14th IRPF El Observador - FA wants more changes on IRPF 
2006 – August 15th IRPF La República – Agreement in the Frente Amplio for the prosecution of tax reform 
2006 – August 17th IRPF El Observador - Difficult agreement on tax reform 
2006 – August 22nd IRPF El País – Farmers´ demonstration against the reform with the opposition support  
2006 – August 26th IRPF El País – MPP closer to an agreement with Astori about the tax reform  
2006 – September 1st IRPF La República – Tax Reform will be a blow to the pocket of professionals 
2006 – September 2nd  IRPF La República – Tax reform an end with commitments, which authorizes the financing of National Health System 
2006 – September 3rd  IRPF El País – Legislators of the ruling party are entering in the final part of the reform 
2006 – September 4th IRPF La República – The tax reform seeks to prevent tax avoidance through zones francas 
2006 – September 5th IRPF El Observador - Tax reform goes: the FA on the verge of reaching an agreement  
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2006 – September 6th IRPF La República – economic team accepts significant modifications of the original initiative 
2006 – September 8th IRPF El Observador - Final text of tax reform was written 
2006 – September 9th IRPF El País – The tax reform would become effective latter 
2006 – September 12th IRPF El Observador - FA deputies are writing tax reform text 
2006 – September 13th IRPF El Observador - Deputies: tax reform will be voted in October 
2006 – September 18th IRPF El Observador - Financial institutions raised objections to the reform 
2006 – September 20th IRPF La República – Since November 1st the DGI will advice on Tax Reform 
2006 – September 22nd IRPF La República – DGI made a written test for candidates to report on Tax Reform 
2006 – September 22nd IRPF El Observador - The timing of the tax reform worries the DGI 
2006 – September 24th IRPF El Observador - Government with full agenda for discussions 
2006 – September 25th  IRPF El País – Ruling party will control the low of rates 
2006 – October 1st  IRPF El País – Pit Cnt is discussing if there will be electoral competition    
2006 – October 3rd IRPF El País – Astori imposed his opinion on the tax reform 
2006 – October 3rd IRPF La República – With some details of wording, tax reform would be approve 
2006 – October 7th IRPF El Observador – Against the economic model 
2006 – October 9th IRPF El Observador – Opinion column: What is the essence of the income tax? 
2006 – October 11th  IRPF El País – Opposition argues that changes didn’t improve the text reform 
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2006 – October 13th IRPF La República – The 25th or 26th of October their would vote in Deputies the tax reform  
2006 – October 16th IRPF La República – Tax reform will collect more 
2006 – October 20th IRPF La República – Astori announced that the tax reform will eliminate penalization to financial trusts 
2006 – October 21st IRPF La República – Tax reform could have new modifications in the Senate 
2006 – October 27th IRPF La República – Astori says that reform will be ready on 1st of January of 2007 
2006 – October 29th IRPF La República – The tax reform bill is still open and there are expectations 
2006 –November 3rd IRPF La República – Tax reform is going to be re-open on Senate  
2006 –November 8th IRPF La República – Tax reform would be approved on the 12th of December by the Senate 
2006 – November 9th IRPF El Observador - The government will maintain reforms and goals 
2006 – November 10th  IRPF El País - Tax reform is now a fact 
2006 – November 10th IRPF El Observador – Astori and Posada: Questioning concluded without debate in the chamber 
2006 – November 10th IRPF El Observador – Astori and Posada: Questioning concluded without debate in the chamber (II) 
2006 – November 10th IRPF El Observador – “Is untenable to say that the IRPF will fall on the middle class” 
2006 –November 15th IRPF La República – Zaidensztat: implement the tax reform, "with the help of the gods", requires no less than five months 
2006 – November 20th IRPF El Observador - Textile industry in ruins 
2006 – November 20th IRPF El Observador - Textile industry in ruins (II) 
2006 – November 29th IRPF El País – New effective date for tax reform 
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2006 – November 29th IRPF El Observador - Astori agreed to delay the reform 6 months 
2006 – November 29th IRPF El Observador - Astori agreed to delay the reform 6 months (II) 
2006 – November 30th IRPF El País – IRPF will be paid since 2008 
2006 –November 30th IRPF La República – The DGI has everything ready to operate under the reform 
2006 – November 30th IRPF El Observador - Agro taxes back to pre-crisis level 
2006 – December 5th  IRPF El País – Tax reform is becoming effective the 1st of July of 2007  
2006 – December  IRPF El Observador - Tax reform was designed to support production strategy 
2006 – December 6th  IRPF El País – Business areas are relieve because the reform was postponed 
2006 –December 8th IRPF La República – Economic team is in favor of no changes to the Tax Reform on the Senate 
2006 – December 8th IRPF El Observador - Astori and his team started their long-term vision 
2006 – December 8th IRPF El Observador - Astori and his team started their long-term vision (II) 
2006 –December 10th IRPF La República – Small businesses will be taxed on IVA and their bills will not be deductible for taxpayers IRAE 
2006 – December 19th IRPF El Observador - Projections foresee that agro taxes will increase with the tax reform 
2006 –December 24th IRPF La República – Regulations for the tax reform would be ready in March  
2006 – December 29th IRPF El Observador – Astori – PIT CNT 
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Appendix Two: Documentary sources and Interviews
Chile 
Law 19753, Chilean Congress National Library http://www.bcn.cl/ 
Law 19753, History of the law. Chilean Congress National Library http://www.bcn.cl/ 
Law 19759, Chilean Congress National Library http://www.bcn.cl/ 
Law 19759, History of the law. Chilean Congress National Library http://www.bcn.cl/ 
Mining Council A.G., “Mining Council presentation to the Honorably Senate Labor 
Commission’s. Comments to the Labor reform Initiative”. Document stored at the 
Chilean Congress Archives.  
CPC, “CPC position in relation to the law initiative on labor reform”, Document stored at 
the Chilean Congress Archives 
Sofofa, “Sofofa’s position in relation to the law initiative that modifies the Labor Code”, 
Document stored at the Chilean Congress Archives 
Chilean Mining Confederation, “On the labor reform initiative that modifies the Labor 
Code”, Document stored at the Chilean Congress Archives 
SNA, “SNA observations to the initiative that modifies the Labor Code”, Document 
stored at the Chilean Congress Archives 
CChC, “CChC’s position on the initiative that reforms labor legislation”, Document 
stored at the Chilean Congress Archives 
Sonami, “Sonami’s comments to the labor reform initiative”, Document stored at the 
Chilean Congress Archives 
CAT, “Observations on the indications done by the Executive and the Honorable Senate 
on the norms that regulates the working day”, Document stored at the Chilean 
Congress Archives 
CAT, “Proposal to the initiative on labor reforms”, Document stored at the Chilean 
Congress Archives 
CAT, “Proposal on the working day: articles 22 to 40 on the actual code”, Document 
stored at the Chilean Congress Archives 
Economy of Labor Program, “Brief on the indications that substitute the Labor Code”, 
Document stored at the Chilean Congress Archives 
CONFESCOVE, “CONFESCOVE’s opinion on the labor reform initiative sent by the 
Executive to the Parliament”, Document stored at the Chilean Congress Archives 
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CNCS, “Initiative that modifies the Labor Code. Comments”, Document stored at the 
Chilean Congress Archives 
COTIACH, “Chilean workers: history and labor reform”, Document stored at the Chilean 
Congress Archives  
CUT, “CUT’s position on the labor reform initiative”, Document stored at the Chilean 
Congress Archives 
CUT, “CUT’s presentation on the initiative on new hiring forms to the Senate’s Labor 
Commission”, Document stored at the Chilean Congress Archives 
CONUPIA, “CONUPIA’s comments on the labor reform incidence on the actual 
distribution of working days and holidays”, Document stored at the Chilean 
Congress Archives 
 
Uruguay 
Law 18083, Uruguayan Parliament. http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Law 18566, Uruguayan Parliament. http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 44. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 46. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 47. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 48. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 52. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 53. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 55. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 57. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
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House, Hacienda Commission, Act 58. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 60. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 62. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 69. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 70. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 72. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 73. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 74. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 75. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Hacienda Commission, Act 76. Integral modification of the tributary system, Law 
18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1363, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1364, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1365, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1366, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1367, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1376, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
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Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1377, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1378, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1379, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1385, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1390, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1391, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1392, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1393, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1394, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1396, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1404, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1405, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Hacienda Commission, Distributed document 1406, Integral modification of the 
tributary system, Law 18083, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Labor Commission, Act 231. Collective Bargaining System, Law 18566, 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Labor Commission, Act 232. Collective Bargaining System, Law 18566, 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Labor Commission, Act 233. Collective Bargaining System, Law 18566, 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
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House, Labor Commission, Act 234. Collective Bargaining System, Law 18566, 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Labor Commission, Act 235. Collective Bargaining System, Law 18566, 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
House, Labor Commission, Act 236. Collective Bargaining System, Law 18566, 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Labor Commission, Distributed document 3330, Collective Bargaining System, 
Law 18566, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Labor Commission, Distributed document 3331, Collective Bargaining System, 
Law 18566, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
Senate, Labor Commission, Distributed document 3332, Collective Bargaining System, 
Law 18566, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/inicio1024sup.html 
 
Personal Interviews 
Uruguay: 
Isaac Alfie. Colorado Party MP; Former Economy Minister 2003-2004; former member 
of the Senate’s Labor Commission during the discussion of the Labor reform and 
the Hacienda Commission during the Tax reform 
Diego Balestra. President at the Industry Chamber (CIU) 
Julio Baráibar. Frente Amplio Itinerant Ambassador since 2010; former Labor Minister 
and Director at the National Labor Direction (Dinatra), 2005-2009; former private 
sector labor leader 
Alberto Bension. Former Economy Minister, 2000-2002 
Juan Jose Bentancor. Former Frente Amplio MP, 2005-2009; and former labor leader at 
the State owned Oil Company (ANCAP) 
Christian Bolz. President at the Merchants Chamber (CMPP) 
Milton Castellanos. Labor leader; Collective Bargaining Secretary at PIT CNT  
Pablo da Silveira. Associate Professor at Education Department at the Catholic 
University in Uruguay 
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Eduardo de Leon. Academic at various institutions with strong knowledge of the labor 
movement  
Cristina Fernández. Transport firm (CITA) delegated negotiator in Wage Councils, 
transport sector 
Santiago Ferrer. Politician; youth movement leader at the Nacional Party  
Fernando Filgueira. Academic, former Director at the Management and Evaluation of the 
State Division (AGEV) at the Budget and Planning Office (OPP), 2006-2009  
Francisco Gallinal. Nacional Party MP, 2005-2009; former member of the Senate’s Labor 
Commission during the discussion of the Labor reform; responsible for the draft 
of the “peace clause” included in the final initiative 
Diego Gianelli. Econosmit at the Monetary Policy Division at the Uruguayan Central 
Bank (BCU) 
Javier de Haedo. Former Budget and Planning Office (OPP) Director, 1993-1995  
Sergio Lijstenstein. Policy maker liked to Frente Amplio; advisor to the Director in the 
Technological University in Uruguay (UTU) 
Monestier, Felipe. Professor at the Political Science Institute at the Republica University 
Ignacio Otegui. President at the Construction Chamber (CCU) 
Santiago Perez del Castillo. Former Labor Minister, 2003-2004 
Jorge Pozzi. Former labor leader in the beverage sector; Frente Amplio MP since 2010  
Ravela, Pedro. Proffessor at the Education Department at the Catholic University and 
former division director at the Public Education Public Administration (ANEP), 
1995-1999 
Juan Manuel Rodriguez. Academic and National Institute for Employment and 
Professional Training Director (INEFOP) since 2010  
Sotelo, Mariana. Former Government’s negotiator at the Wage Councils (2005-2008) 
Ignacio Zubillaga. Lawyer specialized in Labor law and labor rights 
Cristina Zurbriggen. Associate Professor at the Political Science Institute at the Republica 
University 
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Chile: 
Enrique Accorsi, Socialist Party MP 
Manuel Ahumada. Labor leader; CGT Confederation President 
David Altman. Associate Professor at the Political Science Institute; Catholic University 
in Chile 
Osvaldo Andrade. Former Labor Ministry (2006-2010)  
Sergio Bitar Chacra. PPD MP; Former member of Senate’s Hacienda Commission during 
the Tax reform debate 
Axel Buchheister. Former labor issues expert at Libertad & Desarrollo Think Tank 
Guillermo Campero. Advisor to President Lagos; Member of the so called “Lagos’ 
second floor” 
Rossana Castiglioni. Associate Professor at the Political Science School; Diego Portales 
University  
Rodrigo Castro. Health sector expert at the Libertad & Desarrollo Think Tank 
Andres Concha. Business leader. President at SOFOFA 
Juan Eduardo Coeymans. Associate Professor at the Economic Department; Catholic 
University in Chile 
Rafael Cumsille. Business leader. President at Confedech 
Mireya Dávila. Academic at FLACSO; expert in AUGE program and health sector 
Miguel Angel Duran.  Vicepresident AG Mining Group 
Maria Ester Ferez. Associate Professor at the Central University in Chile; labor expert 
and advisor to the Labor Ministry during Lagos term   
Juan Eduardo García Huidobro. Associate Professor at the Education Department; 
Alberto Hurtado University 
Jaime Gazmuri Mujica. Socialist Party MP and member of Labor Commission during the 
Labor reform  
Rafael Guillisasti. Business leader. President at CPC 
Cristian Infante. Policy maker in the education sector. School director 
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Nestor Jorquera Rodriguez. Labor leader in the mining sector; CONFEMIN President  
Pablo Laso. Lawyer. Labor expert at the Foreign Relations Ministry 
Aldo Lema. Businessman in the Financial Sector; Director at Security Financial Services 
Juan Pablo Luna.  Associate Professor at the Political Science Institute; Catholic 
University in Chile 
Roberto Munita. Political Secretary to the Renocacion Nacional (RN) MP Andres 
Allamand  
Ivan Nuñez. Labor leader (retired). Education sector leader during Allende’s government 
Carlos Ominami Pascual. Socialist Party MP and member of Labor Commission during 
the Labor reform 
Alex Pizzarro. Policy maker in the education sector. School director 
Manuel Riesco. Economist; Advisor to the Communist Party and expert at the Centro de 
Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Alternativo-CENDA Think Tank 
Pilar Romaguera. Associate Professor at the Education Department; Chilean University; 
Education Ministry Undersecretary during Lagos and Bachelet governments 
Francisco Rosende. Associate Professor at the Economic Department; Catholic 
University in Chile 
Claudio Sapelli. Associate Professor at the Economic Department; Catholic University in 
Chile 
Ricardo Solari. Former Labor Minister (2000-2006) 
Viktor Tokman. Academic; Economic advisor to the President of Chile during Lagos and 
Bachelet periods 
Rodrigo Vasquez. Labor leader; Advisor to the CUT President on Parliamentary issues   
Carlos Vergara. Advisor to President Lagos; Member of the so called “Lagos’ second 
floor” 
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